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ABSTRACT
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE TERMS OF TRADE:
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
SEPTEMBER 2010
BILGE ERTEN, B.A., MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor J. Mohan Rao

Despite the voluminous literature on North-South macroeconomic interactions
and the key role of terms of trade variations in growth transmission from one region to
another, a significant research gap persists for two reasons. First, there has been very
little empirical work on testing of the relationships between growth patterns and terms of
trade movements. Second, the empirical studies dedicated to testing the Prebisch-Singer
Thesis (PST) focused on testing the long-run tendency for the terms of trade of primary
commodities to deteriorate and neglected the joint nature of the predictions arising out of
a complete formulation of PST.
This dissertation seeks to properly specify the PST, provide a generalization of it
to the case of imbalanced trade, and extend it to a three-region framework through a
structuralist North-South model. Multiple paths of growth divergence/convergence and
terms of trade deterioration/improvement emerge depending on the structural changes
influencing the income-elasticity differentials. I carry out two sets of empirical analyses.
First, I use aggregate data on North-South terms of trade indices to test the presence and
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significance of a downward trend. Second, I use panel data analysis and rolling
regressions to show the evolution of income-elasticity differentials. The results suggest
that the growth rates of developing countries during the 1980s declined in both absolute
and relative terms partly as a result of the downward trend in terms of trade and partly as
a result of income elasticity differentials reflecting the productive and technological
asymmetries between the developed and developing economies.
However, these structural asymmetries have not remained constant: the results
show that they changed both over time and over cross-sections of different groups of
countries. In general the countries that diversified towards manufactured exports had
better chances of eliminating the elasticity differentials, and thus attaining relatively
higher rates of growth.
The cross-country study is complemented by a comparative case study of Turkey
and Malaysia. The results show that industrial and trade policies, if carefully designed
and effectively implemented, can counter potential costs of external market dynamics
while taking advantage of the opportunities for advancing dynamic comparative
advantages.
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CHAPTER 1
WIDENING UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD

1.1 The Problem
During the 1980s and 1990s, after decades of pursuing state-led development
strategies that emphasized autonomy, most of the developing countries moved to open
their markets in the pursuit of the promise of globalization. Greater integration into the
global markets through trade and investment flows was expected by many mainstream
economists to be a recipe for closing the income gap between the poor and the rich
nations. The more favorable capital-output ratio in the poorer countries meant that the
scarcity of capital in relation to labor and natural resources would yield a higher marginal
productivity, ensuring a rapid catch-up process once the barriers for capital and trade
inflows were eliminated. Moreover, latecomers could use the existing technology ready
made for them by the industrial countries without incurring costs of technological
innovation. Theory of comparative advantages created a prediction that international free
trade is mutually beneficial for all trading partners regardless of their levels of
technological development or the types of commodities they specialize in. Yet the great
majority of developing countries experienced neither a substantial rise in their standards
of living nor a convergence in their per capita income levels to the developed world,
despite the fact that they had opened up their trade and financial systems to the global
market. The most successful developing countries, on the contrary, tended to be rather
cautious in pursuing trade and financial reforms. My dissertation investigates the
economic and political dynamics behind the failure of integrationist strategies to generate
global income convergence, and explores its implications for the future development
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policies. To these ends, I investigate the process of global growth divergence, the trends
in the North-South terms of trade as an indicator of distribution of gains from
international trade, and the role of the developmental state in encountering the external
constraints to growth with a comparative case study of Turkey and Malaysia.

1.2 The Setting
Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas (2000) has predicted that the diffusion of
technology will enable income distribution across nations to narrow and make everyone
“equally rich and growing” by the year 2100. While it will take nine more decades to see
if Lucas’ previsions come true, the trend is essentially in the opposite direction with
unprecedented widening of income inequality among countries driven substantially by
the poor economic performance of the countries at the bottom end. The broad pattern is
one of divergence not only between advanced and developing countries, but also between
the leading exporters of manufactured goods among developing countries and the rest of
the developing countries that remain commodity-dependent and experience growth
collapses.
From a long-run historical viewpoint, convergence between the earlier
industrialized regions of the world around 1820—Western Europe and its Western
offshoots (the United States, Australia and New Zealand)—and the rest of the world has
never happened. The relatively more advanced regions of the world in 1820 continued to
grow faster in terms of per capita income throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. There is a broad consensus in the economic history literature that today’s
massive income inequality across countries is the outcome of the “great divergence” in
national incomes that began in the late eighteenth century, and that the present inequality
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is either the legacy of Western industrialism or Western colonial imperialism, or both
(Arrighi et al. 2005).
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the persisting income inequalities
across countries had not widened much due to the broad-based economic growth of the
golden-age of capitalism that tended to include most developing countries. This trend was
reversed during the 1980s and 1990s as the international inequality increased sharply
between developed countries and all developing country regions, except for East and
South East Asia. This polarization in world income distribution has been argued to take
the form of “twin-peaks” (Quah 1996) with the disappearance of “middle class” countries
(Milanovic 2005) from the overall pattern. The only promising aspect in global income
distribution has been that the fast-growth of China led to a decline in overall international
inequality after 1980. However, the exclusion of China results in a large rise in world
inequality from 0.48 to 0.57 measured with Theil decomposition since the year 1980
(Ocampo and Vos 2008: 16).
The generalized downturn in the growth of the developing world in the 1980s has
partly been an outcome of major external shocks: the sharp rise in real interest rates,
which distressed many developing countries disproportionately, and a steep and
prolonged decline in the terms of trade of non-oil exporting developing countries. This
decline was, in part, an outcome of the rising cost of borrowing and the resulting debt
crisis, all of which created an “export desperation” (Sarkar 1994) to increase foreign
exchange earnings.
The impacts of these shocks on developing countries differed according to the
differences in regional dynamics and in the economic policy designs. While Malaysia
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was largely insulated from these adverse trends in the global developments thanks to the
FDI inflows from other Asian economies that were experiencing rising costs, other
developing countries were not as fortunate. Turkey, for instance, experienced a major
debt crisis during the late 1970s and had hardly any choice in adapting austerity measures
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1980. The comparison of Malaysia and
Turkey provides an ideal study of the role of state policies in affecting development
outcomes. Although Malaysia had only half of the per capita income relative to Turkey in
1960, its sustained economic growth over the last five decades allowed it to achieve a
higher income level in PPP-terms. The selective development strategies coupled with
electronics boom in global markets allowed Malaysia to shift its technological base from
natural resource-based to high-technology manufactured exports. In contrast, the
generalized and non-selective nature of industrial policies in Turkey in addition to the
less favorable external conditions produced a much less significant structural change.

1.3 The Hypothesis
Throughout the process of writing this dissertation, my central working
hypothesis has been that patterns of international specialization and the path-dependency
associated with these patterns perpetuate the specialization of developing countries in the
production of commodities with lower technological content (relative to those produced
by developed countries), and thereby, result in widening uneven development between
developed and developing countries. One could expect that these productive patterns
should have changed in response to the price signals from global markets. After all, the
North-South terms of trade have deteriorated substantially, especially after the mid1970s. However, in the context of the existing barriers to acquire new production
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techniques and to human capital formation coupled with adverse external conditions, this
price signal remained for the majority of the South ineffective. In fact, it was those
countries in the developing world taking “relative prices wrong” and pursuing all kinds of
selective price adjustments, subsidies, and promotions that could effectively realize
dynamic comparative advantages and sustained growth rates. I split this hypothesis into
two different hypotheses:
(i) The global demand for the goods produced by developing countries grows at a
slower pace relative to that for the developed country exports, implying a lower incomeelasticity of demand for the developing countries’ exports. The differential in income
elasticities, in turn, gives rise to a joint hypothesis widely-known as the Prebisch-Singer
Thesis (PST): either the relative prices of tradables from developing countries deteriorate
over time, or the developing countries have to grow at a slower pace. PST holds under the
assumption of trade balance, the relaxation of which results in a generalized PST.
Accordingly, the sustained capital inflows over long periods of time render the
predictions of PST less likely.
(ii) My second hypothesis is that effectively implemented trade and industrial
policies at the national level can help counter the adverse effects while taking advantage
of the positive effects of external economic relations. A continuous effort to acquire
technological capabilities and skills is necessary to move up the technology ladder and
thereby reduce the income-elasticity differentials that tend to constrain growth especially
when the relative price adjustments are slow.

5

1.4 The Methodology
I pursue a combination of history of economic thought, theoretical modeling,
empirical investigation, and analytical comparative analysis in this dissertation. First, I
begin with a history of economic thought on growth and development in trade models,
tracing the analytical differences between static and dynamic conceptions of gains from
trade. This allows me to distinguish between the doctrine of comparative advantages and
the structuralist approach to the interaction between trade and development, and
reconsider the arguments of “unequal exchange” and “immiserizing growth” from this
point of departure. Based on these conceptions, I critically review the modeling literature
on North-South macro-interactions, paying special attention to the region that acts as the
engine of growth in the world economy, the dynamics that result in the production of
uneven development, and the role of the terms-of-trade in transmitting the
macroeconomic ramifications from one region to another.
Second, I employ time-series econometric techniques to test for whether the data
generating process underlying the North-South terms of trade is trend-stationary, and to
measure the long-run trend rate. I conduct a disaggregated analysis for different
developing country groups’ terms-of-trade indices after combining indices from a number
of UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. These different groups include non-oil exporters,
which are composed of major exporters of manufactured goods and the remaining
developing countries. The latter is then geographically grouped under developing
countries in America, Africa, West Asia, and other Asia. I have also examined two
additional groups: the least developed countries (LDCs), and the highly indebted
countries (HICs) terms of trade. This empirical examination differs from most of the
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literature by its focus on “country” terms of trade instead of “commodity” terms of trade,
and thus effectively illustrating the impact of the specialization pattern on the trends in
terms of trade. It is also a proper index of measuring the degree of unequal exchange
between developing and developed countries from a dynamic point of view. Moreover, I
conduct tests of structural change—both exogenous and endogenous—to identify the
break points in data, and to estimate the rates of trend improvement/deterioration in preand post-break periods. Finally, I estimate a dummy variable model to measure the
impact of different variables on the occurrence of the structural break at this specific
point in time.
Third, I use theoretical modeling techniques to present my analytical arguments in
a clear and consistent fashion. Beginning with a simple formulation of PST, I extend this
model by relaxing the assumption of balanced trade. However, it needs to be stressed that
the trade balance is a binding constraint for the majority of developing countries that
experience high levels of real interest rates to maintain capital inflows that tend to be
very speculative and de-stabilizing for these economies. Running large current account
deficits as a share of GDP is thus not a sustainable option for developing countries that
need low-interest rates for higher levels of investment in the real economy and less
financial speculation for the same reasons. In the next step, I use a structuralist NorthSouth model that is consistent with the PST and can illustrate several key points: (a) the
income-elasticities of exports are a positive function of the relative levels of
manufacturing GDP and the level of technological content of the manufactured exports;
(b) a policy variable can influence the long-run outcome significantly through its impact
on the growth of the manufacturing sector as a share of total GDP; (c) a process of
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‘Kaldorian traverse’ as a cumulative causation process between industrialization and
economic growth might allow a ‘high-quality’ catching-up for the countries that combine
selective industrial policies with technological upgrading and productivity improvements;
(d) a failed industrialization attempt and ‘market-friendly’ forms of structural reforms can
also be illustrated as a process of lagging behind where the elasticity differentials persist
in the long-run. I extend the model to demonstrate forces of interaction between the fastgrowing and industrializing countries and the rest of developing countries that might lead
to a fallacy of composition effect. In particular, I focus on the tendency for the former to
crowd-out the latter both through supply-side and demand-side channels that sustain the
widening of North-South divergence in the context of an increasing catching-up of a
relatively small portion within the South.
Fourth, I employ a variety of estimation techniques to investigate the extent of
income elasticity differentials for a sample of 51 developing countries over the period
1960 to 2006. These include the dynamic fixed effects model, the GMM, and the
dynamic OLS (or DOLS) model. In the latter estimation, Pedroni cointegration tests are
used to test for the presence of cointegration, and panel data unit root tests are used
initially to test for the presence of a unit root in the variables included to the model. I run
the regressions separately for the major exporters of manufactures and the remaining
developing countries to illustrate the differences in closing the gaps in incomeelasticities. Furthermore, I estimate the elasticities for different time-periods to illustrate
the changes in elasticity differentials over time.
Fifth, I provide a historical overview of different phases of industrial policies
pursued in Turkey and Malaysia, and their impact on patterns of specialization, structural
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change, and technological composition of manufactured exports. This structural
comparative analysis is complemented with an empirical investigation of the impact of
trade liberalization on price and income elasticities of exports and imports. The
estimation techniques used in this part follows the methodology of the previous section.
Overall, I reject the typical neoclassical assumptions in textbooks that the income
elasticities in trade functions are uniform, and that the balance of payments constraint is
an irrelevant factor in determining long-run paths of growth.

1.5 The Contribution
I study the trends and structural breaks in North-South terms of trade over the
period 1960-2006. I then study the implications of the joint hypothesis resulting from
PST, and test the structuralist assumption of asymmetric income-elasticities. To get a
more detailed perspective at the national level, I study the role of the developmental state
in the comparative case study of Turkey and Malaysia.
First, this dissertation contributes to the controversial literature on terms of trade
movements in general and on North-South terms of trade in particular. It shifts the focus
from commodity to country terms of trade by demonstrating the increasing relevance of
the latter in the context of the increasing dominance of manufactured goods in the export
composition of developing countries. The finding of trend deterioration for the major
exporters of manufactures supports the widely-accepted view that manufactured goods
are not immune to falling prices (UNCTAD 2005, Kaplinsky 2006). This supports the
findings on manufacture-manufacture terms-of-trade as well. It also contributes to the
literature on the LDCs and HICs by illustrating that these countries suffered from adverse
terms-of-trade movements the most—which might partly account for their low rates of
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growth and high rates of debt accumulation respectively. The finding of trend-stationarity
of the data generating process of the terms of trade indices supports the view that the
inferences based on trend coefficients are valid.
Second, by analyzing the PST as a joint hypothesis that predicts terms of trade
deterioration in the steady-state and growth divergence when the terms of trade remain
constant, this dissertation makes interventions on the interpretation of the PST and its
empirical testing. PST has been misinterpreted and misapplied even by serious students
of the hypothesis that have largely neglected its joint nature and argued for a secular
tendency for the terms of trade to decline independent of the growth rates and/or
productivity changes.
Third, this dissertation makes a contribution to the literature on structuralist
tendencies for the reproduction of uneven development. It provides a statistical analysis
of the magnitude of the income-elasticity differential, and how it changes between
different types of developing countries according to their patterns of specialization, and
how it changes over time for each group of developing countries given the extent of their
dynamic gains from trade.
Fourth, by analyzing the relation between industrial policies and economic
performance in external markets for Turkey and Malaysia, this dissertation contributes to
the policy debates in economic development literature, particularly to the relationship
between industrial policy, technological development, and export performance. It tests
the differential impact of trade liberalization on the income elasticities of exports and
imports, and provides some explanation about the differences in trade deficit outcomes in
Turkey and Malaysia.
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1.6 Conclusions of the Dissertation
The theoretical review of the literature on North-South interactions gives insights
into the main channels of growth transmission from more to less advanced regions, and
the mechanisms of adjustment to growth cycles in the world economy. From this
perspective, the terms of trade movements between the North and the South are of crucial
importance. An empirical investigation of North-South terms of trade trends shows that
the terms of trade have turned against the South (excluding oil exporters), especially
since the late 1970s and increasingly in the 1980s. A host of factors were responsible in
the emergence of this adverse trend, including the slowdown of the engine of growth in
the North, the “export desperation” resulting from the debt crisis, and the increasing
openness of developing countries after the 1980s.
As noted in the hypotheses, and as established through empirical analysis, this
dissertation examines the evolution of terms of trade in relationship to the evolution of
income-elasticity differentials, relative growth rates of national income, and growth rates
of trade imbalances. First, despite the conventional predictions that increased integration
to global markets through rising trade flows would increase the rates at which developing
countries grow and catch-up, the growth rates of developing countries during the 1980s
declined in both absolute and relative terms partly as a result of the downward trend in
terms of trade and partly as a result of income elasticity differentials reflecting the
productive and technological asymmetries between the developed and developing
economies. Second, these asymmetries are not constant: they change both over time and
over cross-sections of different groups of countries. In particular, the countries
specialized in the production of manufactured exports have succeeded in eliminating the
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elasticity differentials, and thus attaining relatively higher rates of growth. Patterns of
international specialization are, therefore, an important determinant of long-run outcomes
of growth divergence and terms of trade movements. Third, the strategies that have
worked for a group of successful developing countries may not work for the South as a
whole. In particular, efforts undertaken by individual developing countries to improve
their competitive export capacity by devaluation or by specializing in income-inelastic
exports may be frustrated through a deterioration in the terms of trade if it takes place
simultaneously in several countries, i.e. the fallacy of composition effects. Fourth, a
comparative case-study of Turkey and Malaysia shows that industrial and trade policies,
if carefully designed and effectively implemented, can counter these costs from external
market dynamics and take advantage of the opportunities for advancing dynamic
comparative advantages through shifting towards the production of manufactures with
greater technological content and scope of increasing returns.

1.7 Plan of the Dissertation
The remaining part of the dissertation is further divided into five chapters, i.e.
chapters 2-6. Chapter 2 presents theoretical literature review on growth and development
in trade theories and North-South models of trade and growth interactions. Chapter 3
presents an empirical analysis of the trends in North-South terms of trade. Chapter 4
provides a theoretical exposition of PST and an empirical analysis of its joint predictions
on terms of trade movements and patterns of growth divergence based on panel data
composed of 51 developing countries from 1960 to 2006. Chapter 5 presents the casestudy of Turkey and Malaysia as a comparative historical analysis of the role of state
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policies in their industrialization. Chapter 6 presents the conclusions and policy
implications of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT AND THE
TERMS OF TRADE
2.1 Growth and Development in Trade Models
2.1.1 Theory of Comparative Advantage
The theory of comparative advantage, which was first introduced by David
Ricardo and later widely embraced by classical and neoclassical theorists of trade, is the
basis of the notion of static gains from trade. Suppose that there are two countries A and
B both with capability to produce commodities X and Y. The basic proposition of
classical trade theory is that if country A has comparative advantage in producing
commodity X, and country B has comparative advantage in producing commodity Y, it
will be mutually beneficial for country A to specialize in the production of X and for
country B to specialize in the production of Y, and for outputs of X and Y in excess of
domestic needs to be traded freely, and the international relative price ratio will lie
between the autarchic domestic relative prices in the two countries. The concept of
comparative advantage is represented by the relative opportunity-costs, measured by the
marginal rate of transformation between one commodity and another. Assuming perfect
competition, the domestic price ratio between two commodities will be equal to the
marginal rate of transformation. If this were not the case, there would be an incentive for
the producers to switch their production from one commodity to another in order to take
advantage of the relatively favorable price ratio. Hence, the change in the relative prices
induced by free trade would lead to a reallocation of resources along the lines of
comparative advantage.
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Similar to most micro-welfare theories, the comparative advantage theory is a
static one based on restrictive, and often unrealistic, assumptions. It is blind to the
conflict between short-run allocative efficiency and long run growth. The key
assumptions of the theory include the existence of full employment in each trading
country—in the absence of which there would be no opportunity cost involved in
increasing the production of commodities; the prices of resources and goods are assumed
to reflect their opportunity cost; the perfect competition is assumed to exist; and the
factor endowments are presumed to be given and unchangeable. In short, the theory of
comparative advantage takes into account neither the potential negative effects of terms
of trade changes in the presence of low price elasticities of demand nor the dynamic
feedback effects which trade itself might have on comparative advantage.
In the context of developing countries, which are concerned with long-run
development, prioritizing short-term efficiency as suggested by the comparative
advantage doctrine is unreasonable. It has been argued by several development
economists that the efficiency gains from free trade are unlikely to offset the tendency in
a free market for the position of developing countries to deteriorate with respect to the
developed countries. In short, free trade creates a disadvantageous position for the
developing countries mainly due to the nature of the commodities that these countries
produce and trade. Under these circumstances there is a case for protection, since a
change in the structure of production and exports of developing countries requires
policies of infant-industry protection.
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2.1.2 Structural Approaches to Terms of Trade
Raúl Prebisch (1950) and Hans Singer (1950) were among the first development
economists to question the mutually beneficial gains from international division of labor
based on comparative advantage. Their structuralist view of international trade enabled
them to examine the relationship between trade and development from the standpoint of
the balance of payments rather than just real resources. Their central argument was that
the unfavorable impact of free trade on the terms of trade and balance of payments of
developing countries far outweighs any advantages resulting from a more efficient
allocation of resources. In other words, focusing on maintaining an efficient allocation of
factors in production is very unlikely to produce the desired outcome of long-term growth
in developing countries.
The original formulation of the Prebisch-Singer argument was composed of two
different but complementary hypotheses. One of these hypotheses was concerned with
the impact of varying income-elasticity of demand for commodities on the terms of trade
of the developing countries, while the other complementary hypothesis was based on the
asymmetries in the labor and product markets of the centre and the periphery in the
world-economy. These hypotheses conceptually differ from one another because in the
former case, the downward pressure on relative commodity prices results from the
changes in the goods market (and directly leads to a deterioration in the barter terms of
trade); in the latter case, the pressure results from changes in the factor markets (with a
direct effect on factoral terms of trade) with further possible impacts on product prices.
The deterioration in the factoral terms of trade, in the latter case, affects the barter terms
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of trade only indirectly, through the changes in relative production costs and in producer
markups.
In a seminal article, Prebisch (1951) formulated the first hypothesis based on the
fact that the relative size of the primary sector tended to decline with economic growth.
This tendency, Prebisch explains, is an outcome of the low income elasticity of demand
for unprocessed agricultural goods, the replacement of raw materials by synthetic
substances, and the rising efficiency of production in primary products. According to
Prebisch, the tendency for the primary sector to contract has very important implications
at the world level since, for historical reasons, industrialization was concentrated in the
center countries, creating an international division of labor in which the periphery
supplies raw materials to the center. Under these circumstances, changes in productive
structure generate a systematic bias against the developing countries. In particular, two
predictions follow: either the developing countries will grow more slowly or the relative
abundance of the commodities which they produce will tend to reduce the relative
international prices of those commodities. These predictions will be developed
analytically in chapter four.
The second hypothesis was introduced by both Prebisch and Singer to explain
why the fruits of technological progress are unequally distributed between the centre and
the periphery. According to this hypothesis, in the case of productivity improvements in
manufacturing, the benefits are distributed to the producers in the form of higher income,
while in the case of primary commodities, they are reflected in lower prices. Whereas the
center countries are able to retain improvements in productivity through higher wages,
those of the periphery are compelled to “export” technological changes in their export
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sectors through a deterioration in the factorial terms of trade, i.e. relative prices adjusted
for productivity. This asymmetric result is a combination of the functioning of both the
goods markets—monopolistic price setting in markets of manufactures—and the labor
markets—greater organization of industrial workers. These divergences in institutional
setting are further aggravated when the international division of labor is taken into
consideration. As Prebisch emphasized, the weaker demand for primary commodities
leads to a displacement of the workers out of this sector. Yet the displaced workers are
not easily employed in other expanding sectors (thus the assumption of full employment
is not fulfilled) due to the problems of late industrialization and the restrictions on the
migration of workers to the industrialized center. As a result, a surplus of labor is
generated in the developing countries, which lowers the relative wages of the developingcountry workers and leads to a deterioration of the developing countries’ terms of trade.
If the exports of the developing countries are price inelastic, the income terms of trade –
that is, receipts from exports relative to imports – will also fall, widening the income gap
between the advanced and developing countries.
The emphasis on excess supplies of labor, which as we mentioned was crucial in
Prebisch’s analysis, gained further attention with the seminal works W. Arthur Lewis
(1954) and Arghiri Emmanuel (1972), who likewise examined effects of wage
differentials on terms of trade. Let us now examine the effect of incomplete specialization
introduced by Lewis on terms of trade and leave Emmanuel’s study of ‘unequal
exchange’ to the next section.
Lewis employed a Ricardian model in a two region world with complete
specialization. One region, call it the North, produces food and steel while the other
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region, the South, produces food and coffee. Outputs of commodities are fixed
proportions of the labor inputs required to produce them. The terms of trade between the
North and South are given by the rate of exchange between steel and coffee, which
depends on the technical coefficients of production in the North and South due to the
assumptions of linear transformation curves and tradability of all three goods. In other
words, the relative price of steel and coffee is predominantly supply-determined since the
wage rates in the tradable sector of both regions depend on productivity in the food sector
in both countries. Thus, the changes in growth rates of labor productivity in each sector
relative to the other determine the direction of change in the terms of trade. Lewis (1969)
introduces the stylized facts about these changes by stating that productivity growth is
greater in food than in steel in the North, whereas it is greater in coffee than in food in the
South. As a result, a unit of food is worth increasingly more coffee in the South while it is
worth increasingly less steel in the North. This implies that a unit of coffee exported by
the South is worth less and less steel over time, which is to say that the terms of trade of
the South vis-à-vis the North has a secular tendency to deteriorate over time.
An improvement in productivity of coffee or steel production reduces the relative
price of coffee or steel in the same proportion as long as the productivities in the food
sectors stay the same. Consequently, the full benefit of the productivity improvement in
steel or coffee is passed on to the importing country through cheaper imported goods.
The exporting party benefits only to the extent that coffee or steel is consumed at home.
If domestic consumption of the export commodity is negligible and the whole purpose of
production is to sell abroad, technical progress in the export sector does not provide any
significant benefits as the purchasing power in terms of imports does not change. Thus, it
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might be more desirable for the South to promote technological change in the food sector
in order to raise real incomes directly and prevent the decline in its terms of trade
(Findlay 1984: 192). It is important to recognize that this implies turning away from
international trade based on ‘comparative advantage’ to focus on a more domestically
oriented development strategy.

2.1.3 Theory of Unequal Exchange
The theory of unequal exchange developed by Emmanuel (1972) is based on two
assumptions: (a) capital is mobile across national borders, which creates a tendency for
the rates of profit to equalize internationally; and (b) the real wage rates are exogenously
determined through differences in institutional structures, i.e. labor unionization, state
policies, etc. Following Findlay (1984), we will briefly explain Emmanuel’s conception
of unequal exchange using the model developed by Bacha (1978).1 Suppose that there is
complete specialization where the North produces steel and the South produces coffee,
with qN the output of steel per unit of labor in the North, qS the output of coffee per unit of
labor in the South, wN and wS the real wages in North and South respectively, both fixed
in terms of steel, p the relative price of coffee in terms of steel, and r the common rate of
profit. The rate of profit is given by:
r=

qN − wN
pq S − w S
=
wN
wS

(2.1)

which allows us to express the terms of trade of the South vis-à-vis the North in terms of
real wages and productivities:

1

For a very interesting contemporary approach to unequal exchange in global manufacturing
markets, see Heintz (2003).
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wS q N
p= N S
w q

(2.2)

According to Emmanuel, exchange is equal when the double factoral terms of
trade equals to one. In other words, equal exchange results from equality of the amount of
foreign labor embodied in imports to the amount of domestic labor embodied in exports.
To see this, let us write the double factoral terms of trade, f, as follows:

f =

pq S w S
= N
qN
w

(2.3)

Note that f is equal to unity if and only if wS = wN. Emmanuel argues that, due to
institutional reasons, the real wages are lower in the South, wS < wN and therefore, f < 1.
Thus unequal exchange, biased against the South, is a situation in which the commodities
worth a day’s labor in the South are exchanged for commodities worth less than a day’s
labor in the North. In his own words, “inequality of wages as such, all other things being
equal, is alone the cause of unequal exchange” (Emmanuel1972).

2.1.4 Immiserizing Growth
The growth of a country that is experiencing technological progress and/or factor
accumulation might increase the supply of its exports and its demand imports
simultaneously. This would lead to a deterioration in its terms of trade unless the rest of
the world grows at the same pace or faster. If the deterioration in the terms of trade
generates a loss of real income greater than the increase in real income due to growth
itself, the country will actually be made worse off –immiserized– by growth. Hence, the
concept of “immiserizing growth” refers to a situation in which the growth of an
economy results in a significant worsening in its terms of trade which leaves the economy
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with a net loss of real income in post-growth period. Figure 2.1 depicts a case of
immiserizing growth. As the production possibilities curve moves outward, the point of
production moves from E to E’. Yet, the shift in terms of trade line from CE to C’E’
lowers the social welfare as indicated from the downward movement from C to C’.
Bhagwati (1958) argued that a country is more likely to experience immiserizing
growth if it is large enough to have monopoly power in international markets, which
enables it to influence international relative prices substantially. In contrast, in the case of
a small country, the changes in a single country’s export supply and import demand due
to economic growth will not lead to any significant change the world price ratio. Only
when the single country is one of the only producers of the export commodity (or buyers
of the import commodity), would the change in its export supply affect the price of the
commodity. For countries with monopoly power in international markets, Bhagwati
recommended an optimal trade policy that would counteract the deterioration in the terms
of trade. This could involve imposing an import tariff or export tax. Note also that
another implication of Bhagwati’s analysis of immiserizing growth is that countries with
no monopoly power cannot, by definition, experience immiserizing growth. Therefore,
the optimal trade policy for them is to get rid of all protective measures and pursue free
trade.
The case of small-country experiencing ‘immiserizing growth’ was developed by
Johnson (1967), complementary to Bhagwati’s original thesis. In the figure below, we see
that a small economy placed a production subsidy on commodity Y (or a production tax
on commodity X) and thereby increased the relative prices above the marginal rate of
transformation. As the biased growth takes place towards the production of good Y, the
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increased degree of distortion makes the country worse off at a lower level of social
welfare (indicated by the movement from C0 to C1). Thus, Johnson concludes that the
optimum policy is the removal of production taxes and opening up to free trade if the
country is small enough not to be able to influence world prices. In the formulations of
Bhagwati and Johnson, the analysis of immiserizing growth provides a basis for the
neoclassical critique of market interventions underlying industrial policies.
The weak points of Bhagwati’s argument fall into two categories: (a) whether
having monopoly power in world markets is a necessary condition for terms of trade
deterioration as a result of economic growth; (b) whether the only basis for implementing
optimal trade policies is the existence of monopoly power. The first point requires both
historical and theoretical examination. Historically, during the post-war period, the
countries which saw their terms of trade fall were not the ones that had monopoly power
such as the United States. Instead, the relative prices of export commodities (such as food
and raw materials) from the Latin American countries deteriorated sharply. International
food or raw material markets were, however, far from being monopolistic. Several
producers from each country were in harsh competition with each other. Yet competition
did not rescue them from being immiserized. Their terms of trade worsened not as a
result of having monopoly power but rather due to the fact that additional per capita
incomes were being spent on more sophisticated commodities such as manufactures.
Thus, as theoretically demonstrated by Prebisch and Singer, low income-elasticities of
primary products can become a mechanism for terms of trade deterioration, regardless of
whether the growing country has monopoly power or not.
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The second weak part of the argument is concerned with the reasons for
implementing a trade policy other than free trade. Bhagwati argues that this is only
justified when the trading country has monopoly power in the world markets.2 Note that,
in Bhagwati’s world, there is no difference between exporting computer chips or potato
chips. His theory (and of course neoclassical theory in general) is totally indifferent to the
different types of commodities that a country specializes in. As long as it has comparative
advantage in its export commodity, both of the trading partners—and the world as a
whole—gains. If we imagine a situation in which rising incomes are increasingly spent
on computer chips and proportionately less on potato chips, the resulting worsening in
terms of trade for the potato chips-exporting country would be another basis for
protection. Indeed, this was the line taken by Prebisch and other structuralist development
economists. The case for protection of manufactured goods produced by developing
countries is greater, when the demand for existing primary products is expected to grow
less and their price elasticity is low. The case is even stronger when the internal elasticity
of demand for manufactures from the outside world is high and the likelihood of
retaliation by other countries is low.

2.2 Uneven Development in the Context of North-South Models
The literature on uneven development in the context of North-South models is an
application of the growth models developed in the 1950s and 1960s for the analysis of
international trade. It is similar to the structuralist analysis of uneven development in the

2

Another way to think of Bhagwati’s argument is to take the whole South as a region having
monopoly power over its export and/or import markets. In that case, due to its monopoly power,
Bhagwati would recommend the South to pursue an optimal trade policy that would counteract
the deterioration in its terms of trade.
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sense that the structural differences between the central and peripheral countries are
central to the construction of the North-South models.
Dutt (1990) devotes a chapter in his book Growth, Distribution, and Uneven

Development to classifying different types of North-South models based on the different
types of closures assumed for each region in the dynamics of growth and distribution. For
example, Findlay’s model fits into the category of Neoclassical North with a Lewisian (or
Neo-Marxian) South. In this category, Dutt also introduces his own model of uneven
development which assumes, similar to Findlay (1980, 1981) full employment growth in
the North at a given rate, and a fixed real wage in the South. The differences between
Dutt’s and Findlay’s models come from the fact that the latter assumes factor substitution
while the former assumes fixed coefficients; and the former has two social classes,
workers and capitalists, who have different propensities to save, whereas the latter does
not distinguish between different classes in the North and assumes the same saving
behavior by all Northerners (Dutt 1990: 163).
While there is no need to compare and contrast every single North-South uneven
development model, it is nevertheless important to know the main lines of distinctions.
Table 2.1 provides a list of these models according to the types of closures assumed to
characterize the North and the South. In closures having a neoclassical, neo-Keynesian,
or Kaleckian North (irrespective of the closure type in the South), the growth rate of the
South is driven by the growth rate of the North, i.e. North is the engine of growth that
drives the whole system. Only in models with a Lewisian North, is the growth rate of
North constrained by the South’s growth. However, assuming that the North has
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unlimited supplies of labor is a somewhat unrealistic assumption since labor is often the
scarce factor of production in the North.

2.2.1 The Solow-Lewis Model
Findlay (1980, 1981) employed a neoclassical model of growth in the North
linked to a Lewis-type model with unlimited supplies of labor and consequently a fixed
real wage in the South.3 In both regions production functions are assumed to be
neoclassical with constant returns to scale in the two outputs. In addition, Findlay
assumes complete specialization where the North produces and exports only
manufactures while the South produces and exports only primary products. Manufactures
are used for both consumption and investment while the primary products are used only
for consumption.4 There is full employment in the North, whose growth rate is
determined by the growth of the labor force and the rate of Harrod-neutral technical
change.
In contrast, the growth rate of the South is not limited by the labor force due to the
abundant reserves of unemployed or underemployed workers in the subsistence sector.
Instead, it is constrained by the rate of capital accumulation which depends on rate of
profit and saving in primary sector. Yet the only means by which the South can obtain the
necessary capital goods is through imports from the North (which is the only producer of
3

Findlay described his own work as providing a framework within which the arguments of
Prebisch and Singer could be assessed. Ever since the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, Findlay argued
that “the movement of terms of trade between these regions [the North and the South] has been
regarded as a key index of the distribution of benefits from the international division of labor and
the development prospects for the South” (1980: 1).
4

These last two assumptions are also retained in models with Keynesian/Kaleckian-type North
combined with a Lewisian South, such as Taylor (1983), Dutt (1990).
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manufactured investment goods). As a result, the terms of trade play an extremely
important role in affecting the rate at which the South can acquire capital goods and
sustain its capital accumulation and growth. Since Findlay assumes unitary income
elasticities of demand for both manufactures and primary commodities, the growth rate of
the South equals to the growth rate of the North in the long run. The long run adjustment
mechanism works through the movements in the terms of trade, which adjusts the
Southern rate of growth to the exogenously given growth rate of the North.
Findlay (1980, 1981) also shows that there is not much that the South can do to
increase its growth rate since a rise in its saving rate or productivity has only the effect of
turning the terms of trade against it. On the other hand, increases in the Northern saving
rate or productivity also leaves the Northern growth rate unchanged and therefore does
not change the growth rate of the South. The only mechanism that can lead to economic
growth in the South is an increase in the exogenous growth rate of the North.

2.2.2 The Kalecki-Lewis Model
In contrast to the exogenously determined growth rate in models with neoclassical
closure for the North, the Keynesian closure for the North assumes that the firms, facing
an uncertain future, have a desired accumulation function, which makes their investment
depend positively on the profit rate as seen from Table 2.1. The position of the function
depends on the expectations of firms about the future state of the economy, representing
what Keynes referred to as animal spirits. This implies that either Northern investment or
saving rate must be set equal to Southern rate of investment, and then, in turn, the South’s
saving rate must adapt to the North’s growth rate through adjustment in the terms of trade
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(Darity, 1990: 819). The major difference of the Kalecki-Steindl closure for the North
from the Keynesian one is that the former assumes that the firms’ desired accumulation is
not only a function of the profit rate but also the output-capital ratio, i.e. capacity
utilization. Similar to the Keynesian North, the South follows a dependent growth path
which is conditioned by the speed of development in the North. This condition holds
whether the South has a Lewisian structure or a Kaleckian one as seen from Table 2.1.
It is important to note that Northern economic growth—in both Neoclassical
North- and Keynesian North- Lewisian South models—is determined by its own
macroeconomic dynamics, without being conditioned by its terms of trade or Southern
dynamics. The North is, therefore, the major force that drives the world economy, to
which the developing economies adjust. The terms of trade, on the other hand, is
precisely the mechanism through which the economic growth of the developed
economies is transmitted to the rest of the world. Hence, when the engine of growth
speeds up, the Southern terms of trade improve to let the capitalists in the South
accumulate at a higher rate. In contrast, when the engine slows down, this is reflected by
a worsening in terms of trade of the South, and therefore, a contraction in its growth.
In the long run, the fundamental determinant of the terms of trade of the South is,
therefore, the growth rate of the North: the exogenously given growth rate of the labor
force in the case of a neoclassical Northern economy, or the desired accumulation
function in the case of a Keynesian-type Northern economy.
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2.2.3 The Lewis-Lewis Model
Kaldor (1976, 1979) observed that the assumption of unlimited supplies of labor
for the export sector of the South in Lewis’s model implicitly includes the assumption
that the supplies of land and/or natural resources were also unlimited in the South. In case
of limited supply of land and/or natural resources, Kaldor argued that the central
conclusions of Lewis’s model (or any model a Lewisian South) would no longer hold.
When the North starts to grow faster and as a result increases its import demand from the
South, the constraints on land/natural resources in the South would lead to rising primary
commodity prices, which would turn the terms of trade against the North. As a result, the
terms of trade becomes a policy problem for the North in the Kaldorian model.
Formalizing Kaldor’s model, Molana and Vines (1989) show that the low price elasticity
of agricultural goods could be a source of cycles in the terms of trade, which as Kaldor
maintained, “tends to set up perverse cycles in world industrial activity” (1989: 452).
According to Kaldor (1976), trade relations in the international context generate a
deflationary bias. This is because the fall in the prices of primary goods, in the case of a
surplus in primary production, reduces the purchasing power of the primary-goodsexporting countries which is a demand constraint on the advanced countries’ output. On
the other hand, a shortage of primary products leads to an increase in their prices, which
puts upward pressure on money wages. As a result, inflation increases and governments
pass anti-inflationary policies which have contractionary impacts on output and
employment in the world-economy. As a policy suggestion, Kaldor proposed a focus on
price stabilization policies since the unpredictable changes in terms of trade could be a
major obstacle for growth of industrial activity in the North.
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2.2.4 North-South Models of Technological Gaps
Formalizing the seminal contributions of Gerschenkron and Abramovitz, the new
generation of technology gap models such as Fagerberg (1988, 1994) and Verspagen
(1993) sought to explain growth rate differentials based on the ways in which technology
gets created, disseminated, and becomes general knowledge. From this perspective, the
creation and spread of technical knowledge as captured by Schumpeter’s metaphor of
‘creative destruction’ in capitalism is the major determinant of the differences in growth
rates. According to Fagerberg and Verspagern, the ability to acquire technical knowledge
depends on the initial state of economic and institutional structures. The process of
absorbing technological spillovers from abroad and the adoption of new production
processes become important determinants of the speed at which developing countries
close the technology gap with the developed world. Other contributors to the technologygap models, such as Targetti and Foti (1997), Castellacci (2002), and Leon-Ledesma
(2002) developed export-led post-Keynesian models where the linkages between
manufacturing growth and productivity reinforce each other through Kaldor-Verdoon
law. Multiple dynamic paths emerging from these models suggest that there is no a priori
condition for divergence from or convergence to the advanced countries. Depending on
the progress of accumulation of technological knowledge, both diverging and converging
dynamics may occur. Botta (2009) also follows this line of technology-gap models,
paying explicit attention to the ways in which changing productive structures affect the
accumulation of knowledge in the developing countries. We will consider this model in
detail in chapter 4.
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Figure 2.1 Immiserizing Growth I
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Table 2.1 North-South Models
South
Lewis
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Alternative Closures for the North
Neoclassical
Lewis
North:
North:
South:
South:
(1) gN = n,
(1) rS = p fS’
(1) VN = VN
(1) V S= VS
LN =L0ent
(2) gS = sS rS
(2) p = p(rS) (2) rN = (sS/sN)
(2) gN = gS in
(3) V S= VS
p’>0.
rS
stable
equilibrium
path, which
means:
p = n / sS fS’
1.Vines (1984) formalized
1. Findlay (1980, 1981)
Kaldor (1979)
2. Dutt (1990)
2. Thirlwall (1986)
3. Burgstaller-Saavedra-Rivano
3. Conway and Darity (1985)
(1984)
4. Dutt (1990)
4. Burgstaller (1985)
5. Brewer (1985)
5. Ziesemer (1995)
6. Molona and Vines (1989)

Neo-Keynesian
South:
North:
(1)
(1) gN = gN (rN)
gN’>0, gN”<0
V S= VS
(2) gN = sN rN
(2) gS = sS
(3) gN = gS in
rS
equilibrium.
(2) p =
p(rS)
p’>0.

Kalecki-Steindl
South:
North:
(1)
(1) gN=gN (rN, 1/kN)
(2)
gN = sN rN
V S= VS
(3) gN = gS in
(2) gS = sS
equilibrium.
rS
(4) VN = VN (rN)
(2) p =
p(rS)
p’>0.

1. Dutt (1990)
2. Darity (1990)

1. Taylor (1981, 1983, 1986)
2. Dutt (1988, 1987, 1990, 2002)
3. Darity (1990)

South:
(1) gS = sS rS
(2) VS = VS
(rS)

KaleckiSteindl

North:
(1) gN=gN (rN, 1/kN)
(2) gN = sN rN
(3) gN = gS in
equilibrium.
(4) VN = VN (rN)

1.Dutt (1984)
2.Darity (1987)
NeoKeynesian

South:
(1) gS =gS
(rS)
gS’>0, gS”<0
(2) VS=VS
(rS)
Dutt (1990)

North:
(1) gN = sN rN
(2) gN = gS in
equilibrium.

Notes: The letters denote the following variables: r rate of profit, p the terms of trade of the South vis-à-vis the North; f’ the marginal product of capital; s the rate of
savings of capital owners; L the supply of labor; n the growth rate of labor supply; V the real wage; and k the capital-output ratio.

CHAPTER 3
NORTH-SOUTH TERMS-OF-TRADE TRENDS FROM 1960 TO 2006

3.1 Introduction
The gains that an individual country can reap from international trade depend on
the changes in its volume and product composition of trade, and the movements in its
relative prices of tradable goods. As a measure of these movements, the trends in the
barter terms of trade (the evolution of a country’s export prices relative to import prices)
play a crucial role in determining the distribution of gains from trade between trading
partners.5 An upward trend, for example, indicates a rising price of exports relative to
imports, which can result in a higher net export revenue as long as the volume effects of
this relative price change is low. Thus, improving terms of trade would increase net
export earnings as long as the price-elasticities of exports and imports are low. By
contrast, a deterioration in the terms of trade of a country might result in relatively low
gains from trade if its adverse effect is not offset by an increase in its net export volume.
Still worse, the gains from trade might turn into real income losses if the negative impact
from terms-of-trade deterioration outweighs the positive impact from the increase in the
volume of exports. Therefore, the gains from trade do not accrue automatically and are
far from being equally distributed, depending on the movements in the terms of trade and
changes in export/import volumes.
Singer (1975) called for shifting the debate on the terms of trade from a focus on
types of commodities to types of countries as empirically more relevant and theoretically

5

The term “terms of trade” always refers to the “barter terms of trade” unless otherwise is stated.
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more important. Analyses of trends in primary commodity prices relative to manufactures
have a tendency to lose their empirical relevance in a world where the export composition
of developing countries is increasingly dominated by manufactures. Nevertheless, few
studies have actually focused on the empirics of terms of trade between developing and
developed countries. From a theoretical standpoint, it is not possible to capture “unequal
exchange relations”6 between the periphery and the center merely by using the relative
prices of primary commodities, nor is it possible to evaluate the extent to which gains
from technological improvements in the periphery are exported abroad.7
This chapter empirically examines the evolution of the terms of trade of
developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries. Beginning with a review of the
literature on terms-of-trade debates, we highlight the distinctions between “commodity
terms-of-trade” and “country terms-of-trade” and the importance of the choice of
different time periods and different statistical estimation techniques to the results. The
rest of the chapter presents an analysis of the autoregressive dynamics of the North-South
terms-of-trade series, including a test of time trends. A disaggregated analysis of termsof-trade trends for a large number of developing country groupings provides evidence of
substantial terms-of-trade deterioration over the time period 1960-2003/6. The
concluding section presents a brief summary of the findings.

6

This concept is used in the way it was developed by Sarkar and Singer (1991). It is concerned
with the relative distribution of gains from trade between the center and the periphery.
7

For evidence, see Lall (1998).
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3.2 Empirical Debate on Terms of Trade Deterioration
The controversy surrounding terms of trade deterioration is presented in four
parts. The first subsection considers the ways in which the Ricardian view of terms of
trade is a special case of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. The second subsection
highlights the main turning-points of debate on the empirical studies prior to Grilli-Yang
(1988), while the third one considers those studies subsequent to Grilli-Yang (1988).
Finally, the last subsection examines the debate on manufacture-manufacture terms of
trade beginning with Sarkar-Singer (1991).
Based on the observation of a secular decline in terms of primary commodities
vis-à-vis manufactures since the last quarter of 19th century, Prebisch (1950, 1959) and
Singer (1950) advocated industrialization for developing countries as a means to avoid
exporting an increasingly greater volume of primary commodities in return for the same
import bundle of manufactured goods, in which would imply a lower level of welfare for
the major exporters of primary commodities in the long run. Even though Singer’s
subsequent study in 1991 challenged the strategy of industrialization as a way of escaping
terms-of-trade deterioration, the central idea of a secular deterioration in the relative price
of exports of developing countries relative to that of industrialized countries—mainly due
to asymmetries in income-elasticities and labor markets—preserved its theoretical and
empirical importance in economic development literature.
There has been a significant shift in theoretical analysis of terms of trade from
‘commodity terms of trade,’ international relative prices between commodities (primarymanufacture, or manufacture-manufacture), towards ‘country terms of trade’ or ‘NorthSouth terms of trade’, the relative prices of developing countries’ exports to developed
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country exports (Singer, 1975). Yet an overwhelming majority of the previous research
failed to give credit to the importance of this shift and ignored, for the most part, the
movements in North-South terms of trade. It is one of the purposes of this study to
contribute to this over-looked part of the literature.

3.2.1 The Ricardian View as a Special Case of the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis
Classical economists starting with Adam Smith8 and more directly with Ricardo
predicted that the terms of trade for primary goods as against manufactures would
improve over the long run.9 They justified this view based on two key ideas. First, the
production of primary commodities is subject to diminishing returns because the amount
of land used in production is fixed and additional inputs to this fixed amount of land
would result in decreasing incremental growth of output. This places a supply constraint
on agricultural commodities. The same logic applies to raw materials. Second,
technological progress takes place more rapidly in manufacturing than in agriculture. Due
to rapid technological change, costs would fall faster in manufacturing compared to
primary production and the supply curve for manufacturing would shift right at a faster
pace. The combination of these two factors—diminishing returns in primary production
and rapid technological change in manufacturing—allowed Classical economists to

8

Adam Smith was actually sure that technical progress in manufacturing and industry was faster
than agriculture and primary production because of the greater division of labor, introduction of
machinery and increase in the “dexterity” of workers. In dynamic terms, his advice to
governments was industrialization in order to obtain advantages of technical progress; while in
static terms, his suggestion was to follow specialization in goods of comparative advantage and
obtain thereby static gains in free trade (see Singer et al. 1992:141). Ricardo formalized Smith’s
static vision with his theory of comparative advantage.
9

Ricardo (1817), Malthus (1820), Torrens (1815, 1821), Mill (1848) are the most prominent
studies of this prediction. This classical idea was later overtaken by neoclassical economists, such
as Jevons (1865), Marshall (1903, 1926). Keynes (1912) also found this idea persuasive.
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conclude that the price ratio of primary commodities to manufactures would increase
over time.
As applied to the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, however,
Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) disputed the orthodox wisdom with the help of more
recently published UN data on net barter terms of trade (NBTT) of United Kingdom from
1876-80 to 1946-47.10 The NBTT series for the UK showed a steady improvement during
this period. Given that the UK was the world’s largest exporter of manufactured goods
and importer of primary goods for most of the period, Prebisch came to the conclusion
that the NBTT of primary products against manufactures had deteriorated worldwide
(Prebisch, 1950). To support and explain these empirical findings that contradicted the
classical view of terms of trade, Prebisch and Singer identified a number of factors that
contributed to the observed deteriorating trend: (i) lower income elasticity of primary
commodity exports compared to manufactured exports; (ii) capital-intensive
technological progress in manufacturing that economized on the use of raw materials, and
thus reduced the demand for them; (iii) the technological gap between advanced and
developing countries, and the obstacles to gaining the necessary technical knowledge to
industrialize in developing countries; (iv) different types of market structures in the
export industries of industrialized and developing countries, specifically, monopolistic
markets in the former and competitive markets in the latter11 (Prebisch, 1950, 1959 and
1964, and Singer, 1950, 1975 and 1984).

10

This was the dataset used by Prebisch (1950). Singer (1950) revised the terms-of-trade series
which was first provided by Folke Hilgerdt in a publication of League of Nations, 1945 (Singer et
al. 1992).
11

This point is refuted by Spraos (1983) based on the argument of general equilibrium in primary
commodity markets and manufactured goods markets. However, it is reiterated by way of
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Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the Ricardian view of terms of trade
is indeed a special case of Prebisch-Singer joint hypothesis. The terms of trade of primary
commodities might increase if the manufacturing region grows at a much faster speed
than the region exporting primary commodities. In that case, the effect of asymmetric
income-elasticities might be overcome by the faster growth of the manufacturing region.
As a result, the relative scarcity of primary commodities might push up its terms of trade.
Diakosavvas and Scandizzo (1991), Sarkar (1986b), and Spraos (1980) raised
some objections to the evidence of deterioration in terms of trade suggested by Prebisch
and Singer, which is summarized by Razzaque et al. (2007a) as follows: (i) using the UK
terms of trade series to draw conclusions about the overall relative price of primary
commodities might be inappropriate and result in misleading evidence; (ii) the time span
is arbitrary; (iii) the data is inadequate to reach long-run conclusions; (iv) other important
variables are omitted from the analysis; (v) quality improvements of the commodities
traded are not taken into account; (vi) the developing countries are not the only exporters
of primary commodities.
The first issue regarding the appropriateness of UK terms of trade has been
thoroughly discussed by Spraos, who reached the conclusion that “…the evidence of
Britain’s NBTT to an inference about the relative price of primary commodities vis-à-vis
manufactures in world trade was not misleading as to direction though it gave an
exaggerated impression of the magnitude of deterioration” (1980: 113). Sarkar (1986b)
agrees with Spraos and argued that NBTT of UK served as a justified “proxy for the
terms of trade of the industrial region vis-à-vis the agrarian region of the world” (1986b:

modeling competitive and monopolistic market structures and providing their estimations by
Bloch and Sapsford (2000).
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361). In the subsequent studies of NBTT for primary products, this point was no longer a
concern since much better sources of data were available.
The last issue raised by the critiques — that developing countries are not the only
exporters of primary products — does not change the fact that the NBTT for primary
products has deteriorated over time. However, it changes the implications that Prebisch
and Singer drew from the terms of trade deterioration. For example, it makes it
problematic to argue that the gains from trade between the ‘center’ and the ‘periphery’
were unevenly distributed, favoring the former at the expense of the latter. Therefore, the
terms of trade for developing countries as a whole would serve as a better measurement
for the distribution of gains from trade across regions.
Another concern of the critiques was the improvement in the quality of traded
commodities. The troublesome idea was that the relative price of manufactures might
have been increasing due to more rapid improvements in their quality compared to
primary commodities. For instance, the price of automobiles might be increasing because
the newly produced automobiles perform much better than the older ones. The same kind
of improvement in performance does not exist for, say, bananas. However, the studies
such as Grilli and Yang (1988), Sarkar (1986b) and Spraos (1980) showed that the extent
to which the quality improvements are responsible for the increase in prices of
manufactured goods is minuscule. Moreover, Razzaque et al. (2007a: 19) argued that
“there is no measurement of differential qualitative change in the two types of products”.
One way to avoid this problem is again to use the ‘country terms of trade’ instead of
‘commodity terms of trade’. Since the product mix of the export bundle is composed of a
mixture of both primary and manufactured commodities for both developing and
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developed countries, the differential improvements in quality for different categories is
unlikely to systematically favor one country group against the other. The other concerns
raised by the critiques will be explored in the rest of the literature survey.
The strongest evidence in favor of a declining trend in relative price of primary
commodities is provided by Grilli and Yang (1988) and the debate changed its character
after this publication. Therefore, we will first consider the empirical works that were
conducted before the study of Grilli and Yang, and then turn to those that followed after
their seminal study.

3.2.2 Empirical Studies Before Grilli-Yang (1988)
Since the launch of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis in 1950 until mid-1980s, very
few empirical studies were undertaken to test whether there was a declining trend in the
terms of trade for either primary products or developing countries. Most of the discussion
was centered on theoretical debates of why and how terms of trade would change.
Diakosavvas and Scandizzo (1991) provide a list of these studies, including Kaldor
(1963), Myrdal (1956, 1957a, 1957b), Lewis (1955), Nurkse (1959, 1967), Meier (1968),
and Viner (1953).12 Apart from these theoretical analyses, two empirical studies tested the
trends in ‘country terms of trade’: First, Kindleberger (1955) did not find any decisive
evidence for the deterioration in the terms of trade of primary commodities, but he found
some evidence of a declining trend in the terms of trade of developing countries vis-à-vis
the industrialized countries. In particular, he showed that the NBTT of Western Europe
improved by 50 percent vis-à-vis the less-developed areas outside of Europe (1955: 290).
Secondly, Wilson et al. (1969) found that between 1954-57 and 1962-65 least developed
12

For a complete list, see Diakosavvas and Scandizzo (1991: 238-9).
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countries’ NBTT declined from 98.3 to 90.7. Since the base year of the study was 195053, this means that LDC’s NBTT declined 10 percent within 15 years, from 1950 to 1965
approximately.
Although these studies were quite striking in terms of the magnitude of
deterioration in the terms of trade between countries and more relevant in terms of
determining how the gains from trade were distributed, the debate shifted its ground back
to the terms of trade measured between commodities with the publication of Spraos’
comprehensive paper (1980), which re-evaluated the evidence from Prebisch (1950).
Spraos found that Prebisch’s series exaggerated the rate of deterioration in terms of trade
for primary commodities, which Spraos estimated to be lower for the period up to 1950s.
However, Spraos detected that the declining trend became very weak, or “open to doubt”
if the dataset were extended to 1970. This finding implied that the time span chosen for
the study was a major determinant of whether or not one would observe a declining trend
in terms of trade.
Sapsford (1985) tested for structural breaks in the dataset used by Spraos (1980)
and came to the conclusion that Spraos’ results suffered from not taking into account the
significant break in 1950. Sapsford’s estimation included intercept and slope dummies for
the period after 1950, i.e. the post-war period, and his Chow test significantly favored the
specification including the dummy variables. Since the intercept dummy was positive and
the slope dummy was negative, both being significant for OLS estimations, Sapsford
interpreted this result as a once-for-all upward shift in the terms of trade in 1950 with a
continuing declining trend in the post-war period.
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Sarkar (1986b) and Thirlwall and Bergevin (1985), as mentioned in Razzaque et

al. (2007a), also tested the structural breaks in terms-of-trade deterioration to see if
changing the time span would invalidate the declining trend in relative prices of primary
commodities. Sarkar (1986b) estimated the exponential trend equation for the two periods
of 1876-1929 and 1876-1938 in order to see if the great depression was responsible for
the negative trend in Singer’s original estimation for the period 1876-1938. Sarkar’s
results indicated that the declining trend in both series was significant and that the
inclusion of 1930s data had made the existing deterioration in the terms of trade even
worse. Thirlwall and Bergevin (1985) conducted the same exercise for the two subperiods 1954-72 and 1973-82 and found that the rate of decline in the terms of trade
became more severe for the second period, increasing from 1.2 percent to 2.5 percent per
annum. These estimates are much higher than those of Sarkar, who found the overall
decline to be 0.89 percent per annum.

3.2.3 Empirical Debate subsequent to Grilli-Yang (1988)
Grilli and Yang (1988) constructed the longest (1900-86) and the most consistent dataset
for the relative price of non-fuel primary commodities that had so far been compiled.
Razzaque et al. (2007a) argue that the construction of this dataset was their most
important contribution to the literature. Based on the new dataset, Grilli and Yang found
a statistically significant decline of 0.6 percent per annum in the terms of trade of primary
commodities against manufactures.
A renewed interest in the empirical tests of trend equations began as several other
studies followed the example of Grilli-Yang, using their consistent and longer time-series
dataset and analyzing it with the new techniques in time-series econometrics such as unit
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root tests and cointegration analysis. Cuddington and Urzua (1989) became the first study
to challenge the findings of Grilli-Yang on the grounds that their trend equation
estimation was invalid due to the non-stationarity of the estimated series. They argued
that the traditional log-linear trend equation is valid if and only if the test for unit root of
the series is rejected, i.e. the data generating process is a trend-stationary (TS) one. When
this fails to hold, as Cuddington and Urzua (1989) found to be the case for the aggregate
primary commodity relative price index of Grilli-Yang, the non-stationary series needs to
be transformed into a stationary one by using a difference-stationary (DS) model. The
estimation of a DS model by Cuddington and Urzua resulted in a trend rate that was not
statistically different from zero. In addition, they found that 39 percent of the average
shocks to the NBTT is permanent while the remaining 61 percent is cyclical and
disappears in three years (1989: 441).
In a subsequent study, Cuddington (1992) did unit-root tests for the individual
commodity price indices of Grilli-Yang and additional data for oil and coal. He rejected
the unit root for 13 out of 26 commodities. Among those commodities which can be
modeled as TS processes, he found that only 5 of them exhibited a significant negative
trend. Similar to Cuddington (1992), Newbold and Vougas (1996) used several unit-root
and structural break tests in order to determine whether the aggregate index for relative
primary commodity prices is a TS or DS process. Although these tests gave ambiguous
results, the authors chose the DS process and came to the conclusion that the PS
hypothesis is “non-proven” (1966: 660).
Of course, the results of these empirical studies did not go without any responses
from the previous authors who had argued in support of a decline in the growth rate of
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terms of trade. Singer, Sapsford, and Sarkar (1992) argued that the procedure of unit-root
testing by Cuddington and Urzua was not appropriate because of their inclusion of many
insignificant lagged periods of the dependent variable. Singer et al. (1992) showed that
when these unnecessary variables were excluded, the null hypothesis of a unit root would
be rejected, in which case a TS process would be preferred instead of a DS one. This
would allow for an estimation of a declining trend, which had been rejected by
Cuddington and Urzua (1989). Moreover, Singer et al. (1992) questioned the plausibility
of the 50.3 percent decline in relative price index during 1920-21 as indicated in the
dataset used by Cuddington and Urzua. Schlote (1938) estimated this particular fall as
13.5 percent only. Replacing Schlote’s estimate for this time interval and re-estimating
the time-trend, Singer et al. (1992) found a secular downward trend in commodity terms
of trade over 1900-83.
Cuddington’s (1992) results in favor of rejecting declining trends in relative
prices of most of individual primary commodities were also challenged by successive
studies. Changing the unit root testing procedure from the one in Perron (1989) to Zivott
and Andrew (1992), Leon and Soto (1997) found that 20 out of 24 commodities followed
a TS process and 17 out of these 20 commodities exhibited statistically significant
declining terms of trade. Zivott and Andrew’s procedure has the advantage of testing for
structural breaks endogenously whereas the exogenous structural change test in Perron
depends on visual inspection of the data, which might lead to a specification error in the
model due to subjectivity involved in selecting the time break. Leon and Soto (1997)
suspect that this was the problem with exogenous unit root testing applied by
Cuddington. However, a shortcoming of Zivott and Andrew procedure is that it can only
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test for one endogenous structural break. Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) developed a
testing procedure that made it possible to test for two endogenous breaks. Using this
newer technique, Kellard and Wohar (2002) found that 15 out of 24 individual
commodity price indices had a TS process and 12 out of these 15 commodities exhibited
a declining trend over time. Thus, the incorporation of two endogenous breaks into the
unit-root testing procedure makes it more likely to fail to reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root.
The findings of Cuddington and Urzua (1989) regarding the permanent and
cyclical components of the time-series were also challenged by the studies of Ardeni and
Wright (1992) and Reinhart and Wickham (1994). Implementing Harvey’s (1989)
methodology to decompose the series into permanent and cyclical components, these
studies found that most of the deterioration in relative commodity prices was permanent.
In particular, Ardeni and Wright (1992) reported that the decline was 0.6 percent per
annum.
The development of cointegration technique in time-series econometrics (see for
example, Engle and Granger, 1987, Harris, 1995) provided a new methodology to
consider trend-stationarity versus difference-stationarity. Powell (1991) and Bleaney and
Greenway (1993) made explicit use of this new methodology, but they reached strikingly
different conclusions, partly due to differences in interpretation of the results obtained.
Considering the index for primary commodity prices together with the index for unit
values of manufactures, Powell tested whether there is a long-run relationship between
these two non-stationary variables. He argued that the declining terms-of-trade
hypothesis would be rejected if the cointegrating parameter was one. Having controlled
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for three outliers in the series, 1921, 1938, and 1975, Johnson’s test results made it clear
that the cointegrating parameter was not statistically different from one. From this result,
Powell came to the conclusion that the commodity terms of trade are stationary although
the series had three sharp breaks. As Razzaque et al. (2007a) suggests, the results could
very well be interpreted as “a stepwise version of the PS hypothesis with permanent
drops in those three years”. In addition, Powell had made no attempt to test for whether
the cointegrating parameter was changing between the outliers, in which case the
declining terms of trade might not have been rejected (2007a: 25-6). Moreover, as Sarkar
(1994) pointed out (i) Powell’s indirect testing procedure contains various steps and each
step involves tests that have low power; (ii) although Dickey-Fuller test rejected the null
hypothesis that the cointegrating parameter was one, Powell used the Augmented DickeyFuller test—which failed to reject that it was one -- and it is not clear why the augmented
test result is preferred, (iii) cointegration analysis may not be justified when there are
structural breaks in the series (1994: 1613).
On the other hand, the cointegration analysis applied by Bleaney and Greenway
(1993) follows an error-correction model and incorporates both trend and difference
stationary models. This allows Bleaney and Greenway to avoid the pitfalls in unit-root
testing by obtaining a more general specification of the trend equation. Using an updated
Grilli-Yang index, the long-term growth rate is estimated to be -0.7 percent per annum
over the period 1925-91. Moreover, Bleaney and Greenway also find a ‘once-for-all’
drop in commodity terms-of-trade after 1980.
Razzaque et al. (2007b) specify their trend equation following the methodology
suggested by Bleaney and Greenway (1993) in order to avoid testing of the variables for
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unit roots a priori. This makes the testing procedure much simpler and avoids the type
one error of failing to reject the null hypothesis of unit root when it is not true. This is
because the unit root tests have low power against the stationary alternative and hence
there is a tendency to over-accept the null when it is not true. Using updated Grilli-Yang
indices and UNCTAD database, Razzaque et al. (2007b) found a negative and
statistically significant trend for 8 out of 13 commodities and for all broad commodity
groups. The trend rates vary between -0.79 and -1.43 percent per annum for the period
1900-2001. If the period of estimation is restricted to 1960-2002, the trend rate declines
are much higher, varying between -0.9 to -3.50 percent per annum. The aggregate relative
price index has been estimated to fall at an annual rate of -1.82 percent for this more
recent period.
Another study employing Grilli-Yang index for estimating the trend rates in
relative commodity prices is Herrera (1996). The novelty of this study was to implement
new parameter stability tests (those of Chu and White, 1992) and unit root tests which
incorporate trend variables and also allow for an endogenous structural break. The break
point is estimated to be 1972. Prior to the 1973 oil crisis, the study estimated the fall in
non-fuel primary commodity prices as 0.7 percent per annum, which is pretty close to
Grilli-Yang’s original estimate. Yet, the period after the oil shock brought a much larger
decline: 3.7 percent per annum from 1973 to 1992. This break-point was not previously
noticed in the literature. Among the reasons for the 1973-break point, Herrera lists “the
productivity slowdown in industrialized countries, the supply response of non-fuel
primary commodity exporting countries, and other events following the formation of
OPEC and the 1973 oil price shock” (1996: 44). In addition, the results of sequential
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testing procedures suggest a level change in 1945 and a slope shift in 1983. Herrera
argues that these two dates—the end of World War II and the LDC debt crisis—had a
definitive effect on developing countries and their terms of trade.

3.2.4 Manufacture-Manufacture Terms of Trade
The controversy concerning the declining trends in commodity terms of trade
evolved around testing the terms of primary commodities vis-à-vis manufactures. The
empirical evidence of a declining trend in primary-manufacture terms of trade implied
that the developing countries had to industrialize and start exporting manufactured goods
if they wished to avoid deterioration in their terms of trade. However, an influential study
by Sarkar and Singer (1991) showed that, even though manufactured goods began to
dominate the commodity composition of exports of developing countries, the terms of
trade of manufactured exports of developing countries vis-à-vis those of developed
countries have declined about 1 percent per annum since 1965. Industrialization of the
‘periphery’ and diversification of its exports did not necessarily create the means to break
away from unequal exchange relations with industrial countries. Yet, in the absence of
such diversification, it became clear that the situation would get much worse for the
developing countries.
While the income terms of trade was estimated to have a significant improvement,
the differences in labor productivities in manufacturing sectors of the two regions of
periphery and center led Sarkar and Singer to conclude that the double factoral terms of

48

trade of the periphery deteriorated even more than the net barter terms of trade.13 Another
conclusion of the study is derived from the comparisons of terms-of-trade trends for
individual countries (vis-à-vis the rest of the world). Among Latin American countries,
seven out of ten had negative trends; in contrast, among Asian countries, two out of ten
were negative. The authors argued that this contrast contributes to the differences in
balance of payments and debt experiences of the two regions (1991: 338). Yet another
finding of the study is that no country had a significant improvement in its manufacturemanufacture terms of trade vis-à-vis the United States, the ‘center of the center’, in
contrast to some cases of improvement vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
A number of criticisms were directed to the study of Sarkar and Singer (1991): (i)
Bleaney and Athukorala argued that the endpoint of the study corresponded to the debt
crisis and real devaluation of the currencies of the developing countries. (ii) Athukorala
pointed out the limitations of using unit value indices of manufactures to calculate
manufacture-manufacture terms of trade. (iii) The majority of industrialized countries’
manufactured exports are part of intra-regional trade while only 25 percent of developing
countries’ manufactured exports are part of intra-regional trade, which Athukorala
suspects might lead to a bias. (iv) The inclusion of nonferrous metal products in the
category of manufactures might be partly responsible for the declining manufacturemanufacture terms of trade of the periphery vis-à-vis the center. (v) Aggregation bias
might also be responsible for the negative trend. (vi) The use of labor productivity in the
manufacturing sector as a proxy for labor productivity in the export-oriented
manufacturing sector may not be appropriate (Athukorala, 1993 and Bleaney, 1993).
13

This is because the average labor productivity of the periphery’s manufacturing sector declined
much more steeply relative to that of the centre’s manufacturing sector (Sarkar and Singer 1991:
335)
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In response to these criticisms, Sarkar and Singer (1993) defended their
methodology and the result of declining manufacture-manufacture terms of trade with the
following corresponding arguments: (i) Using a dummy variable for the period after
1982, i.e. the start of the debt crisis, Sarkar and Singer tested if the trend decline rates for
the two periods, 1970-82 and 1970-89, differed. Their results indicate that the average
rates of decline are the same: 1 percent per annum. Thus, changing the endpoint did not
change the central result. (ii) As admitted by Athukorala, Sarkar and Singer argue that
this point does not create a systematic bias in any particular direction. (iii) Although
Athukorala mentions that this fact would create a bias in favor of Sarkar and Singer’s
result, Sarkar and Singer argue the opposite. Due to the technology gap and
demonstration effects, the monopoly power of the industrialized countries’ exports
increase over time. Since the denominator of the terms of trade is likely to underestimate
the upward movements of unit values of manufactured exports from industrialized
countries to the developing countries, there would be a bias against the result of declining
terms of trade. (iv) Regressing the trend rate of terms of trade against the share of
nonferrous metals in total manufactured exports shows that cross-country variations in
the latter do not explain the former. (v) Sarkar and Singer question why the disaggregated
results would be more appropriate and argue that the aggregation bias (if any) might go in
either direction. Lücke (1993) does a country-level analysis of the same trends and comes
to the same conclusion as the one Sarkar and Singer had derived from their aggregate
analysis. (vi) Sarkar and Singer argue that using labor productivity in the manufacturing
sector as a proxy for labor productivity in export-oriented manufacturing does not create
a problem as long as the “differences in the rate of growth of the labor productivity in the
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total manufacturing sectors of the developing countries and industrialized countries also
indicate the actual difference between the rates of growth of labor productivity in the
export-oriented manufacturing sectors of the two regions” (1993: 1619).

3.3 Data Sample and Classification
This section examines the direction of movement in the terms of trade of the
global South vis-à-vis the global North from 1960 to 2006 by employing an
autoregressive model to estimate the long-run trend and test its significance. The global
North and South refer to the developed and developing economies, respectively. The
analysis is based on nine terms-of-trade indices, each corresponding to a separate
category of developing countries, which are classified by the UNCTAD Handbook of
Statistics according to their major export commodities and their geographic locations (see
Figure 3.1).
First, the major oil-exporting countries are separated from the developing
countries as a whole because their terms of trade depend completely on the changes in oil
prices. Second, the rest of the developing countries—i.e., non-oil-exporting countries—
are further divided into two categories: the major exporters of manufactures and
remaining countries. Third, the remaining developing countries—i.e., non-oil- and nonmajor-manufacture-exporting countries—are grouped according to their geographic
location: America, Africa, West Asia and Other Asia. Fourth, there are two additional
categories of countries in the UNCTAD classification under the name of “memo items”:
the least developed countries (LDCs) and the highly indebted countries (HICs). A schema
of this classification is presented in Figure 3.1.
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The time period 1960-2006 was chosen solely on account of data availability for
the country classification above.14 Moreover, each terms-of-trade index is a net-barter
terms-of-trade index, calculated as the ratio of the unit value of exports to the unit value
of imports. While the data for unit value of exports are reported on an f.o.b. basis, those
for imports are reported on a c.i.f. basis (UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2008).
Figure 3.2 overlays the aggregate terms of trade index for developing countries as
a whole onto the terms of trade indices of oil-exporters and non-oil exporters. The spikes
in the aggregate index reflect the increases in the relative price of oil during the oil
shocks of 1973 and 1978. Both oil shocks can be clearly seen from the upward
movements in the series. Moreover, the following downward adjustment corresponds to
the debt crisis after 1982 and the currency devaluations for the majority of indebted
developing countries. Once the oil-exporters are excluded from the sample of developing
countries, a marked long-term downturn is noticeable in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.3 shows that the terms of trade of the major exporters of manufactures
were significantly higher prior to the 1980s than that of remaining non-oil exporters.
However, the index of the former group starts to decline more steeply than that of the
latter and converges with it over time. This evidence reinforces the empirical findings of
Sarkar and Singer (1991) that the commodity terms of trade of manufactures exported by
developing countries relative to those exported by developed countries displayed a
downward trend.

14

Note that this time period is valid for three terms-of-trade indices of developing countries:
developing countries as a whole, the major exporters of oil, and major exporters of manufactures.
For the rest of the indices (with the exception of HICs), the time period covers from 1960 to
2003. For the category of highly indebted countries (HICs), the time range is from 1978 to 2003.
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The visual inspection of the terms-of-trade series for various groups of countries
from Figure 3.4 also suggests a prolonged declining trend over the period 1960-2003.

3.4 Empirical Analysis of the Trends in North-South Terms of Trade: 1960-2006
In order to determine whether the terms of trade follows a negative trend over the
long run, the methodology developed by Bleaney and Greenway (1993) and Razzaque,
Osafa-Kwaako and Grynberg (2007b) is implemented.15 Suppose that the behavior of netbarter terms of trade (NBTT) can be represented by an autoregressive model16 that
includes a time trend:

lnNBTTt = a + bt + clnNBTTt-1 + ut ,

(3.1)

where t is time and u is a white-noise disturbance term. By subtracting lnNBTTt-1 from
each side, Equation (3.1) becomes:
∆ lnNBTTt = a + bt + ψlnNBTTt-1 + ut ,

(3.2)

where ψ = c – 1. Equation (3.2) turns into an ideal error-correction model if ψ is
negative, statistically significant and greater than -1, (i.e., -1 < ψ < 0; Razzaque et al,
2007b: 37). If this is the case, the change in lnNBTTt is negatively related to its current
level, which will pull back the short-run deviations to the steady state long-run trend path.
In contrast, if ψ = 0, lnNBTTt would be a random walk with an increasing variance over
time. The estimation results of Eq. (3.2) can be interpreted in the following fashion: If b ≠
0 and ψ < 0, lnNBTTt has a non-zero deterministic trend, i.e., it has a long-run tendency to
15

The reason for choosing this methodology is to avoid the loss of power from unit root tests, and
to be able to determine the long-run trend of the series for cases where the null hypothesis of a
unit root is rejected.
16

The trend equation is an extension of the linear trend equation, e.g., lnYt = a + bT + ut,
whereby the growth rate for the dependent variable Y per time period T is given by the
coefficient b.
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revert to a non-zero trend following any short-term disturbances. If b ≠ 0 and ψ = 0,

lnNBTTt is a random walk with drift. In this case, a negative (positive) value estimated
for b implies that it is more probable that lnNBTTt will be smaller (greater) in the future
compared to its current value. The combinations of the following conditions therefore
provide empirical support for the declining trend hypothesis: (i) b < 0 and ψ = 0; (ii) b < 0
and ψ < 0. An augmented version of Eq. (3.2) will be used for the estimation:
∆ lnNBTTt = a + bt + ψlnNBTTt-1 + d ∆ lnNBTTt -1 + vt.

(3.3)

This version follows the usual practice with Dickey-Fuller regressions by
including the first-order lagged dependent variable (i.e., ∆ lnNBTTt-1) in Eq. (3.3)
irrespective of its statistical significance. In addition, dummy variables are used to control
for the sudden jumps in commodity prices. Most terms-of-trade indices have a clear peak
around the mid-1970s. In order to control for these sharp terms-of-trade movements, the
trend equations to be estimated have to include point dummy variables. The inclusion of
these point dummy variables lets us pull the atypical data points towards the expected
result for a normal year, defined by the trend equation.
Results reported in Table 3.1 show that the estimated coefficients of the trend
variable are negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for all categories of
developing countries, i.e., b < 0. The lagged level dependent variable (lnNBTTt-1) is
negative and less than zero for all the regressions. For all groups of countries except the
LDCs and the remaining West Asian countries,17 the t-ratio on lnNBTTt-1 is higher than
the Dickey-Fuller critical value. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at least
at the 10 percent level, which means that ψ is significantly different from zero. The
17

For these groups’ terms of trade, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of unit root, i.e., ψ = 0.
However, as we noted before, the case where b < 0 and ψ = 0 also provides empirical evidence
for the deterioration in net barter terms-of-trade.
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combination of a negative trend coefficient with a negative lagged dependent variable,
with both being significant, leads us to the case where b < 0 and ψ < 0. This implies that
the terms of trade series has a long-run tendency to revert to a negative trend following
any short-term disturbances. In order to determine the degree of the decline in terms of
trade, it is necessary to calculate the long-term growth rate.
The last column of Table 3.1 displays the long-term growth rate in NBTT in
percent per annum for each group of countries.18 The rate is negative for all groups,
ranging between -0.65 (for the remaining countries) and -2.19 (for the highly indebted
countries, HICs). For all non-oil-exporting developing countries, the terms of trade has
fallen at an annual rate of almost 1.5 percent from 1960 to 2003, which cumulatively
amounts to 47 percent from 1960 to 2006. The sharpest declines in NBTT are observed
for the least developed countries (LDCs) and the highly indebted countries, declining
respectively at the rates of -1.78 and -2.19 percent annually. The least deterioration is
observed for the remaining countries as a whole: -0.65 percent. There is a notable
contrast between the trend rates of major exporters of manufactures’ NBTT and the
remaining countries’ NBTT. While the former index declined at the rate of 1.42, the latter
declined much less, 0.65 percent per annum. This evidence matches with our visual

18

In Equation (2), ∆ lnNBTTt = a + bt + ψlnNBTTt-1 + ut, b is the time trend. However, the
trend affects prior values of NBTT, which because of the lagged term affect subsequent values of
NBTT. Thus, the trend has two effects: a direct effect on NBTT (coefficient b) and an indirect
effect through the lagged values of NBTT. To calculate the long-term trend, we assume that
Equation (2) is equilibrium in the long-run, meaning that lnNBTTt = lnNBTTt-1. Then, the
change in lnNBTTt would be zero: 0 = a + bt + ψlnNBTTt-1 + ut. Replacing lnNBTTt-1 by
lnNBTTt, we obtain 0 = a + bt + ψlnNBTTt + ut, which can be rearranged as -ψlnNBTTt = a + bt
+ ut, or lnNBTTt = (a/ -ψ) + (b/-ψ) t + ut. The coefficient on the trend variable is the long-run
trend rate: (b/-ψ).
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inspection of Figure 3.3, in which we noted the steeper decline of the NBTT of major
exporters of manufactures.
The regression residuals are tested for serial correlation and normality. First, the
Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test results are reported under the column “serial
corr.” in Table 3.1. Residuals were found to be serially correlated for first regressions for
West Asian and Other Asian countries’ NBTT. This can be seen from the p-values below
five percent, which implies rejection of the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. In the
case of the West Asian NBTT, adding four additional lagged regressors, i.e., lnNBTTt-m,
eliminated the problem of serial correlation, while in the case of Other Asian NBTT,
leaving out the insignificant point dummy variable made the series serially uncorrelated.
These second regressions are preferred specifications for making inferences. Second, the
tests of normality are conducted using White’s Q-statistic. Since these statistics are
greater than 5 percent for all preferred specifications, i.e., the second regressions when
there is a second one, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the residuals from each
regression are normally distributed. This also implies that the inferences drawn from
these model specifications are valid.

3.5 Analysis of the Structural Breaks
Trend equations with intercept and slope dummies are estimated in order to see if
there were any significant changes in the annual percentage change in the trend rates.19
The results are reported in Table 3.2. For most of the categories, we found evidence for a
slightly increasing terms-of-trade prior to 1975 or 1980, followed by a much greater
19

The methodology used here is similar to Perron’s structural break tests. Innovational outlier
with changing trend model is estimated for different categories and different structural break
points. The structural break points are exogenously determined.
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decline after 1975 or 1980. For the broadest category of non-oil exporting countries, for
example, the terms of trade increased by 0.77 percent per annum prior to 1975 and
declined by 1.42 percent per annum after 1975. If we take the year 1980 as the structural
break point, the value of the estimates decline to 0.49 and 1.295 respectively. Since the
dummies for 1975 are more significant, it might be better to take 1975 as the break point.
For the major exporters of manufacturers, the year 1976 represents the most significant
point of structural break. The terms of trade of this group of developing countries
increased 1.01 percent per annum prior to 1976 and started to decline after that year by
1.12 percent per year. For the remaining category of non-oil- and non-major manufacture
exporting countries, the break in the year 1980 is more significant than the one in 1975.
Before 1980, the terms of trade for the remaining countries increased at 0.53 percent per
year and began to decline after 1980s at 0.86 percent per year. Among the groups of
remaining countries, the ones that experienced the sharpest decline in their terms of trade
are again the less-developed countries (LDCs) and the highly-indebted countries (HICs).
These are also the ones that experienced the sharpest structural breaks in their terms-oftrade movements.
Complementary to the results in Table 3.2, we have undertaken tests for unknown
break dates using JMulti software. The break date estimated for each country
classification is presented in Table 3.3. The results are very close to each other for most
of the cases. For the non-oil exporting developing countries’ terms of trade, 1974 is
estimated to be the break date from the unknown break test. Compared to the break date
from the exogenous tests, this is one year earlier than 1975.The same is also true for the
remaining countries. However, the break dates are the same for NBTT of major exporters
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of manufactures, being 1976 from both test results. The break date for LDCs is also
estimated to be the same in both test results: 1977. The test results differ for the terms-oftrade series of remaining countries in Africa, West Asia, Other Asia, and HICs by an
amount of 3-6 years. In short, we can conclude that both tests confirm the existence of a
structural break between 1974 and 1977 for the majority of terms-of-trade series for
different classifications of developing countries, excluding the major oil exporters. Prior
to the break, the terms-of-trade series exhibited a slight rise, which turned into a steep
decline after the break date.

3.6 Factors Responsible for the Structural Break in the Terms of Trade
In the mid-to-late 1970s, the terms of trade for non-oil exporting developing
countries has experienced a sharp structural break, that is, a reversal from a slightly
increasing upward trend to a largely decreasing downward trend. This evidence applies
for all the disaggregated groups except the Highly Indebted Countries (HICs) whose
break date is 1986. Three major and largely unexpected developments in the worldeconomy explain this generalized downturn in the terms of trade in mid-to-late 1970s.
The first was the end of golden age of growth in the developed economies after
the oil shocks of 1970s, having an adverse effect on the demand for commodities
exported by developing countries (Ocampo and Parra 2003, Maizels 1992). Since most of
the exported commodities from the developing countries were used as inputs of
production in industrial products, the demand for these commodities declined as a result
of the reduced output growth in industrial production of the developed countries. As
income growth in the North slows down, the demand for imports from the South has a
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tendency to fall—depressing the relative price of Southern exports to the North, i.e.
terms-of-trade deterioration for the South.
The second major development was the eruption of the debt crisis in 1980s as a
result of the interest rate shock of 1979. As the real interest rates in the United States had
increased from -1.8 % in 1979 to 3.6 % in 1981, the cost of borrowing for developing
countries increased tremendously due to the rise in average risk premiums from 2.5 to
22.0 percentage points (Ocampo 2008: 13). The resulting debt crisis created an excessive
debt burden for the developing countries. In order to service their debts, they were under
constant pressure to generate trade surpluses. Sharp reductions in their real exchange
rates allowed many of these indebted developing countries to increase their volume of
exports, but it came with the side-effect of reducing the relative prices of their exports.
Therefore, the process of “export desperation”, as Sarkar (1991) named it, explains a
major part of the deteriorations in terms of trade for developing countries occurring in
this time period.
The third major factor was the increasing implementation of outward-looking
strategies in developing countries. The neoliberal reforms were put into practice, partly as
a result of the pressure from international organizations, and partly due to the perception
that the outward-oriented economies had achieved higher rates of growth. Nominal
devaluations were one of the major policy items among the neoliberal conditionality
packages, which in general contributed to the deteriorating trend in developing countries’
terms of trade. However, more importantly, it is possible to identify two main effects
resulting from increased openness on the terms of trade. The first one is the failure of the
small country assumption to hold. The small country assumption maintains that each
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trading country is small enough not to have any effect on the world prices of its exports
and imports. Lutz and Singer (1994) show that this assumption might fail to hold if the
trade liberalization is aimed at raising the size of the tradable sector (in either absolute or
relative terms). In this case, changes in the tradable sector size might lead to a
deterioration in terms of trade under certain conditions.20 The second effect is known as
the fallacy of composition, which underlines that even where the small country condition
is valid for separate individual countries, it may not apply to several countries when they
simultaneously liberalize their trade or become more outward-oriented. If many countries
follow the same trade diversification strategy at the same time, the resulting oversupply
of products in the global market may lead to declining prices and deteriorating terms of
trade. Therefore, the collective efforts of several developing countries all at once to
engage in trade diversification in similar product markets might indeed lead to lower
prices for their exports and lower their terms of trade.
To summarize, the structural breaks in the trend of terms of trade in the mid-tolate 1970s reflect the simultaneous impacts of the changes in the world-economy: (i) the
slowdown of the Northern growth rate after the oil shocks; (ii) the decreased trade
deficits of the Southern economies as a share of their national income, i.e. increased
‘export desperation’ after the debt crisis; (iii) the increased openness of the Southern

20

The idea is that the increasing size of the tradable sector, thus the size of exports and imports
and their shares in global markets all else constant, might change the relative prices of exports
and imports. If the relative prices of exports declines in this process, this implies a deterioration
of terms of trade. Since the trade liberalization of a given country then results in a change in
terms of trade, this violates the small-country assumption.
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economies due to neoliberal reforms. In order to show their differential effects over time,
we will use an augmented structural equation with dummies in the following form:21

lnNBTTt = β1 lnYNt + β2DlnYNt + β3OPt + β4 DOPt + β5 TBRt + β6DTBRt + ut
(3.4)
where lnNBTTt : the logarithm of net barter terms of trade for non-oil exporting
developing countries,

lnYNt:

the logarithm of real GDP in developed countries (or the North),

DlnYNt: an interaction dummy, e.g. 0 if t < 1980, and lnYNt if t ≥ 1980.
OPt:

an index of openness which is calculated based on Rao (1999).22

DOPt:

an interaction dummy, e.g. 0 if t < 1980, and OPt if t ≥ 1980,

TBRt:

the ratio of trade balance to GDP in non-oil exporting countries,

DTBRt:

an interaction dummy, e.g. 0 if t < 1980, and TBRt if t ≥ 1980.
For t < 1980, the interaction dummy variables become zero, and the structural

equation reduces to:

lnNBTTt = β1 lnYNt + β3OPt + β5TBRt + vt.

(3.5)

For t ≥ 1980, the coefficients of the interaction dummy variables must be added to
the coefficients of the original variables, which yields:

lnNBTTt =(β1 + β2) lnYNt + (β3 + β4) OPt + (β5 + β6) TBRt + wt.

(3.6)

21

Log-log form lets us interpret the coefficients in such a way that a one percentage change in
any independent variable leads to its coefficient times percentage change in the dependent
variable. Therefore, variables are in levels instead of growth rates. The coefficient is omitted
since it was insignificant. The TBR variable is not in logarithm form because it is already
measured in percentages.
22

Openness index is calculated by the error terms from the regression of Trade/GDP to structural
determinants of population size and per capita GDP. “Given the premise that population and
income are ‘structural’ determinants of a country’s capacity to trade, we have statistically isolated
their effects on observed trading shares and constructed an openness index from the latter after
purging them of the structural effects” (Rao 1999: 302).
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The estimation of the augmented structural model gave us the following results:

lnNBTTt = .29 lnYNt + (-.03) DlnYNt + (.01)OPt +(-.02)DOPt +(-.03)TBRt
(84.91)
(-7.88)
(3.66)
(-3.86)
(-1.18)
+ (-.03)DTBRt
(-1.07)23
The results of the estimation can be rearranged in the form of Equations (3.5) and
(3.6) to reflect the differences between the two periods:
Pre- 1980: lnNBTTt = (.29) lnYNt + (.01) OPt + (-.03) TBRt
Post-1980: lnNBTTt = (.26) lnYNt + (-.01) OPt + (-.06) TBRt
The following points are worth stressing:
(i)

A one percent increase in total Northern income leads to 0.29 percent increase in

Southern terms of trade in the period prior to 1980.
(ii)

This positive response of the term of trade decreases to 0.26 percent in the post

break period of post-1980. The reduction in the coefficient implies that the slowdown in
Northern income growth had a depressing effect on Southern terms of trade.
(iii)

A one percentage point increase in the openness index of the South leads to a 0.01

percent improvement in the terms of trade of the South before 1980s.
(iv)

The coefficient of the openness index turns negative in the post-break period,

indicating the crowding-out effects associated with the fallacy of composition effect.
After 1980s, one percentage point increase in openness leads to a 0.01 percent decrease in
Southern terms of trade.
(v)

Due to the excessive burden of the debt payments and increasing necessity to

export more, regardless of how low the relative price ratios might be, the trade balance to

23

N=47, Adjusted R2= 0.99, AIC: -105.13, and the figures under coefficients are t-ratios.
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GDP ratio, or TBR, posed an accentuated negative impact on the terms of trade after
1980. Note, however, that there could be simultaneity/joint determination here.
(vi)

While a one percentage point increase in the TBR resulted in a 0.03 percent

decrease in the terms of trade before 1980, the effect became much stronger after 1980: a
0.06 percent reduction per percentage point increase in TBR.

3.7 Conclusion
The controversy over the international terms of trade has predominantly focused
on the commodity terms of trade— between primary commodities versus manufactures,
or manufactures versus manufactures with different countries of origin. However, neither
of these measures accommodates the changes in the commodity composition of
developing country exports. While the first measure—the primary/manufactures terms of
trade—is hardly relevant when the export bundle of developing countries is increasingly
dominated by manufactured goods, the intra-manufacturing terms of trade completely
ignores the primary commodities exported by the developing countries. These drawbacks
arising from using different versions of commodity terms of trade can be avoided if the
country terms of trade—that is, the terms of developing countries’ trade vis-à-vis
developed countries—are taken as the unit for measurement. This is especially the case if
the aim is to adequately measure the extent to which gains from trade are unevenly
distributed between the global North and South.
Our review of the literature also shows that empirical inferences concerning the
trend in the terms of trade have been strongly shaped by the particular time-series
techniques used. In order to avoid pitfalls in unit-root testing, this paper employs a more
general specification of the trend equation, which allows us to proceed without a priori
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testing of the variables for unit roots. The results of the econometric analysis concerning
nine North-South terms of trade indices reveals that the terms of trade have turned against
the South since the 1960s. However, the terms-of-trade deterioration is neither
continuous nor evenly distributed over different country groupings. Further analysis of
the data provides evidence of structural break around the mid-to-late 1970s in the SouthNorth terms of trade, which deteriorated at a rate of almost 1.5 % per year during the
post-break period. Cumulatively, this amounts to a decline of 47 % from 1960 to 2006—
the most striking finding to date in support of the dynamic unequal exchange thesis.
The terms-of-trade deterioration was not evenly distributed across countries. First,
the highest rates of decline in terms of trade are observed for the least developed and
highly indebted countries: -1.78 % and -2.19 % per annum, respectively.24 Moreover, the
terms of trade for major exporters of manufactures deteriorated much more severely than
for the rest of the non-oil exporting developing countries. This supports the view that
manufactured exports are not immune to falling relative prices (Singer and Sarkar 1991,
Kaplinsky 2006). Within the country group of non-major exporters of oil and
manufactures (or the remaining countries), the terms of trade for developing countries in
America exhibits greater deterioration compared to terms of trade for the developing
countries in Other Asia. In all, then, these findings point to a highly differentiated and
uneven process of development that is partly structured by international trade relations.

24

Note here that the criteria for inclusion in the memo item groupings exert a downward bias in
the terms of-trade movement since a decline in terms-of-trade is one contributor to being a poor
or highly-indebted country.
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Figure 3.1 Classification of Country Groupings
Developing Countries
Major Exporters of Oil

Non-oil Exporters

Major Exporters of
Manufactures

Remaining Countries
America

Memo Items:
i) Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

Africa
West Asia

ii) Highly Indebted Countries (HICs)
Other Asia

Figure 3.2 Terms of Trade Indices for All Developing Countries, Oil Exporters, and
Non-oil Exporters, 1960-2003/6.
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Figure 3.3 Terms of Trade Indices for Major Exporters of Manufactures and
Remaining Countries from 1960-2003.
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Figure 3.4 Terms of Trade Indices for the Remaining Countries Disaggregated by
Region and Economic Groupings, 1960-2003.
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Table 3.1 Estimation Results for Different Categories of Developing Countries
∆ lnNBTTt

Constant

T

lnNBTTt-1

Non-oil-exporting
countries

6.160
(2.94)
23.428
(4.93)
10.67
(4.33)
5.349
(2.76)
6.285
(3.41)
7.215
(2.60)
8.297
(3.05)
8.199
(2.81)

-.0026
(-2.94)
-.0099
(-4.86)
-.0046
(-4.27)
-.002
(-2.51)
-.0023
(-3.11)
-.0029
(-2.40)
-.0032
(-2.78)
-.0031
(-2.53)

-.2271
(-2.50)
-.66866
(-4.50)
-.3238
(-4.22)
-.2916
(-2.87)
-.3553
(-3.65)
-.31778
(-2.82)
-.3981
(-3.45)
-.4047
(-3.32)

Major exporters
of manufactures
Remaining
Countries

Remaining
America
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Remaining
Africa

Note: Table continues in the next page.

∆lnNBTTt-m
―
∆lnNBTTt-12
-.065(0.37)
―
―
―
―
―
―

∆lnNBTTt-1 Dummies
-.2106
(-1.25)
-.1648
(-2.13)
.1594
(1.24)
-.01205
(-0.09)
-.2376
(-1.81)
-.1179
(-0.76)
.0185
(0.12)
.0556
(0.38)

D751
-.08 (-1.95)
D751
-.07 (-2.01)
D751
-.13 (-3.99)
D741
-.16 (-4.43)
D74751
-.13 (-4.98)
D751
-.13 (-2.49)
D75771
-.12 (-3.03)
D771
-.16 (-3.08)

Adj.
R2
0.15

AIC

Serial Corr.

-161.08

0.46

-135.79

0.36

-168.89

0.41

-157.79

0.46

-161.49

0.21

-112.60

0.27

-115.39

0.28

-112.85

1.722
(0.1894)
1.171
(0.2792)
3.471
(0.0625)
8.283
(0.004)
0.462
(0.497)
0.017
(0.897)
0.268
(0.605)
1.769
(0.184)

White’s
Q-stat.
34.733
(0.015)
16.265
(0.298)
20.042
(0.392)
29.78
(0.055)
26.47
(0.118)
24.347
(0.082)
15.93
(0.46)
18.19
(0.31)

Trend
(%)
-1.15
-1.48
-1.42
-0.69
-0.65
-0.91
-0.80
-0.77

Table 3.1 (continued)
∆ lnNBTTt

Constant

T

lnNBTTt-1

69

White’s Trend
Q-stat.
(%)
Remaining
7.711
-.0031
-.3054
―
-.097
D731
-120.22 4.383
10.27
-1.02
West Asia
(2.37)
(-2.20)
(-2.71)
(-0.74)
-.18 (-3.77)
(0.036)
(0.85)
D731
0.31 -98.86
1.334
5.29
-0.99
9.636
-.0039
-.3892
∆lnNBTTt-2, -.0233
(-0.13)
-.18 (-3.40)
(0.2481)
(0.98)
(2.04)
(-1.88)
(-2.53)
t-3, t-4, t-5
Remaining
14.17
-.0055
-.7425
―
.0503
D731
0.27 -106.64 11.22
11.20
-0.74
Other Asia
(3.30)
(-3.20)
(-3.35)
(0.28)
.08 (1.38)
(0.001)
(0.79)
10.276
-0.71
13.108
-.0049
-.70314
―
.04134
―
0.25 -106.49 1.473
(0.225)
(0.852)
(3.06)
(-2.94)
(-3.16)
(0.22)
LDCs
7.94
-.0035
-.197
―
-.096
D771
0.24 -130.65 1.685
13.12
-1.78
(2.50)
(-2.42)
(-2.46)
(-0.65)
-.18 (-3.53)
(0.19)
(0.83)
HICs
33.91
-.0155
-.70664
―
.34322
―
0.45 -77.80
0.75
9.3219
-2.19
(4.34)
(-4.30)
(-4.44)
(2.15)
(0.39)
(0.502)
Notes: Figures within the parentheses under coefficients are t-ratios. Those under the test statistics of serial correlation and White’s Q-statistic are pvalues. The Dickey-Fuller critical values for the coefficient of lnNBTTt-1 at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are, respectively, -3.18, -3.50 and -4.15 for all
series except HICt, which has 24 observations, and therefore the corresponding critical values for its lnNBTTt-1 are -3.24, -3.95 and -4.38. Variables with
the letter ‘D’ indicate a point dummy variable. For example, D751 indicates a dummy variable with 0 for 1973 and 1 for all other years, and D7577
indicates a dummy variable with 0 for 1975 and 1977, and 1 for all other years. The estimates of trends do not significantly change when the dummies are
excluded from the estimation. The only changes that occur affect the stationarity of the series, i.e. some estimates might point to a non-stationarity in the
time-series.
∆lnNBTTt-m

∆lnNBTTt-1 Dummies

Adj.
R2
0.36

AIC

Serial Corr.

Table 3.2 Estimation Results with Intercept and Slope Dummy Variables for Different Categories of Developing Countries
∆ lnNBTTt

Const.

Non-oil
exporting
countries

-9.935
(-2.40)
-4.877
(-1.51)
5.054
(2.32)
-1.677
(-0.33)
-7.314
(-2.23)
7.907
(2.35)
-6.535
(-1.16)
-5.805
(-1.60)
-30.69
(-1.95)
-14.7
(-1.43)
-7.42
(-0.60)
-6.84
(-0.78)

Major exporters
of manufactures

70
A

Remaining
Countries

Remaining
America

Remaining
Africa

T
.00727
(3.24)
.00478
(2.42)
-.002
(-2.14)
.0016
(0.61)
.0049
(2.85)
-.0033
(-1.87)
.0051
(1.77)
.0053
(2.52)
.01668
(2.07)
.0089
(1.60)
.0048
(0.76)
.0047
(1.02)

lnNBTTt-1
-.946
(-4.60)
-.98219
(-4.39)
-.2280
(-1.96)
-.3138
(-2.77)
-.4837
(-5.66)
-.3105
(-1.91)
-.7659
(-3.81)
-.9943
(-4.85)
-.47975
(-2.61)
-.6228
(-2.97)
-.4632
(-2.60)
-.5365
(-2.90)

Note: Table continues in the next page.

∆lnNBTTt-1 Intercept
Dummy
.22432
D75
(1.52)
40.83(4.7)
.35657
D80
(2.05)
34.49(3.8)
-.0325
D90
(-0.20)
3.28(0.60)
.0314
D75
(0.20)
11.02(1.5)
.0168
D76
(0.15)
20.25(4.0)
.1527
D80
(0.79)
.013(0.00)
.1523
D75
(0.97)
25.87(3.3)
.2807
D80
(1.75)
27.2(3.67)
.0033
D75
(0.02)
44.56(2.5)
.0924
D80
(0.49)
28.38(1.9)
.10413
D77
(0.57)
19.06(1.3)
.1208
D80
(0.66)
17.52(1.5)

Slope
Adj.
Dummy
R2
D75t
0.42
-.021(-4.7)
D80t
0.32
-.018(-3.8)
D90t
0.05
-0.002(-0.6)
D75t
0.19
-.006(-1.5)
D76t
0.59
-.010(-4.1)
D80t
0.10
-.00003(0.01)
D75t
0.29
-.013(-3.3)
D80t
0.36
-.014(-3.7)
D75t
0.19
-.023(-2.5)
D80t
0.18
-.014(-1.9)
D77t
0.09
-.01(-1.3)
D80t
0.14
-.009(-1.5)

AIC
-175.9
-169.5
-155.6
-158.5
-186.8
-153.8
-148.8
-153.2
-110.7
-110.1
-103.2
-105.3

Serial
Corr.
0.10
(0.75)
2.73
(0.10)
4.07
(0.04)
20.25
(0.00)
0.06
(0.81)
3.54
(0.06)
0.23
(0.63)
5.08
(0.02)
0.001
(0.98)
2.27
(0.13)
0.30
(0.58)
0.06
(0.80)

White’s
Q-stat.
19.824
(0.405)
14.959
(0.725)
30.150
(0.049)
16.198
(0.644)
15.33
(0.70)
17.76
(0.539)
19.29
(0.44)
21.698
(0.299)
7.9630
(0.95)
9.44
(0.89)
12.3
(0.72)
14.28
(0.58)

Trend rate (%)
Pre 75: 0.77
Post 75: -1.42
Pre 80: 0.49
Post 80: -1.29
x
Pre 75: 0.51
Post 75: -1.27
Pre 76: 1.01
Post 76: -1.12
x
Pre 75: 0.67
Post 75: -1.05
Pre 80: 0.53
Post 80: -0.86
Pre 75: 3.48
Post 75: -1.23
Pre 80: 1.43
Post 80: -0.88
Pre 77: 1.04
Post 77: -1.06
Pre 80: 0.88
Post 80: -0.78

Table 3.2 (continued)
∆ lnNBTTt

Const.

T

lnNBTTt-1
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∆lnNBTTt-1 Intercept
Slope
Adj. AIC
Serial
White’s
Trend rate (%)
Dummy
Dummy
R2
Corr.
Q-stat.
7.264
x
-11.86
.0066
-.2564
-.1775
D73
D73t
0.07
-105.5
1.30
(0.25)
(0.968)
(-0.46)
(0.51)
(-1.88)
(-1.09)
18.6(0.71)
-.01(-0.7)
Remaining
-6.135
.0039
-.3289
-.2409
D75
D75t
0.13
-108.0
0.28
5.669
x
West Asia
(-0.38)
(0.48)
(-2.31)
(-1.52)
12.8(0.75)
-.007(-0.8)
(0.59)
(0.99)
-.0055
-.3699
-.1576
D80
D80t
0.11
-107.0
0.07
4.701
x
12.56
(1.51)
(-1.32)
(-2.12)
(-0.94)
-6.9(-0.8)
.0035(0.78)
(0.79)
(0.99)
15.45
-.0068
-.4311
-.2298 (D96
D96t
0.35
-118.6
0.57
9.874
Pre 96: -1.58
(2.78)
(-2.74)
(-2.90)
1.71)
42.36(2.9)
-.021(-2.9)
(0.45)
(0.87)
Post 96: -6.50
10.27
x
Remaining
-5.13
.0041
-.632
.0185
D75
D75t
0.23
-103.6
0.14
(0.71)
(0.85)
Other Asia
(-0.26)
(0.43)
(-2.65)
(0.10)
16.76(0.9)
-.009(-0.9)
11.09
-.004
-.6969
.0367
D80
D80t
0.20
-102.6
1.24
10.85
x
(1.16)
(-0.87)
(-2.93)
(0.19)
2.104(0.2)
-.001(-0.2)
(0.27)
(0.82)
15.32
Pre 90: -0.70
16.10
-.0061
-.8732
.1181
D90
D90t
0.3
-107.2
0.18
(0.67)
(0.50)
Post90: -1.55
(2.53)
(-2.23)
(-3.54)
(0.60)
14.86(1.9)
-.007(-1.9)
2.937
-.0002
-.5476
.1592
D75
D75t
0.24
-129.5
0.58
17.83
Pre75: -0.04
(0.39)
(-0.05)
(-4.00)
(1.07)
27.88(3.1)
-.014(-3.1)
(0.45)
(0.53)
Post75: -2.61
LDCs
-.6658
.2037
D77
D77t
0.28
-131.8
22.54
Pre77: 0.02
2.88
.00011
2.23
(0.04)
(-4.11)
(1.37)
35.9(3.97)
-.018(-3.9)
(0.14)
(0.26)
Post77: -2.70
(0.46)
.3997
.0012
-.6038
.2073
D80
D80t
0.23
-129.2
0.36
20.14
Pre80: 0.20
(0.09)
(0.55)
(-3.90)
(1.30)
33.9(3.49)
-.017(-3.5)
(0.55)
(0.39)
Post80: -2.62
16.43
Pre90: -0.75
8.297
-.0032
-.4279
.1465
D90
D90t
0.12
-123.7
0.21
(0.65)
(0.63)
Post90: -2.57
(2.14)
(-1.89)
(-2.79)
(0.86)
15.35(1.4)
-.008(-1.4)
HICs
64.84
-.031
-.781
.1154
D90
D90t
-87.4
0.004
8.12
Pre90: -3.97
(5.84)
(-5.69)
(-5.98)
(0.78)
-38.1(-3.7)
.01917(3.7)
(0.95)
(0.62)
Post90: -1.52
Note: Figures within the parentheses are t-ratios. The Dickey-Fuller critical values for the coefficient of lnNBTTt-1 at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance
levels are, respectively, -3.18, -3.50 and -4.15 for all series except HICt, whose number of observations are 24 and therefore the corresponding critical
values for lnNBTTt-1 are -3.24, -3.95 and -4.38. x means that the trend coefficient is not significant and therefore the trend growth rate is not estimated
and can be considered to be zero.

Table 3.3 Timing of Structural Breaks
Estimated break
date with a shift
dummy25
1974
1976
1974
1975
1974
1974
1974
1977
1986

Non-oil exporting countries
Major exporters of manufactures
Remaining Countries
America
Africa
West Asia
Other Asia
LDCs
HICs

25

Break dates are endogenously estimated by using the JMulti software, downloadable from
www.jmulti.de. This program provides unit root tests proposed by Saikkonen and Lütkepohl
(2002) and also implements tests for unknown break dates.
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CHAPTER 4
GROWTH DIVERGENCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF TERMS OF TRADE:
THE EMERGENCE OF IMMISERIZING GROWTH DURING NEOLIBERAL
GLOBALIZATION
4.1 Introduction
In open economies, one of the major constraints on economic growth is the
availability of foreign exchange. This is especially the case for developing countries that
have balance of payments difficulties arising from their inadequate international
competitiveness. If a country runs a current account deficit, or a foreign exchange
shortage, that is not automatically eliminated through a change in the relative prices of
tradable goods, it becomes a constraint on demand given that the deficit cannot be
indefinitely financed at a constant rate of interest, and will therefore affect the growth
process. Thus, the balance of payments is a binding constraint on economic growth in the
presence of foreign exchange shortages that need to be managed by attracting short-term
capital flows that are highly volatile and demand high rates of interest.
By limiting the potential for achieving high growth rates in developing countries,
the balance of payments constraint becomes an important mechanism to generate growth
divergence between developed and developing economies. It is much easier for
developed countries to raise foreign exchange since it is their own currency that functions
as a global unit of exchange in world capital markets. Therefore, balance of payments
constraint favors developed countries and disfavors developing ones, enhancing the
patterns of growth divergence across countries.
The studies focusing on balance of payments constrained growth (Thirlwall and
McCombie 2004, Blecker 2004, Perraton 2004) take into account neither the changes in
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terms of trade nor changes in trade balance.26 Dutt (2002) emphasizes that both of these
neglected aspects should be incorporated into the analysis in order to obtain a more
complete theory of uneven development:
…[Thirlwall’s Law] is derived on the basis of a number of stringent assumptions, of
which two are: that the terms of trade is constant, and that trade is balanced. Both these
assumptions are troubling in the present context. Regarding the first, variations in the
terms of trade between rich and poor countries have played an important role in the
examination of economic relations between the North and the South…Regarding the
second, international capital flows have also been a major relation in the analysis of the
relation between rich and poor countries. It has often been argued that foreign direct
investment by transnational corporations creates development problems for the South and
exacerbates North-South uneven development, and ‘surplus transfers’ from the South to
the North resulting from payments of interest on Southern debt have also had analogous
effects. Others have argued that international capital flows provide an important means
by which the South can grow more rapidly than is possible from domestic saving and
thereby catch up with the North. …. What is needed to overcome this problem is a model
that simultaneously determines the growth rate of the North and the South and the
evolution of the North-South terms of trade, rather than one that arbitrarily takes the
terms of trade as exogenously given. Such a general equilibrium model of North-South
trade also offers the possibility of explicitly taking into account North-South flows of
capital…. (Dutt 2002: 376).

Such a model that simultaneously determines the growth rate of the North and the
South, and the evolution of North-South terms of trade can be formulated based on the
Prebisch-Singer Thesis (PST) that endogenizes the relative growth rates and the NorthSouth terms of trade. Moreover, PST offers the possibility of explicitly taking into
account North-South flows of capital by its modification to imbalanced trade. The
purpose of this chapter is to introduce a formal PST model that relates growth divergence
in the world economy to the evolution of terms of trade endogenously under a NorthSouth balance of payments constraint. The extension of PST allows us to take into
account the cases where trade is not balanced, and therefore, capital flows play an
important role in balancing payments. The income elasticity differentials are also

26

See Razmi (2009) for an exposition of these BOP-constrained models and their exclusion of the
non-tradable sector.
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endogenized as a function of structural change and technological upgrading based on a
structuralist North-South model (Botta 2009). The chapter combines this theoretical
framework with empirical evidence on the patterns of growth divergence, the evolution
of terms of trade, the trends in trade balance, and the income-elasticity differentials; it
also tests the joint predictions of PST. The evidence suggests the emergence of

immiserizing growth for the whole set of developing countries in the 1980s as the
simultaneous entry of many developing countries into simple manufacturing production
for servicing their debt payments led to a sharp decline in terms of trade and growth
collapses across the whole set of developing countries. The primary gain from increased
exports and initial growth was largely offset by the secondary loss in income due to
deteriorating terms of trade. It is in this sense that the South experienced immiserizing
growth under the neoliberal phase of globalization.

4.2 A Reformulation of the Prebisch-Singer Thesis
A few years after the pioneering work of Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) on
the terms of trade trends, Johnson (1953) developed a simple model on the effects of
economic growth on terms of trade. This model derives the conditions for the trade
balance equilibrium to hold within an expanding world economy. Johnson’s model can
be reinterpreted assuming that there are two regions in the world: the North and the
South, which are also identified as the advanced countries and the developing countries.
The North exports high-technology manufactured goods, the South raw materials or lowtechnology manufactures. The demand for high-technology manufactures, that is, the
South’s import volume (M), thus depends on the national income of the South (YS) and
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the price of high-technology manufactures relative to raw materials (or low-technology
manufactures) (p):

M = M (YS , p )

(4.1)

The demand for raw materials, or the South’s export volume (X), depends on the
national income of the North (YN) and the relative price of raw materials (1/p):

X = X (YN , 1 p )

(4.2)

What would be the effect of economic expansion on trade balances if the demand
for high-technology manufactures is more income-elastic relative to the demand for raw
materials (or low-tech manufactures)? If we assume that both regions grow at the same
pace, the demand for high-technology manufactures in the South grows faster than the
North’s demand for raw materials (or low-tech manufactures). As a result, there will be a
relative abundance of these less sophisticated commodities produced by the South, which
will push the Southern terms of trade down. The deterioration in Southern terms of trade
can only be prevented if the South grows less rapidly than the North.
This situation can also be seen from the conditions for equilibrium under balanced
trade (TB=0):

TB = X (Y N , 1 p ) − pM (YS , p )

(4.3)

Taking time derivatives and setting dTB/dt = 0, Eq. (4.3) yields

dTB dt = X [eS g N + η S pˆ ] − pM [eN g S + (1 − η N ) pˆ ]
where eS = income elasticity of demand for Southern exports

eN = income elasticity of demand for Northern exports
ηS = price elasticity of demand for Southern exports
ηN = price elasticity of demand for Northern exports
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(4.4)

gS = rate of growth for Southern national output, i.e. (dYS /dt)/YS
gN = rate of growth for Northern national output, i.e. (dYN /dt)/YN
p̂ = rate of growth of Northern terms of trade.

If we initially assume that TB=0, then we have X=pM. To ensure a zero trade
balance over time, we need to have

eS g N − eN g S + (η S + η N − 1) pˆ = 0

(4.5)

This results in a trend of the Northern terms-of-trade depending on (4.6):

pˆ =

eN g S − eS g N
ηS + ηN − 1

(4.6)

Eq. (4.6) implies that the lower income elasticity of demand for raw materials
relative to high-tech manufactures would be reflected in a deterioration of South’s terms
of trade (conversely an improvement in the North’s terms of trade) or alternatively as a
slower rate of economic growth for developing countries. In other words, the elasticity

differential (eN > eS) generates two predictions: (i) If the regions grow at the same rate in
the steady-state, the South’s terms-of-trade is bound to deteriorate; (ii) If the terms-oftrade remains constant over time, the South will grow at a slower rate than the North. The
Prebisch-Singer Thesis (PST) is a joint hypothesis composed of these two predictions.
Notice that the derivation of PST is based only on the income elasticity
differential. However, the magnitude of the change in terms of trade required to
reestablish trade balance also depends on the price elasticities. The lower these
elasticities are, the larger the deterioration of the terms of trade of Southern exports will
be. We assume that the sum of these price elasticities of demand for exports of both

77

regions is greater than one (a positive denominator in Eq. 4.6), which is required by the
Marshall-Lerner dynamic stability condition.27

4.2.1 Incomplete Specialization, Technological Change, and Factor Accumulation
In the case of incomplete specialization, that is when countries produce importcompeting and exported goods, the effect of economic growth on terms-of-trade may be
ambiguous. If the growth is biased towards exports, the excess supply of exports leads to
a deterioration in the growing country’s terms of trade. By contrast, growth that is biased
towards imports may improve its terms-of-trade. Thus, the effect of growth on import
demand determines the direction of change in terms-of-trade. An import-biased growth
that significantly lowers the demand for imports would improve the growing country’s
terms-of-trade. Indeed, this was precisely the basic reasoning behind the strategy of
import-substituting industrialization supported by Prebisch. If the developing countries
increased their domestic supply of manufactured goods, the growth of their manufactured
imports could be less than that of national income, despite their high income elasticity of
demand for these goods.
Even though the PST depends primarily on demand side factors, considerations
from the supply side can be introduced into the basic framework. Consider, in particular,
the effect of a neutral technological change, such that relative factor use at constant factor
prices is not affected by the technological change. If the rate of technological change
varies across sectors, the terms of trade of countries that specialize in sectors with faster
productivity increases will have a tendency to decline. This was the reason behind the

27

Note that Eqs. (4.1) and (4.2) and hence (4.5) and (4.6) assume infinite elasticities of supply of
Home and Foreign exports.
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Ricardian expectation that the terms-of-trade of countries specialized in producing
manufactures would tend to deteriorate due to rapid technological developments in
manufacturing (especially relative to primary sector). If we assume that the technological
change is not similar in the same sectors of different countries, the effect of productivity
increases on the terms of trade becomes uncertain. Nevertheless, we can still derive a
more general implication. A region’s terms-of-trade tends to improve (deteriorate) if the
rate of technological change in its import-substituting (export) sectors increases more
rapidly than the rest of the world. This is also the view emphasized by Prebisch and
Singer: the productivity increases taking place in export industries are “exported” to the
rest of the world via a declining terms-of-trade, whereas those in import-substituting
sectors tend to benefit technologically developing countries more than proportionately.
Another supply-side factor that affects the terms-of-trade is the relative supply of
productive factors. If the countries are specialized in the production of goods that
intensively use their relatively more abundant factors, an increase in the supply of these
abundant factors would have a negative impact on their terms-of-trade. On the other
hand, an increase in the supply of scarce factors would improve the region’s terms of
trade. If developed countries increase their relative endowment of capital as they grow,
this will depress their terms of trade over time as they specialize in capital-intensive
goods. By contrast, economic growth renders land and other natural resources relatively
scarce, which leads to increasing relative-prices of land- or natural resource-intensive
products. Note that this was also a Ricardian prediction that warned about rising terms of
trade of countries specialized in primary products.
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Although the net effect from these demand-side and supply-side factors on terms
of trade for developing countries is ambiguous, it can be seen that the demand elements
generally reduce the terms of trade of primary commodity producing regions, while the
supply factors tend to have a counteracting effect. Moreover, our consideration of these
supply factors indicates that the developing countries as a whole benefit much more from
technological improvements in import-substitution activities compared to export
activities, plus their accumulation of scarce factors such as capital (including human
capital) would tend to improve their terms of trade.
The condition of trade balance equilibrium is, to a great extent, a reasonable
external constraint to the growth of developing countries as many of them find
themselves running into balance of payment problems whenever they try to expand at a
faster rate. Some economists argued that free capital movements have not necessarily
relaxed this external constraint because of their adverse effect in destabilizing the
developing economies by creating currency crises (Taylor 1998). Thus, it seems
appropriate to take the trade balance to be a binding constraint for the South, especially
over the long run.

4.3 The Generalized PST
In some cases, trade deficits/surpluses might be sustained over time. To examine
these cases, we will relax the assumption of balanced trade and derive the conditions for
terms of trade deterioration and growth divergence under unbalanced trade. Using the
expression for trade balance in the South (Eq. 4.3), we can consider situations where the
trade balance is not zero due to international movements of capital:
TB = X (Y N , 1 p ) − pM (Y S , p )

(4.3)
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As demonstrated in Appendix A, the following dynamic restriction expresses the
modified Prebisch-Singer Thesis when neither the level, nor the change in the trade
balance (TB), is preset to be zero:
TˆB
pM
TB

(η S

+ η N − 1) + η S

+

eN g S
pM
TB

pM
E
− eS g N
TB
TB

(η S

+ η N − 1) + η S

= pˆ

(4.7)

where, as before, e is the income elasticity, η is the price elasticity of demand for exports,
and η S + η N > 1 is the Marshall-Lerner stability condition. Eq. (4.7) is thus the
generalized form of Eq. (4.6), or the generalized PST, without restrictions placed on the
trade balance.
Eq. (4.7) may be interpreted, to begin with, for the case where there is no initial
trade balance.
(i)

If TˆB = 0 , that is, when the trade balance is constant but not necessarily zero, and

pˆ = 0 , then if the South starts with a trade surplus, g S could equal g N even if eS < eN .

In other words, an initial Southern trade surplus makes uneven growth less likely. In
contrast, an initial trade deficit or balance for the South implies that the South will grow
slower than the North, with the deficit reinforcing uneven development.
(ii)

If TˆB = 0 in the steady-state such that g S = g N , then if the South starts with an

initial trade surplus, p̂ might decline (or the Southern terms of trade might improve) even
if eS < eN . Thus, an initial Southern trade surplus makes terms-of-trade deterioration for
the South less likely. On the other hand, an initial Southern trade deficit or balance leads
to a deterioration in the South’s terms of trade.

81

In summary, given a constant trade balance over time, the original predictions of
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis apply as long as the South begins with an initial trade deficit
or balance. In the case of an initial trade surplus, the predictions depend on whether the
opposing effect of this trade surplus exceeds the effect of elasticity differentials or not.
Let us consider the case where the trade balance varies over time.
(i)

If the trend change in trade balance is positive, that is TˆB > 0 , and pˆ = 0 , then

there will be growth divergence as long as the South starts with a trade balance or deficit.
Again, an initial Southern trade surplus would make the result ambiguous. In the contrary
case of a negative trend in trade balance and pˆ = 0 , we obtain

e N pM
g
> N , which
eS E
gS

means that growth rates do not necessarily diverge.
(ii)

If TˆB > 0 in the steady-state such that g S = g N , then the Southern terms of trade

will deteriorate as long as the initial trade balance is negative or zero. However, in the
case of a substantial initial trade surplus, there appears the possibility that the terms of
trade might improve. On the other hand, if TˆB < 0 in the steady-state, the resulting effect
on p̂ depends on whether the negative effect of TˆB outweighs the positive effect of
income-elasticity difference and the initial trade deficit/balance. An initial trade surplus
would weaken the positive impact from income-elasticities and would therefore make the
decline in p̂ (or the improvement in Southern terms of trade) more likely.
In short, a positive trend in trade balance reinforces the original PST predictions.
As long as the initial trade balance is zero or negative, a positive trend in Southern trade
balance results in either growth divergence between the North and the South and/or a
terms-of-trade deterioration for the South. Moreover, a negative trend in Southern trade
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balance, together with an initial trade surplus, might yield ambiguous results but does not
exclude the original PST predictions.

4.3.1 A Structuralist Extension of the PST: A Three-Region North-South Model

As the literature review in Chapter 2 has demonstrated, there has been a vast body
of literature on economic modeling of the North-South interactions. The new theories of
international trade have greatly formalized and illustrated a range of implicit ideas
contained within the propositions of structuralist school of thought, such as the presence
of technological gaps and the existence of ‘external economies.’ However, a drawback of
this new generation of models has been the neglect of some of the crucial insights of the
structuralist theories, such as asymmetries in productive structures, external balance
constraints, and asymmetric trade patterns.
In order to bring these mechanisms of uneven development back into the
technology-gap models, and therefore form a more complete formulation of the NorthSouth interactions, Botta (2009) has incorporated crucial aspects of structuralist
formulations into a model where differences in the levels of technology, as well as
industrial policies and institutional changes, play a crucial role in giving rise to uneven
development. This section will provide an overview of the model, illustrating its
relevance for the North-South patterns of growth divergence, terms-of-trade movements,
and possibilities of ‘catching-up’ with the developed North. The model is fullycompatible with the PST and can be thought of as a closure of PST. It is a two-region
North-South model, but it can also be used to demonstrate the emergence of a third semiindustrialized region under the provision of protectionist measures that are temporary and
conditional to the achievement of performance criteria. Kaldorian “cumulative causation”
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mechanisms play an important role in eliminating both demand-side and supply-side
bottlenecks during this process.
This section will also consider the impact of the third region on the persistence of
a North-South divide. While Botta assumes the emergence of one of the three conditions,
(divergence, convergence, or initial convergence with long-run divergence), one can use
the model to describe the emergence of partial convergence of the South (due to
differentiation within the South) accompanied by and partly leading to the sustained
persistence of growth divergence between the North and the rest of the South. The
driving force in the model is the increasing importance and share of manufacturing
activities within the total GDP—which acts as an indicator of structural change.
However, Botta implicitly assumes that the manufacturing experience of one part of the
developing world is independent from those in other parts. This leaves out the possibility
of exports from faster growing developing country that “crowd out” their competitors
from the global markets, i.e. it assumes the absence of the fallacy of composition
effects.28 Yet, it is possible to consider these effects in order to see their impact on the
long-run growth dynamics of other countries whose structural transformation takes place
at a slower pace.
Let us first begin by assuming two regions, a developing South and a developed
North. Suppose that the productive regimes of these regions take the following form:

28

qnt = r + α n hnt −1

(4.8)

qst = r + α s hst −1

(4.9)

For empirical evidence on these effects, see Blecker and Razmi (2008).
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In Equations (4.8) and (4.9), qst ( qnt ) and hst (hnt ) are the rates of growth for labor
productivity and for the share of manufacturing in GDP of the South (North).
Industrialization produces positive effects on labor productivity as a result of the
increasing returns in manufacturing and technological spillovers from the manufacturing
sector to the rest of the economy. This formulation is widely-known as the KaldorVerdoon law, reflecting the original perspective of Kaldor on the positive relationship
between the growth rate of labor productivity and the “excess of the rate of growth of
manufacturing production over the rate of growth of the economy as a whole” (Kaldor,
1967:8, quoted from Botta 2009: 63). This productivity-enhancing property of
manufacturing can also be traced back to Adam Smith and other classical political
economists, and it is strongly supported by empirical evidence (UNCTAD 2003a,
Greenwald and Stiglitz 2006).
Following the structuralist tradition, the mark-up rate is assumed to be constant,
which allows the price-setting to be represented in the following terms:
pnt = wnt − qnt
wnt = r + ρ nα n hnt −1

(4.10)

pst = wst − qst
wst = r + ρ sα s hst −1

(4.11)

According to (4.10) and (4.11), the price inflation pst ( pnt ) is defined as the
difference between the monetary wage inflation wst ( wnt ) and the labor productivity
growth rate in the South (North). The monetary wage deflation is determined by the sum
of the exogenous component of the growth in labor productivity ( r ) and a portion of the
endogenous component, where, the parameters ρ s and ρ n are institutional factors that
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influence the degree of productivity growth that is transferred to the nominal wage
inflation.
A binding external constraint to growth is imposed based on the existence of trade
balance in the long-run. In dynamic terms, this yields:
pst + x st = pnt + mst

(4.12)

x st = η s ( pnt − p st ) + es g nt

(4.13)

mst = η n ( p st − pnt ) + en g st

(4.14)

Equations (4.13) and (4.14) express trade equations: The growth rate of exports
(imports) in the South x st ( mst ) is a function of the growth rate of relative price
differences and of income in the North (South) g nt ( g st ) . Price and income elasticities are
represented by the η ’s and e ’s.
Income growth in the South under the trade balance constraint can be derived by
substituting Eqs. (4.8)– (4.11), (4.13) and (4.14) in (4.12):
g st =

(η s + ηn − 1) [(w
en

nt

− wst ) + α s hst −1 − α n hnt −1 ] +

es
g nt
en

(4.15)

This expression can be simplified through a few additional assumptions:
(i) If the developed countries are the engines of growth in the world economy (Taylor
1983, Findlay 1981), the Northern income growth and productive structure can be
assumed to be exogenous and constant over time, that is g nt = g n and hnt = 0 .
(ii) The rate of growth of the manufacturing GDP share in the South is positively related
to the economic growth, g st .
hst = σ t g st , and 0 ≤ σ < 1

(4.16)
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Income growth in the South tends to shift consumers’ preferences towards industrial
goods, and thus stimulates the growth of manufacturing share. On the supply side,
income growth generates a larger and fast-growing domestic market that sustains
manufacturing industries with economies of scale. Parameter σ is a policy variable that
captures the feedback from domestic institutions to industrialization in the South. While
high-values of σ represent protectionist policies and favor expanding the manufacturing
growth rate as a share of GDP, low values of σ stand for a ‘market-friendly’ institutional
environment that impedes infant-industry protection. Needless to say, the development
strategies represented by σ exert a great impact on the emergence of the different NorthSouth growth paths.
(iii) Incorporating insights from the technology-gap literature (Verspagen 1993, and
others), the pattern of exports are assumed to change through technological factors such
as learning-by-doing, innovation, and technological spillovers from developed countries.
Thus, the income elasticity of exports (imports) est ( ent ) is positively (negatively) related
to the domestic share of manufacturing in GDP and negatively (positively) related to
“technological content”:

ent =

est =

2e ∗
1+ e

[ln ( H st / H n )] / φ

2e ∗
1+ e

− [ln ( H st / H n )] / φ

with

∂ent
∂ent
< 0 and
<0
∂ (H st / H n )
∂φ

(4.17a)

with

∂est
∂est
> 0 and
>0
∂φ
∂ (H st / H n )

(4.17b)

where H st ( H nt ) is the level of the share of manufacturing in the South’s (North’s) GDP;
e ∗ is a uniform level of income elasticity if the regions had identical productive
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structures; and φ is a technological parameter that captures the “technological content”
of industrialization in the South.
One of the central properties of the model is that the process of industrialization
leads to diversification of the productive pattern and thereby changes the composition of
export and import flows. Equation (4.17a) shows that development of the manufacturing
sector within the South lowers the income elasticity of imports as the South becomes
capable of producing substitutes for imported goods. At the same time, Southern
industrialization diversifies the set of domestic exportable goods, and thereby increases
the income elasticity of exports (Leon-Ledesma 2002, Botta 2009).
Higher values of the technological parameter φ indicate a rise in the non-price
competitiveness of the Southern goods. This results in an increase of Southern exports
and a decline of Southern imports. With the growth of Northern income, this means the
South has a higher income elasticity of exports and a lower one for imports. The
evolution of income elasticities is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Equation (4.15) can be rewritten based on the assumptions (i)–(iii):
g st = (1 − ρ s )

α s (β s + β n − 1)
est

σ (t −1) g st −1 +

ent
gn
est

(4.18)

where 0 < α s (β s + β n − 1) < 1 and est ≥ 1 .
In Equation (4.18), industrialization generates economic growth through Eqs.
(4.9), (4.17a) and (4.17b). First, the lagged rise in the share of manufacturing in GDP
increases labor productivity, and therefore the price competitiveness of Southern goods,
as shown by the Kaldor-Verdoon law in Eq. (4.9). Note that the terms of trade of the
South would deteriorate during this process, as the rising productivity leads to lower
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relative prices of Southern tradable goods. Second, the increasing level of Southern
industrialization modifies the North-South trade pattern and reduces the gap in income
elasticities. Both of these effects tend to relax the external balance constraint and
stimulate the Southern growth to gain a faster pace.
The long-run dynamics of the model are obtained through a Kaldorian cumulative
causation process between industrialization and growth. Equation (4.19), whose
derivation is provided in Botta (2009: 67-8), represents these dynamics as follows:
t

σ (i −1)

i =1

eni

g st = [α s (1 − ρ s )(η s + η n − 1)]t ∏

With: g s∗ =


(η + ηn − 1) σ (t −1) {B}g + est g → g ∗
g so + α s (1 − ρ s ) s
n
n
s

ent
ent



es∗ (H s∗ )
gn .
en∗ (H s∗ )

(4.19)

In the long-run, the growth of income in the South depends on the growth rate of
the Northern income and the long-run income elasticity differential. This is exactly the
same condition obtained from the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis under the conditions that
the terms of trade remain constant over time and the balance of trade holds. Interestingly
though, this extended dynamic model allows us to conceive the income elasticity
differential as a function of the relative share of manufacturing sectors in the South vis-àvis the North. Note also that the long-run equilibrium is “path-dependent” and
“endogenous” to the process of industrialization, i.e. different initial conditions or
temporary shocks generate permanent impacts on industrial development.
Two distinct outcomes emerge from Eq. (4.19) in the long-run. First, if the South
accomplishes structural transformation so that its share of manufacturing GDP converges
to that of the North ( H s∗ = H n ), the South will grow at the same pace as the North in the
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long-run ( g s∗ = g n ). Second, the failure of the South to transform itself sustains the
differential in relative manufacturing ratios as a share of GDP ( H s∗ < H n ), resulting in
North-South divergence in the long-run ( g s∗ < g n ). To be precise, the author also
considers a third dynamic outcome, which is composed of a temporary convergence that
is replaced by a long-run divergence due to the failure to upgrade technologically.
Instead of considering these outcomes one at a time as multiple paths of NorthSouth growth, one might think of them as simultaneous paths corresponding to different
types of Southern countries, based on their pace of structural change and previous
manufacturing experiences. The case of a “high-quality” industrialization process for one
country in the South, say for the major exporters of manufactured goods, can take place
simultaneously with the case of a “failed industrialization attempt” for the rest of
Southern countries that rely mostly on primary production. The model, therefore, not
only accommodates the presence of “differentiation within the South,” but explains the
emergence of a third region that successfully transforms itself during the Kaldorian
traverse. This third region develops its manufacturing sector vigorously with its selective
industrial policies (high values of σ ), rising productive efficiency (high values of α s )
and upgrading its domestic industries technologically (high values of φ ). Figure 4.2a
provides a depiction of this growth-enhancing manufacturing process.
The development of the third-region might indeed make it more difficult for the
rest of the developing countries to industrialize. This ‘fallacy of composition’ effect
operates through both the demand-side and supply-side factors. As to the demand-side
factors, economic growth in the developed countries may increase the market share of the
manufactured goods produced by fast-developing countries by shifting consumers’
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preferences towards the superior-quality and cheaper industrial goods produced by
leading exporters of manufactures. As to the supply-side factors, the excess supply of
labor in the faster-growing region gets more quickly depleted, and the pressure to
introduce technological innovations increases. In the lagging regions, on the other hand,
the large reserve of surplus labor creates a greater incentive to rely on cheaper labor
inputs and reduces the rate of technological upgrading. Although price competitiveness
might trigger initial convergence, it fades out without rising levels of productive
efficiency and attaining higher levels of technological content. The failed
industrialization attempts might also be due to the “trade-off between too-high and
generalized protectionist measures and poor incentives to pursue efficiency and
innovation” (Botta 2009: 69). Thus, a high level of σ , together with low values for

α s and φ , might produce sustained uneven development for the majority of the South
vis-à-vis the North. These dynamics are shown in Figure 4.2b.
Sustained uneven development can also occur when the industrial policy variable

σ is set to zero under an extreme “market-friendly” setting. The neoliberal paradigm that
predicates privatization, liberalization, trade openness and abandonment of discretional
industrial policies can be depicted in Figure 4.2, where Eq. (4.18) does not move at all
since domestic industrialization does not take place ( σ = 0). The original North-South
asymmetries in productive and technological structures remain intact, and the incomeelasticity differential reproduces the original North-South growth divergence. In fact,
several developing countries experienced deindustrialization after following the
neoliberal recipes dictated by international lending institutions. In this model, this would
correspond to a declining manufacturing GDP share that would lower the export-import
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elasticity ratio even further and widen the divergence between these developing countries
and the North.

4.4 An Empirical Analysis of the PST
4.4.1 Data Sample and Classification

This section examines the evolution of the income elasticity of demand for
imports (en) and exports (es) using an unbalanced panel data set composed of 51
developing countries over 1960-2006: 11 major exporters of manufactured goods, 4
major exporters of petroleum and 36 primary commodity exporters, out of which 15 are
highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs). The sample is fairly comprehensive and aimed
to be representative of certain types of international specialization among developing
countries. It includes the leading exporters of manufactures (China, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, Turkey, and the Philippines) and a
few petroleum exporting developing countries (Congo Republic, Iran, Nigeria, and
Syria). While manufactured exports play a central role in the pattern of specialization of
the first group, the exports of the second group are dominated by petroleum and other
petroleum-based products. The group of primary exporters can be separated into two subgroups: first 15 countries that have accumulated a large share of debt to GDP (Benin,
Bolivia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Honduras,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo), then 21 countries
with lower ratios of debt to GDP (Bangladesh, Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, South Africa, Tunisia, and Uruguay). Note that the
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former group tends to have a less diversified export structure with greater dependence on
primary commodities than the latter group in general. In total, the sample considers a
sufficiently heterogeneous group of countries whose patterns of specialization represent
the major patterns that can be found in developing economies.

4.4.2 Income Elasticity Differentials

First, different panel data techniques are used to estimate the income elasticity of
demand for imports based on the following equations:
mit = ai + en yit + η n pmit + uit

(4.20)

where m is the log of imports in real terms, ai is the country-specific effect (using panel
data), y is the log of real domestic income, pm is the log of import prices relative to
domestic substitutes, and u is a white noise error term.
Assuming that the adjustment of import demand to changes in prices and income
is not instantaneous, we present a dynamic specification for estimation:
mit = α i + en yit + η n pmit + δ n mit −1 + µit

(4.21)

where mit-1 is the log of lagged real imports and µ is a white noise error term. This
specification allows us to distinguish short and long run elasticities. The short run price
and income elasticities are ηn and en respectively; whereas the long run elasticities are

η n /(1 − δ n ) and en /(1 − δ n ) . The estimates for these coefficients are presented in Table
4.1 and Figure 4.3.
Similarly, we can estimate the income elasticity of demand for exports using the
following equations:
xit = bi + es z it + η s pxit + ωit

(4.22)
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where x is the log of exports in real terms, bi is the country-specific effect, z is the log of
real foreign income, px is the log of relative export prices, and ω is a white noise error
term. Including a lagged dependent variable (xit-1), the dynamic specification would be of
the form:
xit = bi + es zit + η s pxit + δ s xit −1 + γ it

(4.23)

Rolling regressions29 are used to estimate the income elasticity of demand for exports and
imports of the total sample of developing countries from 1960-2006. The results are
presented in Figure 4.3.
It can be seen from Figure 4.3 that the elasticity of demand for exports was
significantly lower than import elasticity for the whole set of developing countries. Three
points are worth emphasizing in this regard:
(i)

The evolution of income elasticity for imports exhibits two peaks in the 1970s and

1990s and a sharp trough in the 1980s.30 Export elasticity follows a similar trend, but with
a considerable time lag of one or two decades.
(ii)

Income-elasticity differential persists over time. It shows a decline in the late

1970s and early 1980s with the implementation of trade liberalization and the initial
tendency for the export demand to respond faster to currency devaluations. However, this
initial positive effect is reversed with subsequent currency overvaluation and insufficient
levels of technological upgrading.
(iii)

There has been an upturn in income elasticities in the recent period, 1996-2005,

corresponding to an upturn in terms of trade for several primary commodity producers
29

Rolling regressions for demonstrating the evolutions of elasticities have been used by other
studies including Cimoli et al. (2010) and Pacheco-Lopez and Thirlwall (2006).
30

This is similar to the findings for Latin American countries (Cimoli et al. 2010: 393-4).
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due to rising demand for raw materials and industrial inputs from China and India. This
has increased their purchasing power of exports, and thus might have been reflected in
the upward trends for income elasticities of imports and exports.
Table 4.1 presents the results obtained by estimating en (the coefficient of variable
y) for the whole sample using three different estimation techniques. The first is the fixed
effects estimator which includes dummy variables to account for individual countryspecific effects. The second is the dynamic panel data model based on generalized
methods of moments (GMM) that controls for the endogeneity of other explanatory
variables. The third is a cointegration technique based on dynamic OLS estimation
performed with one lead and one lagged differenced dependent variable, hence the term
DOLS (-1, 1).
It can be seen from Table 4.1 that the estimated income elasticities are consistent
across different estimation techniques. The long-run income elasticity for imports is
found 1.15 and 1.29 by using the dynamic fixed effects estimator and the GMM model
respectively. The results from the static fixed effects model and the DOLS model are
similar as well, with1.11 and 1.12 respectively. Moreover, the estimates for price
elasticities are very low, which resembles to the findings of other research papers
(Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall 2004, Perraton 2004) and contradicts the small country
assumption of traditional trade theory.
Table 4.2 shows the estimation results from fitting Eqs. (4.22) and (4.23) to the
data for the whole data set. It is seen that the estimates for income-elasticity of exports
are inelastic, ranging from 0.76 to 0.92 depending on the estimation method. Price
elasticities of exports are still low, but slightly higher than the import price elasticities.
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In summary, Figure 4.3, as well as Tables 4.1 and 4.2, show that income elasticity
for exports tended to be less than that for imports for the developing countries in our
sample as a whole,31 and this was, in large part, due to the increases in the elasticity
differential in the 1970s and 1990s. However, in order to see the differences among
developing countries according to their patterns of specialization it is necessary to
consider each specialization group separately and compare the evolution of their
elasticity differentials over time.
Figure 4.4 presents the evolution of income elasticities for developing countries
whose exports are predominantly composed of manufactured goods, with varying degrees
of technological-intensity. The dotted line displays the rising trend in the income
elasticity of demand for exports, while the straight line represents the more stagnant trend
in import income-elasticity. Two trends stand out in the evolution of income elasticities
for major exporters of manufactured goods:
(i)

Income-elasticity of exports exceeded that of imports for sustained periods of

time by eliminating the initial difference in the 1960s and then rising steeply again after
the decline in the 1980s. This played a large role in relaxing the external constraint on the
growth paths of the countries specialized in exporting manufactured goods.
(ii)

Income elasticity of imports for manufacture exporters follows a steady trend

through the 1960s and 1970s, declines during the 1980s, then rises again in the 1990s
(Figure 4.4). However, since it never reaches very high levels as a share of export
elasticity, it never poses a serious constraint on balance of payments and growth.

31

The preliminary estimation results from aggregated data shows similar results (see Appendix
C). For the majority of developing countries that are non-major exporters of manufactures and oil,
the export to import elasticity ratio is less than 1. The elasticity differential is greater than 1 for
major exporters of manufactures and oil.
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The evolution of income elasticities for the developing countries specializing in
primary commodity production can be seen from Figure 4.5. Except for a short period of
time between the late 1970s and early 1980s, the export income-elasticity lies below the
income elasticity for imports. It is also observed that during the period following trade
liberalization, both elasticities significantly rose; however, the impact on import elasticity
is much more profound keeping the gap wide open in the 1990s. There are some signs of
convergence in the more recent period due to the recent increase in commodity prices.
Note that the latest available date is 2006, therefore, the collapse of primary commodity
prices in 2008-9 is not reflected within this data set.
In comparison to the broad group of primary exporters, highly indebted poor
countries (HIPCs) have a larger discrepancy between income-elasticity of imports and
that of exports, again with peaks in the 1970s and 1990s. The greater instability of
elasticity differentials is another indicator of a low degree of diversification in the HIPCs
compared to the primary commodity exporting developing countries. This makes it more
difficult for them to adjust to changes in the international economy and tends to create
major disruptions in their pattern of specialization.

4.4.3 Elasticity Differentials, Terms of Trade, and Relative Growth Rates

The next objective is to evaluate these elasticity differential trends in view of
changes in the terms of trade and relative growth rates. The evolution of terms of trade in
our sample is presented in Figure 4.7. It is fairly analogous to the terms-of-trade trends
for non-oil developing countries that we analyzed in the previous chapter.
The median, as well as the mean, of net barter terms of trade indices across
developing countries in our sample exhibit a slightly rising trend until the mid- to late-
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1970s, followed by a steep decline after the late 1970s. This pattern confirms our
previous findings from aggregated terms of trade indices for non-oil exporting
developing countries.
Table 4.3 presents the income elasticity ratios, growth rates of income, trends in
terms of trade, and trade balance growth rates for the different groups of developing
countries from 1960 to 2006. For all 51 developing countries in our sample, the ratio of
export to import elasticity is estimated to be 0.66, which is less than 1 as we expected.
Only for the major exporters of manufactured goods (11 out of 51) is the elasticity ratio
greater than 1. The ratio is 0.55 for exporters of primary commodities, 0.36 for the highly
indebted poor countries, and 0.92 for petroleum exporters. This finding suggests that
countries specialized in primary commodities—whether agricultural products or
petroleum—experience a tendency for their export demand to grow at lower rates
compared to those specialized in manufactured exports. Following the literature on
growth and structural change, the income elasticity ratio is a function of the pattern of
specialization and thus a country’s “supply characteristics” (McCombie 1997: 346). In
the North-South model developed by Botta (2009), we have shown that the incomeelasticity of exports (imports) responds positively (negatively) to higher shares of
manufacturing in GDP, thus lowering the export-import elasticity ratio.
A periodical comparison across groups of developing countries from Table 4.3
allows us to trace different phases of economic growth across these developing countries.
These phases, in turn, are related to shifts in economic policy. First, during the 1960s
developing economies grew at relatively high rates around 5 percent per annum.32 This
was, however, not sufficient to prevent growth divergence from the rest of the world
32

Note that this is total GDP growth and not GDP per capita.
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which was growing at an annual rate of 5.39 percent. Terms of trade for the entire set of
developing countries improved until the first oil shock of 1973. The rise in their relative
prices of exports before the oil shock resulted in higher export earnings since the majority
of the goods exported from developing countries were income-inelastic during this
period. The higher rate of growth of exports ensured a positive trend in trade balance,
which reinforces the PST’s joint predictions on growth divergence and/or terms of trade
deterioration given the unfavorable elasticity-ratio as we have shown in the previous
sections. Essentially due to the strong import demand from developed countries, the
terms of trade did not deteriorate, but improved instead. The growth divergence,
however, was not avoided due to the BOP-constrained growth dynamics and the positive
trend in trade balance.
Second, these growth dynamics of the 1960s were not universal. Despite
unfavorable elasticity-ratios and trade balance trends, major exporters of manufactures
were able to increase their relative growth rates vis-à-vis the rest of the world, while the
primary commodity exporters, HICs, and petroleum-exporters were confined to divergent
growth. However, all groupings experienced slightly rising terms of trade throughout the
1960s. The positive trend was very low in the case of petroleum exporters, while it was
0.54 percent per annum for primary commodity exporters and 0.35 percent per annum for
major exporters of manufactures.
Third, the growth and terms of trade dynamics were reversed during the 1970s.
While developing countries continued to grow at a rather fast annual rate of 5.46 percent,
the rest of the world grew at much slower rates around 3.26 per cent—allowing an
opportunity for developing countries to partially catch-up. However, a comparison of
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GDP per capita growth rates shows an absence of catching up due to much higher rates of
population growth within the developing world. Indeed, the 1970s represent the end of
the golden age of prosperity of the previous period through two major external shocks.
The first one comprised of the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, which not only adversely
affected the terms of trade (of both the North and the non-oil exporting South), but also
caused price hikes and persistent inflation worldwide. The price stabilization attempts in
the North took the form of monetarism. Rising interest rates at the end of 1970s—as a
result of actions taken by the US treasury to tighten the money supply and to control for
inflation—was the second shock with rather harsh consequences for developing
countries. Many of them experienced severe debt problems due to the skyrocketing cost
of borrowing. Moreover, the non-oil commodity prices collapsed during the 1980s, which
made the debt crisis far worse for most of the developing countries. In all, the two oil
price shocks, the abrupt rise in world interest rates at the end of 1970s, and the adverse
trend in non-oil exporters’ terms of trade initiated the debt crisis of the 1980s, which
prepared the conditions for the IMF and World Bank interventions.
Fourth, during the 1980s there was a sharp decline in the growth rates of
developing countries, in both absolute and relative terms. The domestic growth rate fell
from 5.46 percent to 3.04 percent annually, and the relative growth ratio declined by
almost half, from 1.67 to 0.88. Developing countries were paying the debt accumulated
during the 1970s by means of a sharp contraction in growth, particularly in the
investment rate. The deterioration of the terms of trade for all the developing countries in
our sample worsened from -0.03 to -1.60 percent per annum. Even the exporters of
petroleum suffered from a downturn in their terms of trade trend from an 8.89 percent
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increase during 1971-80 to a 7.81 per cent decline during 1981-90. The trend in trade
balance of the entire sample changed from a negative trend of 0.07 percent to a positive
trend of 1.76 percent. The change in sign of the trade balance growth rate was due to the
widespread “export desperation” (Sarkar 1994) among developing countries that were
trying to earn the necessary foreign exchange to service their debt. The trade surpluses
that ran during this period corresponded to a simultaneous massive capital outflow, which
tended to restrain the rate at which developing countries grew relative to the rest of the
world.
Fifth, major exporters of manufactured goods obtained elasticity ratios that were
continuously higher than 1 in after the 1970s and recorded relative growth rates that were
larger than 1 all through the four decades: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The upward
adjustments in elasticity ratios reflect changes in their pattern of production towards
manufactured goods with expanding international markets. This played an important role
in relaxing the balance of payments constraint on the effective growth rates of countries
specializing in manufactured exports. However, note that part of the adjustment to rapidly
growing net exports (reflected by the positive trend in trade balance) is accomplished
through a deterioration in the terms of trade, which lends support once again to the idea
that manufactured goods are not immune to falling prices in international trade.
Sixth, during the 1990s the elasticity ratio for all developing countries increased
to 0.92, but it remained still below 1. The GDP grew faster than during the previous
period, in both absolute and relative terms. However, it is seen that the gap in GDP per
capita remained wide open. The terms of trade deteriorated at an annual rate of 0.42 per
cent, while the trade balance grew slightly. The growth in the overall trade balance
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reflected mainly the better export performance of leading manufacture exporters, whose
export growth far exceeded import growth. The primary commodity exporters, on the
other hand, exhibited a negative trend in their balance of trade. This provided an
opportunity to catch up as long as capital inflows were sustained. However, for several
developing countries, the dependency on capital inflows and their high rates of
fluctuation resulted in financial crises.
The relative growth patterns of developing countries can be illustrated in Figure
4.8 for the entire sample. This figure plots the convergence rate (the rate of growth of
developing countries with respect to the rate of growth for the rest of the world, i.e.
domestic/foreign growth rates) against the ratio between the income elasticity of exports
and that of imports (export/import elasticity). This allows for the reproduction of the first
section of Table 4.3 to discuss the movements in convergence/divergence rates and the
BOP-constraint imposed by the elasticity ratio. Four patterns emerging from Figure 4.8
are worth emphasizing:
(i)

In the 1960s, the developing countries were in quadrant C, which represents

sustainable divergence; yet the degree of the divergence (measured by the distance with
respect to the horizontal line) was not large during this period.
(ii)

In the 1970s, the developing countries moved to quadrant A of sustainable

convergence by attaining an elasticity-ratio and a relative growth ratio that is greater than
1. However, the seemingly sustainable growth path proved unstable once the external
shocks of interest-rate hike and severe terms of trade deterioration hit the developing
countries, pushing them into a balance of payments crisis that then turned into a debt
crisis.
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(iii)

In the 1980s, there was sustainable divergence once again (quadrant C), with the

developing countries growing at relatively much lower rates constrained under the
unfavorable elasticity ratios. Payments for the debt accumulated during the 1970s
contributed to the sharp contraction in growth rates as the developing countries sought
ways to simultaneously increase their exports for earning sufficient foreign exchange. As
the relative prices of their exports continued to collapse during this period, the fallacy of
composition effect reinforced losses from international trade. In all, the unfavorable
external shocks of the 1970s were indeed responsible for the “lost decade” of divergence
during the 1980s. The uncoordinated policy responses from the IMF and the World Bank
only made the situation worse.
(iv)

In the 1990s, the developing countries moved to the situation of unsustainable

convergence (quadrant B). However, the convergence rate was rather low in this case
compared to that of the 1970s, and the elasticity-ratio was less than unitary. Even though
the elasticity-ratio might seem quite close to 1, leading one to expect a rather small
adverse impact on balance of payments and growth, it is seen from Table 4.3 that the
ratio is much lower for the majority of primary commodity exporters (0.77) and higher
for the manufacture-exporters (1.21), relative to the overall ratio of 0.92. The rise in the
income elasticity ratios between these two groups of developing countries underlines the
degree of divergence within the South that has been growing since the last few decades.

4.5 Emergence of Immiserizing Growth

The growth of a country that is experiencing technological progress and/or factor
accumulation might increase the supply of its exports and its demand for imports
simultaneously. These market forces would generate a deterioration in its terms of trade if

103

the growing country possesses monopolistic or monopsonistic power in the world
markets and the rest of the world grows at a slower pace. If the deterioration in the terms
of trade produces a loss of real income greater than the increase in real income due to
growth itself, the country will actually be made worse off—immiserized—by growth, a
phenomenon referred to as “immiserizing growth”.

4.5.1 Optimal Trade Policy

The sub-optimal welfare condition of immiserizing growth can be offset by the
imposition of an optimal tariff structure. The theory of the optimum tariff follows that “if
a country possesses monopolistic or monopsonistic power in world markets, world
market prices for its exports and imports will not correspond to the marginal national
revenue from exports and marginal national costs of its imports, and asserts that by
appropriately chosen export and import duties—taxes on trade—the country can equate
the relative prices of goods to domestic producers and consumers with their relative
opportunity costs in international trade” (Johnson 1969: 143). In other worlds, Pareto
optimality requires the imposition of taxes on trade that are intended to equate the
domestic price ratios facing producers and consumers with the marginal rates of
transformation between commodities in international trade if foreign demand or supply is
imperfectly elastic.
When several developing countries simultaneously attempt to diversify their
exports into commodity markets that face low income-elasticity of demand, their
collective actions exert monopoly power on the relative prices of internationally traded
goods. They may experience immiserizing growth if the secondary loss from
deteriorating terms of trade outweighs the primary gain from the initial growth process.
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Since the terms of trade deterioration is essentially as result of possessing monopoly
power in world markets and the imperfectly-elastic foreign demand, the restoration of
previous welfare levels require the pursuit of an optimal trade policy.
In other words, given that the global South acts in a unified way to pursue an
optimal trade policy (imposing an export tax and/or import tariff), it can protect itself
against immiserizing growth due to terms of trade losses. It is possible to make a case
that the South as a whole effectively acted in this way during the post-war era from
roughly 1950-1973.33 Optimal trade policies allowed developing countries as a whole to
correct for the tendency of their terms of trade to deteriorate and to achieve higher rates
of income per capita compared to the past. Indeed, the terms of trade for non-oil
exporters improved during the 1960s and the South was granted enough policy space to
pursue industrial policies aimed at import substitution. Although Southern per capita
income growth was particularly high during this period, it was not enough to catch-up
with the developed economies.
As we have discussed in the previous section, the period of high growth and
optimal trade policies came to an end with adverse external shocks in the 1970s. The oil
price shocks, the abrupt rise in world interest rates at the end of 1970s, and the adverse
trend in terms of trade for non-oil exporters initiated the debt crisis of the 1980s, which
prepared the conditions for the intervention of the IMF and the World Bank. With the
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It is true that the optimal trade policies, such as import tariffs, were not a coordinated action of
an established institution of developing countries in the way that OPEC functioned. However,
given the concerted efforts for industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s and the recognition
that import tariffs can be an effective tool for infant industry protection, there was a unified action
of developing countries towards this direction, i.e. implementing optimal trade policies. Thus, it
was not a coordinated effort, but the result of an uncoordinated yet collective action in more or
less the same direction.
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programs of structural adjustment and stabilization imposed on the indebted developing
countries, there was a complete change in the imposition of industrial and trade policies,
and the outcome of “immiserizing growth” became the new reality facing the developing
world after the 1980s.

4.5.2 Abandonment of Optimal Trade Policy

First, the “policy space” granted to the developing countries to pursue their own
policies of industrialization was put under deliberate constraints. Conventional economic
wisdom held that an integrated world economy would close the income gap between the
rich and the poor nations. The standard advice to the developing countries was therefore
liberalization of trade flows and financial transactions. Being caught up in the midst of
debt crisis, the conditionalities of the IMF loans induced the majority of the developing
countries to open up their trade and financial systems to the global market. Despite the
increased openness across the South during the 1980s, income convergence was far from
being realized. The growth rates of per capita income of developing countries decreased
substantially during the post-1980 period (much more than the decline of the developed
countries’ income growth rates), which resulted in greater income divergence between
the developed and developing economies.
Second, trade liberalization meant that the global South could not implement
optimal trade policies since every country was considered a single unit with no monopoly
power in international trade and therefore faced elastic foreign demand. Arguments for
free market policies were backed by the new political economy argument concerning
directly-unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) and rent-seeking activities (Bhagwati 1982b,
Krueger 1974). The neoliberal ideology served to tie the hands of the state and curtail its
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developmental agenda. In the absence of the optimal trade policies, the terms-of-trade
moved against the South (excluding the oil exporters) throughout the neoliberal era. The
devaluations across the South due to the debt crisis worsened the rate of deterioration.
Third, the North began to retaliate in the 1980s in order to protect its home
markets from global competition. The retaliation of the North, through powerful
protectionist measures, further immiserized the South since its capacity to respond to the
Northern retaliation was significantly undermined. Bhagwati acknowledges this
possibility even though he tries to refute every possible argument in support of an importsubstituting strategy:
If Brazil successfully exports footwear, for example, and the importing countries invoke
market-disruption-related QRs, or frivolous countervailing duty (CVD) retaliation, then
Brazil faces a less than perfectly elastic market for footwear, and an optimal tariff (that is,
a shift to import-substituting (IS) strategy) in this sector is called for. This should justify
only selective protection, carefully devised and administered, not a general IS strategy. If,
however, this response is feared no matter what is exported, that is, the fear of
protectionism is nearly universal in scope, a generalized shift to IS strategy unfortunately
would be appropriate (Bhagwati 1988: 41).

The case of universal protection in the developed world certainly justifies a
protective response in the form of an optimal tariff at the very least. This policy response,
however, was practically prevented from taking place through universal reductions in
tariff levels across the South. Moreover, the pursuit of industrial development in the
South, with the exception of the East Asian countries, was also severely constrained.
Therefore, despite the widespread protectionism in the North, particularly in the export
markets of the South such as agricultural commodities and low-skilled manufactures like
textiles, the appropriate “generalized shift to IS strategy” has failed to take place.
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4.5.3 Shifts in Demand and in Production of Partner Country/Region

Fourth, even if the South were implementing optimal policies before and after
growth, it might not have avoided immiseration if the foreign offer curve shifted (due to
shifts in demand or in production abroad) sufficiently enough to outweigh the gains from
growth. This was the case developed by Melvin (1969). Bhagwati (1969) argued that in
this case, the reduction in gains from trade resulting from shifts in the foreign offer curve
is the primary cause of immiseration. Therefore, even though optimal policies were
followed before and after growth, he argued it would not be possible to escape this kind
of immiseration. Interestingly enough, a similar case was emphasized recently by
Samuelson (2004), where social welfare of the home country decreases as a result of
biased economic growth in the partner country. If an import substitution strategy is
followed by the growing partner country, it will produce more of the importable good and
therefore import less of it. The reduced demand for the importables will lower its relative
price (vis-à-vis exportables). Since the partner country’s importables are the home
country’s exportables, this will amount to a deterioration in the home country’s terms of
trade. This adverse price shift might cause immiseration in the home country if the losses
from reduction in the gains from trade outweigh the primary gain from economic growth.
Samuelson argued that an industrialized country such as the United States could
experience such a case of immiserizing growth if its less developed trade partner (e.g.
China or India) is rapidly growing by producing the products that it had previously been
importing. Therefore, the developing country growth leads to immiserizing growth for
the industrialized country. A New York Times article summarized Samuelson’s central
point saying: “… a low-wage nation that is rapidly improving its technology, like India or
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China, has the potential to change the terms of trade with America in fields like callcenter services or computer programming in ways that reduce per-capita income in the
United States” (Lohr 2004). In general, the possibility of immiserizing growth arises
depending on “the types of changes in the production frontier in both countries (import or
export biased), demand conditions in both countries, trade policies pursued in both
countries, and the relative rates of economic growth in both countries” (Pryor 2007: 212).
Samuelson’s recent discussion of immiserizing growth provoked a response from
Bhagwati, Panagariya and Srinivasan (2004), arguing that such immiseration worries in
the case of an innovative society such as the United States were unwarranted. First, they
try to demonstrate that the job loss from outsourcing is not so great as to cause general
unemployment and that new jobs are created also through outsourcing itself. Second,
while acknowledging the possibility of immiserizing growth, they “discount and dismiss
the possibility of significant terms of trade changes” that might yield immiserizing
growth because of their firm belief that the US is capable of generating more high-value
jobs and that its foreign competitors will not be able to close the innovation gap with the
US. In an interview, Bhagwati argued that the US could change the terms of trade in its
favor by moving up the technology ladder, and that he was, therefore, optimistic.34
Increased investments in science, research, and education would be the policy
prescriptions to prevent the type of immiseration suggested by Samuelson. Furthermore,
wage insurance programs could be introduced for workers who lose in global
competition.

34

See Lohr (2004).
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4.5.4 Reproduction of the Technology Gap under WTO Rules

This indeed brings us to our fifth point about the rules of the game in the post1980 period. The innovation gap between the North and the South is being reproduced
under the main WTO agreements from the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). While the
agreement on Trade-related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) directly
provides support for intellectual property rights of Western corporations, the agreement
on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) indirectly serve to keep the innovation gap open, in favor of the already
industrialized nations.35 Under TRIPS, each member state is required to enforce
intellectual property rules to protect copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, data
secrets, and patents (on drugs, electronic and mechanical devices, etc.). Although the
agreement might seem innocent in treating each member equally, the end result is the
creation of rents flowing from the South to the North. In the market for knowledge, the
North is a net producer of patentable knowledge, while the South is a net consumer. By
increasing the price of patentable knowledge to consumers, TRIPS ensures that the North
receives increasing flows of rent from the South (Wade 2003: 624).
Moreover, TRIPS prevents the spread of technological knowledge from the
centers of innovation to the periphery of replication. Given that the latter has limited
funds and foreign exchange in general, the firms operating in the periphery either use
much older technology (which lowers their competitiveness further) or try to reverseengineer some of the patented products. Reverse-engineering, however, has become
much more difficult as the scope of TRIPS covers not only the final product, but every
single intermediate products and each stage of production as well. Thus, an argument in
35

For a detailed examination of these agreements, see Wade (2003).

110

support of TRIPS that says “the higher the returns to knowledge generation, the more the
North will innovate, and the more the knowledge dissemination to the South will be”
does not hold. Even if the North innovates more to receive higher returns of its patents,
the dissemination from there to the South is far from being automatic.
In addition to TRIPS, the policy space of developing countries is further
constrained by TRIMS, which regulates investment measures. Its central emphasis is “to
avoid trade and investment distortions”. Since most of the ‘performance requirements’ on
foreign firms, such as local content and export requirements, are interpreted as
‘distortions’, TRIMS prohibits the use them. When a developing country tries to impose
such performance requirements, what typically happens is that a complainant from the
US or the EU is taken it to the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), where the
developing country certainly loses the case. During the Doha Round in 2001, the US and
EU demanded an expansion of the current TRIMS agreement to cover all performance
requirements, including technology transfer, joint venturing, etc. However, India and
Brazil prevented the approval of these demands (Wade 2003: 627-8).
Complementing TRIMS and TRIPS in tilting the playground against developing
countries is the agreement on trade in services, namely GATS. Similar to TRIMS, GATS
aims to eliminate any trade and investment distortions, but as it relates to the service
trade, which includes banking, education, and tourism. Therefore, GATS prohibits any
kind of government interference into service markets, such as regulating multinational
companies operating in their service sectors. As a result, it becomes almost impossible
for developing countries to protect their own service industries from competition by
foreign firms while delivering the necessary public services demanded by the public
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(health services, water, sanitation, etc.). GATS secures the interests of foreign firms by
deregulating service sectors, even though it might clash with the interests of the general
public. Moreover, the promises of increased flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) did
not come true as the UNCTAD and World Bank reports confirm (Wade 2003: 629).
To summarize, the post-1980 period brought several changes that enhanced the
economic and political power of the North in the world-economy at the expense of
immiseration in the South: the narrowing ‘policy space’ prevented the South from
pursuing optimal trade policies that could have counteracted the deterioration in its terms
of trade; the neoliberal actors in policy-making, both domestic and international,
eliminated the effectiveness of the state as a developmental force in pursuing industrial
development; the Northern retaliation in the form of increased protection of its own
markets against Southern exports turned the terms of trade further against the South and
increased its immiseration; and international agreements changed the rules of the game
that sustained immiserizing growth in the South by keeping its innovation gap with the
North wide open.

4.6 Technological Asymmetries and Elasticity Differentials

In the extension of PST to a three-region model, we have shown that the elasticity
differential is a function of structural change (share of manufacturing in GDP) and
technological upgrading. As the productive and technological structure of the economy
becomes diversified towards manufactured goods with higher technological content, the
income elasticity for imports tends to fall and that for exports tends to increase, closing
the gap in elasticity ratios. This convergence scenario, however, is becoming increasingly
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difficult under the current WTO agreements due to the difficulties associated with
technological upgrading as discussed in the previous section.
This section will examine the evolution of technological asymmetries between the
developed and developing countries, as well as its impact on elasticity differentials and
growth divergence. Figure 4.9 shows the relative values of exports for developing
countries vis-à-vis developed ones in different categories of goods, classified according
to their technological intensity. Although all non-oil global markets are still dominated by
developed country producers, developing countries have expanded their participation
rapidly, especially since the mid-1980s. This was accompanied by a significant shift in
the structure of exports by developing countries away from primary commodities towards
manufactured goods. The share of developing countries in markets of low-tech, mediumtech, and high-tech manufacture markets have increased, while those of primary
commodities and natural-resource based manufactures declined over the period 19622003 (Figure 4.9).
This remarkable increase in participation of manufactured exports with higher
technological content has been largely due to the efforts of China, plus first-tier and
second-tier NICs. The declining share of developing countries in primary commodity
markets was due to the rising market penetration of developed countries within these
commodity markets by means of relatively high protectionism and subsidization. Since
the shares are calculated based on values instead of volume of exports, the divergences in
price trends between commodity exports by developed and developing countries could
have also played a role in this outcome. Although the general trend for developing
countries has been greater diversification of their production structure and increased
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participation in global markets, the Asian countries (the NICs, China, and India) have
diversified much faster than other regions. The slowest diversification away from primary
commodities has taken place in Sub-Saharan Africa.
In order to assess the impact of diversification of productive structure on the
evolution of the elasticity differential of developing countries, we will use two indicators
of diversification. The first one is the share of developing countries in primary
commodity exports, which acts as an indicator of structural change in developing
countries with respect to developed ones. Lower shares of primary exports indicate rising
shares of manufactured exports, and thus an increasing share of manufacturing in the total
output of developing countries relative to developed ones. The second indicator is the
share of developing countries in high-tech manufactured exports, which measures the
technological intensity of manufactured exports of developing countries relative to
developed ones. We expect that higher shares of developing countries in high-tech
exports would reduce the income elasticity differential (i.e. increase the export-import
elasticity ratio).
Table 4.4 presents the correlation coefficients between the export-import income
elasticity ratio (ER), the share of developing countries in high-tech manufactured exports
(H) and the share of developing countries in primary commodity exports (P). There is a
positive correlation (0.61) between the export-import elasticity ratio and the participation
of developing countries in high-tech export markets, which confirms our expectation:
higher shares of technological content in manufactures tends to raise export elasticity and
lower import elasticity, thus reducing the elasticity differential (i.e. the effect of φ on
elasticities).
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The correlation coefficient between ER and P is negative (-0.32), indicating that
the structural change of developing countries away from primary commodity exports
tended to increase income-elasticity for exports more than that for imports, which reduces
the income elasticity differential between developing and developed countries.
Figure 4.10 displays multiple items. Evolution of the export-import elasticity
ratio is shown in a bar chart and uses the left-handed scale, while the percentage share of
developing countries in high-tech manufactures and primary exports uses the righthanded scale. The elasticities are estimated using the dynamic fixed effects estimator in
rolling regressions with a 10 year window. The shares of high-tech and primary exports
correspond to the middle point of these 10 year windows. For example, for the 1960-1969
elasticity ratio, the share of high-tech and primary exports in year 1965 is used.
The positive association between the rising share of developing countries in hightech exports (therefore falling shares of primary exports) and the rising shares of exportimport elasticity ratios are also observed from Figure 4.10.

4.7 Conclusion

Previous tests of PST have largely ignored the joint predictions arising from the
impact of income elasticity differentials on North-South growth divergence and terms of
trade movements. They have primarily focused on testing the tendency for relative prices
of primary commodities to deteriorate over time—which may or may not be observed
depending on a host of factors, including the evolution of elasticity differentials, the
changes in relative growth rates of the regions, and the growth rate of the trade
surplus/deficit. In other words, the deterioration of terms of trade is conditional upon the
trends of these interrelated factors.
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This chapter derived a generalized PST model where both the North-South terms
of trade trends and patterns of growth divergence are endogenized within a balance of
payments constrained framework. The specialization patterns determine long run
outcomes. If the South produces relatively income-inelastic goods, it must face in the
long run either slower growth or a deterioration of the terms of trade. If part of the South
begins to specialize in relatively more income-elastic goods, by means of industrial
policies designed for structural transformation and technological upgrading, there is a
possibility of catching-up with the North in terms of achieving high rates of growth.
Thus, industrial policy plays a crucial role in the process of successful industrialization,
and its absence or mismanagement produces persistent uneven North-South development.
Empirical findings confirm the joint predictions of the generalized PST model.
First, income elasticity differential is present for the entire sample of developing
countries, as well as subsets of these developing countries, except for the set of major
exporters of manufactured goods. The elasticity differential is highest for highly indebted
poor countries and also rather high for primary commodity exporters. Second, the
simultaneous entry of new producers from the developing world into markets that faced
low income elasticities during the mid-to-late 1970s produced a sharp deterioration in the
terms of trade for all non-oil exporters, which had negative consequences for their growth
performance and overall welfare level. This is the phenomenon of immiserizing growth.
Third, protectionism of the Northern markets and the resulting retaliation efforts,
combined with the imposition of neoliberal policies designed to dismantle the
developmental state in the South, were additional factors responsible for the adverse
terms of trade movements, along with the divergence of growth paths during neoliberal
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globalization. Forth, the comparative evidence shows that countries specialized in
exporting manufactures succeeded to eliminate their elasticity-differentials and relax the
external constraint on their growth dynamics; whereas the opposite has been the case for
those specialized in less income-elastic exports. Fifth, capital flows have not necessarily
relaxed the trade balance constraint. Periods of loose monetary policy and significant
capital inflows generally followed periods of tight monetary policy and capital flights.
These fluctuations in international liquidity and financial transactions often resulted in
financial crises taking a large toll on the growth performance of developing countries.
Finally, empirical evidence suggests that elasticity differentials of developing countries
tend to decline as developing countries increase their share of high-technology
manufactured exports and lower their share of primary exports relative to the developed
country exports. Despite significant export diversification over the last decades, the share
of developing countries in high-technology manufactured exports relative to developed
countries is still very low, about 13 percent (see Figure 4.10). Thus, the disparity in
technological capabilities between developed and developing countries remains
significantly high. Under the current WTO regulations with their novel difficulties for
technology transfer, there does not seem to be much scope for eliminating these
technological asymmetries and thus for creating a more egalitarian world economy.
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Figure 4.1 The North-South Import-Export Income Elasticity Pattern
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Figure 4.2 Convergence and Divergence Dynamics
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(a) Convergence of the third-region to the North: “high quality” industrialization in the
South. (b) Divergence between the North and the rest of the South: high price elasticities,
but poor technological content of industrialization in the South.
Source: Botta (2009).
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Figure 4.3 The Evolution of the Income Elasticities of Demand for Imports vs. Exports,
All Developing Countries, 1960-2006.
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Source: Author’s estimations. Data sources are presented in Appendix B.
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Figure 4.4 The Evolution of the Income Elasticities of Demand for Imports vs. Exports,
Major Exporters of Manufactures, 1960-2006.
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Source: Author’s estimations. Data sources are presented in Appendix B.
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Figure 4.5 The Evolution of the Income Elasticities of Demand for Imports vs. Exports,
Primary Commodity Exporters, 1960-2006.
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Source: Author’s estimations. Data sources are presented in Appendix B.
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Figure 4.6 The Evolution of the Income Elasticities of Demand for Imports vs. Exports,
Highly Indebted Poor Countries, 1960-2006.
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Figure 4.7 Evolution of Net Barter Terms of Trade (NBTT) for 51 Developing Countries
4.7a. Median and 0.25, 0.75 Quantiles of NBTT (2000=100, Whole Sample)
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4.7b. Mean and +/- 1 Standard Deviation of NBTT (2000=100, Whole Sample)
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Source: Author’s calculations.
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Figure 4.8 Developing Countries: Sustainable and Unsustainable Convergence
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Figure 4.9 Value of Exports of Developing Countries as a Percentage of the Value of
Exports of Developed Countries, by Category of Goods, 1962-2003.
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Figure 4.10 Technological Diversification and Elasticity Differential for Developing
Countries
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Table 4.1 Import Elasticities in Developing Economies (Entire Sample): 1960-2006
Fixed Effects
Equation
Equation

GMM
Equation

(4.20)

(4.20)

(4.21)

DOLS
(-1, 1)

Explanatory Variables
Log of relative prices (pm)
-0.31*
-0.06*
-0.08 **
-0.33*
Log of domestic income (y)
1.11**
0.15**
0.27**
1.12**
Lagged log of real imports (mt-1)
0.87**
0.79**
Long run income elasticity (yLR)
1.15
1.29
Long run price elasticity (pmLR)
-0.46
-0.38
Diagnostic Statistics
R2
0.96
0.99
0.96
Hausman test
0.63
18.13**
Wald test
[0.00]
Sargan test
[0.00]
1st -order serial correlation
[0.65]
[0.00]
2nd -order serial correlation
[0.00]
[0.00]
Residual Unit Root Tests
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat
[0.061]
ADF - Fisher chi-square
[0.001]
PP - Fisher chi-square
[0.015]
Number of observations
1843
1821
1770
1735
Notes:
** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level; * significant at the 5%
level, and § significant at the 10% level.
Figures in brackets are p-values.
Hausman’s chi-square statistic favors the fixed effects estimator over the random
effects model. This indicates that there is within group variation in all variables for at
least some groups. The Wald test is for the joint significance of the explanatory
variables. The Sargan test is for over-identifying restrictions.
All estimations are performed using EViews 7.
Panel data unit root tests and cointegration tests are reported in Appendix B Tables B1
and B2.
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Table 4.2 Export Elasticities in Developing Economies (Entire Sample): 1960-2006
Fixed Effects
Equation
Equation

GMM
Equation

(4.22)

(4.22)

(4.23)

DOLS
(-1, 1)

Explanatory Variables
Log of relative prices (px)
-0.42**
-0.11**
-0.17**
-0.43**
Log of domestic income (z)
0.76**
0.06**
0.11**
0.79**
Lagged log of real imports (xt-1)
0.92**
0.88**
Long run income elasticity (zLR)
0.75
0.92
Long run price elasticity (pxLR)
-1.38
-1.42
Diagnostic Statistics
R2
0.94
0.99
0.95
Hausman test
11.62**
177.16**
Wald test
[0.00]
[0.00]
Sargan test
[0.00]
1st -order serial correlation
[0.00]
[0.00]
2nd -order serial correlation
Residual Unit Root Tests
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat
[0.000]
ADF - Fisher chi-square
[0.000]
PP - Fisher chi-square
[0.000]
Number of observations
2310
2258
2207
2209
Notes:
** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level; * significant at the 5% level,
and § significant at the 10% level.
Figures in brackets are p-values.
Hausman’s chi-square statistic favors the fixed effects estimator over the random effects
model. This indicates that there is within group variation in all variables for at least
some groups. The Wald test is for the joint significance of the explanatory variables.
The Sargan test is for over-identifying restrictions.
All estimations are performed using EViews 7.
Panel data unit root tests and cointegration tests are reported in Appendix B, Tables B3
and B4.
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Table 4.3 Income Elasticity Ratios, Growth Rates of Income and Trade Balance
and Trends in Terms of Trade
All Developing
Countries
Import elasticity (εs)
Export elasticity (εn)

εn /εs
Domestic growth
ratea (% p.a.)
Foreign growth rate
(% p.a.)
Relative growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)
Domestic GDP per
capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Foreign GDP per
capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Relative GDP per
capita growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)
Terms of trade trend
(% p.a.)
Trade balance growth
rate in real terms (%
p.a.)
Trade balance growth
rate in nominal terms
(% p.a.)
Initial trade balance
(millions US$)
Major Exporters of
Manufactures
Import elasticity (εs)
Export elasticity (εn)

εn /εs
Domestic growth
ratea (% p.a.)
Foreign growth rate
(% p.a.)
Relative growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)
Domestic GDP per
capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Foreign GDP per

(19601970)
1.10
0.50
0.46
5.02

(19711980)
1.05
1.19
1.14
5.46

(19811990)
1.24
0.59
0.48
3.04

(19912006)
1.65
1.52
0.92
3.72

(19602006)
1.15
0.76
0.66
4.07

5.39

3.26

3.47

2.48

3.19

0.93

1.67

0.88

1.50

1.28

2.28

2.22

0.61

1.79

1.50

3.31

1.76

1.77

1.57

1.69

0.69

1.26

0.34

1.14

0.89

0.47

-0.03

-1.60

-0.42

-0.85

0.62

-0.06

3.94

0.32

0.81

1.06

-0.07

1.76

0.33

0.03

-68

-110

-1184

-682

-68

(19601970)
1.34
0.64
0.48
6.04

(19711980)
1.27
1.51
1.19
6.56

(19811990)
1.25
1.30
1.04
5.45

(19912006)
1.64
1.99
1.21
4.44

(19602006)
1.41
1.44
1.02
5.69

5.39

3.26

3.47

2.48

3.19

1.12

2.01

1.57

1.79

1.78

3.40

4.24

3.58

3.03

3.69

3.31

1.76

1.77

1.57

1.69
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capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Relative GDP per
capita growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)
Terms of trade trend
(% p.a.)
Trade balance growth
rate in real terms (%
p.a.)
Trade balance growth
rate in nominal terms
(% p.a.)
Initial trade balance
(millions US$)
Primary
Commodity
Exporters
Import elasticity (εs)
Export elasticity (εn)

εn /εs
Domestic growth
ratea (% p.a.)
Foreign growth rate
(% p.a.)
Relative growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)
Domestic GDP per
capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Foreign GDP per
capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Relative GDP per
capita growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)
Terms of trade trend
(% p.a.)
Trade balance growth
rate in real terms (%
p.a.)
Trade balance growth
rate in nominal terms
(% p.a.)
Initial trade balance
(millions US$)
HICs

1.03

2.41

2.02

1.93

2.18

0.35

-1.82

-0.87

-0.77

-1.15

0.82

2.75

2.69

2.20

1.98

1.18

0.46

1.05

1.15

0.77

-187

-375

-1706

-2414

-187

(19601970)

(19711980)

(19811990)

(19912006)

(19602006)

1.12
0.35
0.31
4.74

0.86
0.44
0.51
5.16

0.77
0.42
0.55
2.46

1.63
1.26
0.77
3.54

0.95
0.52
0.55
3.58

5.39

3.26

3.47

2.48

3.19

0.88

1.58

0.71

1.43

1.12

0.98

1.49

0.10

1.33

0.79

3.31

1.76

1.77

1.57

1.69

0.30

0.85

0.06

0.85

0.47

0.54

-0.52

-1.17

-0.92

-1.10

0.21

-0.62

3.15

-0.06

0.65

0.81

-1.17

1.58

-0.18

-0.39

-31

-97

-875

-169

-31

(19601970)

(19711980)

(19811990)

(19912006)

(19602006)
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Import elasticity (εs)
Export elasticity (εn)

εn /εs
Domestic growth
ratea (% p.a.)
Foreign growth rate
(% p.a.)
Relative growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)
Domestic GDP per
capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Foreign GDP per
capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Relative GDP per
capita growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)
Terms of trade trend
(% p.a.)
Trade balance growth
rate in real terms (%
p.a.)
Trade balance growth
rate in nominal terms
(% p.a.)
Initial trade balance
(millions US$)
Oil-Exporters
Import elasticity (εs)
Export elasticity (εn)

εn /εs
Domestic growth
ratea (% p.a.)
Foreign growth rate
(% p.a.)
Relative growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)
Domestic GDP per
capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Foreign GDP per
capita growth rate (%
p.a.)
Relative GDP per
capita growth ratio
(domestic/foreign)

0.91
0.66
0.73
4.17

1.26
0.47
0.37
3.90

0.01
0.44
44.00
1.83

1.96
1.28
0.65
3.62

1.31
0.47
0.36
2.80

5.39

3.26

3.47

2.48

3.19

0.77

1.20

0.53

1.46

0.88

1.24

0.74

-1.21

0.97

-0.18

3.31

1.76

1.77

1.57

1.69

0.37

0.42

-0.68

0.62

-0.11

0.48

0.80

-1.24

-1.73

-0.86

0.79

-2.15

3.42

-1.40

0.61

0.81

-1.79

1.49

-0.54

-0.38

-13

-26

-214

-74

-13

(19601970)
0.80
0.67
0.84
4.79

(19711980)
1.77
1.46
0.82
5.10

(19811990)
0.25
1.19
4.76
1.62

(19912006)
1.16
0.35
0.30
3.47

(19602006)
0.62
0.57
0.92
4.1

5.39

3.26

3.47

2.48

3.19

0.89

1.56

0.47

1.40

1.29

0.95

1.95

-1.54

1.22

1.13

3.31

1.76

1.77

1.57

1.69

0.29

1.11

-0.87

0.78

0.67
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Terms of trade trend
0.04
8.89
-7.81
4.92
2.00
(% p.a.)
Trade balance growth 3.71
-8.95
14.14
-2.57
-0.67
rate in real terms (%
p.a.)
Trade balance growth 2.87
0.42
5.36
2.65
1.67
rate in nominal terms
(% p.a.)
Initial trade balance
-61
509
-2530
-538
-61
(millions US$)
Notes:
Elasticities are estimated by dynamic fixed effects estimator. The growth rates of
national income and terms of trade are estimated by standard exponential growth
functions. Initial trade balance is the mean of the trade balance for the entire
sample for the initial year.
a
Growth rate of GDP percent per annum.

Table 4.4 Correlations between Elasticity Differential of Developing Countries
(ER), Share of Developing Countries in High-Tech Manufactured Exports (H), and
Share of Developing Countries in Primary Exports (P)
ER
H
ER
1.00
0.61
H
0.61
1.00
P
-0.32
0.10
Source: Figure 4.9 and Author’s calculations.
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P
-0.32
0.10
1.00

CHAPTER 5
OPTIMUM TARIFFS AND RETALIATION: FROM GLOBAL TO INDIVIDUAL
STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY
5.1 Introduction

While many questions in international trade policy have their roots in global
North-South interactions, the policy responses are necessarily adopted at the individual
country level. In this sense, what constitutes a “global policy response” to mechanisms
reproducing uneven development with or without terms of trade deterioration requires
taking into account game theoretic, or strategic, actions of individual country players.
These strategic actions might be motivated by the “optimum tariff” theorem, which states
that a country can improve its welfare as compared with the free trade position by
imposing a tariff on imports. If other countries retaliate by imposing tariffs in their turn,
two possibilities emerge: either all players are worse off at the end of the tariff war
(Sckitovszky 1941-2) or the country that initiates the tariff war can eventually be better
off (Johnson 1953-4). While the first possibility emerges as a standard “prisoners’
dilemma” game at the global level, the second one is a different kind of game where one
party gains in equilibrium, and it is “often overlooked” in the literature (Johnson 1953-4:
142). In this chapter, I bring into analysis game theoretic nature of the tariff policy
problem to discuss: (i) the strategic reasons that lead countries to implement optimum
tariffs which might invite retaliation from other countries, and (ii) the possible outcomes
emerging from the tariff games.
Consider three separate but interconnected games of tariff policy: (i) the tariff
game played between countries in the North, (ii) the tariff game played between countries
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in the South and (iii) the global North-South tariff game where groups of developed and
developing countries play the game.36 The first two games in each region are composed
of symmetric players, i.e. their payoffs from a particular strategy pair are similar. The
third differs from these intra-regional games in that it is played by asymmetric players—
North and South—whose payoffs from a particular strategy pair are different. One of the
reasons for this difference is that for countries with asymmetric productive structures, the
gains from a certain tariff policy strategy combination are unevenly distributed among
each other. For instance, the benefits of removing trade barriers in industrial sectors of
developing countries might be much larger for already-industrialized countries having a
competitive edge. In such inter-regional games with asymmetric players, as we will
show, it is more likely that the trade negotiations will conclude with a stalemate, or a
non-free trade solution at best.
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, I discuss the global NorthSouth game in a non-cooperative framework with a focus on the incentives for imposing
an optimal tariff on imports. In section 5.3, I consider the same game under a cooperative
framework that allows for negotiations between the parties. I also present the Nash
cooperative solutions based upon the negotiation sets resulting from the game rules under
the standard and the Johnson cases. In section 5.4, I discuss the intra-regional North and
South games, and in section 5.5, I discuss the inter-regional North-South game from a
historical viewpoint. Finally, I summarize the inferences and implications of this chapter.

36

The last one has been well-documented in the Doha Round between the long standing Quad
and the more recently formed G20 (Jawara and Kwa 2003). The Quad consists of Canada, the
US, the EU, and Japan. The G20 is a group of developing countries including Brazil and India.
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5.2 Global North-South Game in a Non-Cooperative Framework

In this section, I assume that regions set their tariff policies without the benefit of
prior communication with each other. Thus, the central assumption is that they behave
non-cooperatively. Consider the game in Table 5.1. This is a non-cooperative game
between the global North and South, in which each region has only two alternative
strategies: to charge no tariff by choosing Free (F) trade, or to charge a tariff that is
optimal relative to the other region’s tariff by imposing an Optimal (O) tariff.37
The elements of Table 5.1 indicate the four possible outcomes which correspond
to four pairs of strategies. Thus, if North chooses strategy O and South chooses strategy
F, the outcome is (a, d'). North receives a and South receives d', where a and d' are
measured in utility terms. Based on the game-theoretic trade theory, it is possible to
establish the relative magnitudes of the elements of Table 5.1.
Optimal tariff theorem states that beginning from free trade, if a group of
countries large enough to exert monopoly power in trade change an optimal tariff and no
retaliation takes place, the group of countries which impose the optimal tariff is better off
and the other group of countries is worse off from the optimal tariff. In terms of the
elements of Table 5.1, this means that a > b, a' > b', b > d and b' > d'. The outcome (c, c')
is the result of a tariff war where retaliation occurs in response to an optimal tariff.
Comparing this outcome with the free trade outcome, there are two possible welfare
outcomes. The first one is the standard case where both countries in tariff war are worse
off than at free trade, and it is a classical prisoner’s dilemma game, b > c, b' > c'. The
second possibility is that one country benefits from a tariff war while the other one loses,

37

A similar game was developed by Riezman (1982) for two countries in a tariff game.
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and it differs from the prisoner’s dilemma game with conditions specified by Johnson
(1953-4). In Table 5.1 this means that b > c and c' > b' (or c > b and b' > c').
In the standard case of prisoner’s dilemma, the dominant strategy for each region
is to choose strategy O, since for any strategy choice of the opposing region the playing
strategy O yields a higher payoff. This result can easily be seen from Table 5.1. Suppose
the South chooses strategy F, then the North receives b for playing F, and a for playing
O. Since a > b, O is the best choice for the North when the South chooses F. Suppose the
South chooses O. The North obtains d by playing F and c by playing O; again O is the
best choice for North. Therefore, North will choose O, and the same reasoning applies to
South. In the second case developed by Johnson, the same reasoning can be applied to
show that the dominant strategy for each region remains O. To sum up, when the regions
act in a non-cooperative game, each region will select the strategy of imposing the
optimal tariff, and the outcome of free trade will not be reached. Note, however, that it is
possible that one region benefits from the tariff war, but both cannot at the same time.

5.3 Global North-South Game in a Cooperative Framework

Relaxing the assumption that cooperation is not allowed, we can assume that the
groups of countries can communicate and make binding agreements before they choose a
tariff strategy. In a cooperative framework, each region approaches the negotiations
trying to maximize its own welfare. They are aware of the fact that they can both receive
at least c and c' respectively, which would be the outcome when they both select strategy
O and refuse to negotiate. Thus, the point (c, c') would be a logical choice for beginning
point of negotiations. During the negotiations, a set of points dominating the point 0 = (c,
c') can be identified as the negotiation set. Figure 5.1a displays the standard case where
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both regions suffer from a tariff war, and Figure 5.1b displays the Johnson case where
one region is better off while the other is worse off from a tariff war.
In Figure 5.1, point B denotes the payoff (d, a') that corresponds to the strategy
choice (F, O) since it is known that d < c and a' > c' from Table 5.1. Similarly, point C
indicates the payoff (a, d') which results from the strategy pair (O, F). If free trade is
chosen by both regions (F, F), the payoff is (b, b'). In the standard case of prisoner’s
dilemma, b > c and b' > c', and therefore, the free trade outcome (b, b') can be denoted by
point F in Figure 5.1a, showing the best possible outcome that is attainable. The shaded
area 0EFD in Figure 5.1a shows the negotiation set, which is composed of outcomes with
positive payoffs for the two regions. If the Pareto optimality assumption is made, then the
negotiation set becomes restricted to the line segment EFD, and the set of solutions lying
on this line segment is called the Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution.
To summarize, under the standard prisoner’s dilemma game, when the two
regions negotiate in a cooperative framework, they will choose a joint tariff policy whose
utility level is given by some point on EFD. Note that the free trade outcome (point F) is
only one of the many possibilities which can be chosen in the process of negotiations.
However, if they have no way of negotiation in a non-cooperative game, they will end up
imposing optimal tariffs on each other, resulting in the worst possible outcome of point 0.
The shaded area in Figure 5.1b illustrates the negotiation set for the Johnson case.
While the locations of points B, C, and 0 are the same as the standard case, the location of
point F differs since its payoff outcome (b, b') in Johnson case yields a loss for one player
and gain for the other: either b > c, c' > b' or c > b, b' > c'. Thus, point F could have been
drawn somewhere around point B, instead of point C. Since moving to free trade makes
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one region worse off relative to the point where both regions impose the optimal tariff,
none of the players choose free trade as a pure strategy in Johnson case. If we assume
Pareto optimality, the negotiation set shrinks to the line segment ED.
Given that we have identified the negotiation sets under the two possible cases,
the next step is to examine a cooperative game solution in order to assess the likelihood
for free trade strategy to be chosen. Consider the Nash cooperative solution, which is, by
definition, the point that maximizes the product of the two region’s utilities and exists in
the negotiation set. In our game, if Ui is the utility of region i, then the Nash solution
chooses the point that maximizes U = USUN. Figure 5.2 shows that the Nash solution
could be either free trade (as in Fig. 5.3a) or a point which is not free trade (as in Fig.
5.3b).
Free trade strategy will be chosen if the slope of the world indifference surface
US/UN is greater in absolute terms than the slope of line segment BF and less than the
slope of FC, which can be written as the following:
a ′ − b ′ U S b′ − d ′
<
<
b − d UN
a−b

The North and the South are likely to choose free trade as a joint cooperative
strategy the smaller the gain from imposing a tariff ( a − b and a ′ − b′ ) and the larger the
gain to the retaliated region of moving to free trade ( b − d and b′ − d ′ ). If the regions are
symmetric (i.e. a = a ′ , b = b′ , etc.) then free trade will be the joint strategy chosen (as in
Fig. 5.3a).
Figure 5.2b shows an equilibrium outcome which is not free trade. The slope of
the world indifference surface equals the slope of FC, i.e. U S U N = b′ − d ′ a − b . This
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indicates that a − b is large, or the potential gain of the North from imposing a tariff on
Southern imports is rather large. In this case, the North would sacrifice much more than
the South by accepting free trade. Since each region is treated equally under the Nash
cooperative solution, the final solution will differ from free trade.
It should be here mentioned as a historical reference that almost all of the nowdeveloped countries of the North had used tariff protection and other forms of infant
industry promotion when they were in catching-up positions. Only when protection could
no longer offer benefits as the now-developed economies became far more competitive
than others, they resorted to free trade policies and denied the use of tariff protection as
part of the “kicking away the ladder” (Chang 2002). From a historical perspective,
therefore, the developing countries sacrifice much more than the developed ones when
they accept free trade strategies. In other words, the potential gain of the South from
charging a tariff on imports from developed countries is so much larger that the free trade
outcome would not be realized in the Nash cooperative equilibrium.

5.4 Intra-Region North and South Games

Intra-regional games between Northern (or Southern) individual countries can, in
principle, be characterized as a prisoner’s dilemma game where one country can benefit
from imposing a tariff on other country’s imports, but if the other country retaliates, it
might end up being worse off at the end of the tariff war. However, it should be noted
that the proposition of optimum tariff theorem is valid only in the case of large countries
(or a group of countries acting in a unified fashion) which grants them monopoly power
in trade. If the large country assumption is relaxed, the individual countries in the North
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or the South can no longer take advantage of imposing optimal tariffs as they fail to
influence world market prices. In other words, the optimal tariff argument fails to hold in
case of the small country assumption.
Nevertheless, the Northern intra-regional game has often been simplified as either
a dual game between the United States and the European Union (Krugman 1987, Bradley
1987), or a trilateral game between Japan, the US, and the EU (Harrison and Rutström
1991). Thus, assuming that each country (or group of countries in case of the EU) has
enough market power in international trade flows, the same game theoretic approach
presented in previous sections applies. As Krugman summarized, the game is essentially
a prisoner’s dilemma, “where each country is better off intervening than being the only
country not to intervene, but everybody would be better off if nobody intervened” (1987:
142). In Krugman’s model, the strategic trade interventions arise from the oligopolistic
market structures prevailing in developed country markets.
With the recent rise of large-sized developing countries including Brazil, India,
China, and Russia in international trade, Southern intra-regional game can also be
thought of as a prisoner’s dilemma from a strategic viewpoint. But perhaps more
importantly, the fallacy of composition argument (each developing country is better off
with a small competitive devaluation and/or entry into low-tech manufactures, but it is
worse off if many other developing countries follow the same policies simultaneously) is
essentially a standard prisoner’s dilemma game . Thus, even when the large country
assumption fails to hold for a large number of small developing countries, their best
response strategies to cope with the growing competitive pressures in the world market
leads them into outcomes where they are worse-off as a whole (and the immiserizing
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growth outcome resumes). Moreover, it is much harder for many small countries within
the South to reach cooperative outcomes38 avoiding the Nash non-cooperative solutions
as compared with the small number of players in the intra-North game.

5.5 Inter-regional North-South Game from a Historical Viewpoint

From a historical perspective the degrees of protection exercised by individual
countries varied with respect to their stages of development and their colonial/semicolonial status. Most of the now-developed countries implemented very high rates of
tariff protection in their earlier stages of development, and forced the less developed
countries to practice free trade by means of unequal treaties and colonization (see Table
5.2).39
During this period from roughly 19th century to the Second World War, the
North-South game can be depicted as in Table 5.3. The best response for the North is to
impose an optimal tariff on its rival’s imports regardless of whether the South practices
free trade or plays the optimal tariff. The same is true for the South. In a non-cooperative
equilibrium, we would expect both regions to end up in a mutually harmful trade war
with the payoff (1, 1). However, the period is characterized by a very uneven world trade
regime in which the now-developed countries actively used infant industry protection and
prevented less developed countries from imposing tariff barriers through unequal treaties
and colonization. Indeed, for several colonies average tariff rates were as low as 5 percent
over this period (Amsden 2001: 43-45). The result of this unequal bargaining process
38

Commodity agreements for coffee, cocoa, etc. are attempts to reach such cooperative outcomes,
but they have been quite limited and ineffective as a solution, especially given the rise of
financialization of commodity markets (UNCTAD 2008).
39

See Chang (2002) and Amsden (2001) for a detailed historical analysis.

142

would be illustrated by the strategy pair (F, O)—the South practicing free trade (F) and
the North imposing optimal tariffs (O)—which results in the payoff (-5, 5), that is, a net
loss for the South and a net benefit for the North.
Once the now-developed countries achieved to promote their infant industries
through interventionist industrial, trade, and technology policies, they began to reduce
their tariffs in a gradual manner. In the meantime, during the post-WWII period the less
developed countries gained independence and freedom to pursue ISI-type policies. The
new North-South game can be represented by Table 5.4. Thanks to its industrial
development, the North receives a higher payoff for practicing free trade when the South
adopts a tariff-ridden policy. The non-cooperative outcome of the game is (O, F)—where
the Southern optimal trade policies are tolerated by the North which begins to liberalize
its trade barriers. The payoff outcome is (5, 2), which is the same total benefit of free
trade (3,4). But clearly the South benefits more under these renewed rules of the game.
Once the less developed countries begin to attain higher rates of growth and arise
as strong competitors with the now-developed countries (Korea, Taiwan, and other Asian
countries in fierce competition with the USA and the EU), the rules of the game alter one
more time. Table 5.5 shows that the North can no longer afford to tolerate competition
from Southern firms at global markets. This is epitomized by very high rates of tariff
protection during the Reagan administration in the USA.
In Table 5.5 if the South imposes an optimal tariff, the best response of North is to
retaliate. Non-cooperative game solution would be (O, O) with the payoffs (1, 1).
However, the developed countries and the lending institutions controlled by them have
succeeded to convince (or force depending on the debt situation of the developing
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country) them to open up their markets by liberalizing their trade and investment flows.
The neoliberal agenda under the Washington consensus can be represented by the
strategy pair (F, O) in which the South practiced free trade while the North began to
pursue protectionism. This was almost as destructive as the colonial game due to ensuing
deindustrialization in developing countries. The neo-colonial relations created the “lost
decade” for many developing countries.
Even though average tariff rates of developed countries declined substantially
after the Reagan-years, “the developed countries’ weighted tariff on imports from
developing countries is twice the average rate they impose on imports from other
developed countries” (Cordoba and Vanzetti 2005: 3). The reason for this uneven tariff
structure is the existence of tariff peaks for important export goods of developing
countries such as low-skill manufactures and processed agricultural products. Tariff
peaks are defined as tariffs that are three times the national weighted average. Since the
WTO negotiations target the reduction of average applied tariff rates, developed countries
are not required to lower the very high rates of protection that apply to textiles and
agriculture. One of the UNCTAD reports wrote:
…protection in Quad markets is quite clearly concentrated in typical export categories of
interest to low- and middle-income developing countries, such as textiles and agriculture.
Therefore, developing countries that are mainly specialized in raw materials and primary
agricultural products are faced with higher trade barriers when trying to move into the
subsequent production stages (low technology sectors such as processed agriculture and
textiles, or medium technologies such as automotive) (UNCTAD 2003b: 25).

Difficulties to diversify into products with higher technological content arising
from the concentrated Northern protection in strategic export markets of the developing
world should be taken into account in trade negotiations. In the present context, taking
into account other impediments to development from other WTO agreements on
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intellectual property rights and so forth, it is hard to say that the outcome of the global
North-South game changed from an unfavorable payoff for South coupled with a
favorable payoff for the North in the upper off-diagonal section.

5.6 Conclusion

There are many inferences and implications that can be drawn from the gametheoretic approach presented in this section. Three points are worth emphasizing:
(i)

Countries, or a group of countries acting in a concerted manner, can be viewed as

players in a tariff game. Each player recognizes the dynamic nature of its tariff decision
and takes into account that any change in its tariff rates might evoke a response from its
rival. The tariff game might quickly turn into a tariff war if the response from the rival
takes the form of increasing tariffs and making both players worse off eventually (the
standard prisoner’s dilemma solution).
(ii)

An exception to the standard game is the Johnson case where one country ends of

benefiting from a tariff war. In either case, the best response for each country (or group of
countries) is to choose an optimal tariff strategy if the rival chooses a free trade strategy.
The best response remains the optimal tariff strategy even if the rival decides to choose
an optimal tariff policy due to the welfare loss from practicing free trade.
(iii)

These results apply to the three games we have discussed: intra-North game,

intra-South game, and inter-regional North-South game. The asymmetric nature of the
players in the latter makes it less likely for the cooperative Nash outcome to be reached.
The evolution of game dynamics depending on the economic development and political
influence of players has a lasting effect on the equilibrium outcomes. While the pursuit of
free trade in earlier stages of development is much costlier than that in later stages, the
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existence of colonial or semi-colonial status (i.e. unequal exchange treaties) brings
additional costs to countries under colonial rule. These dynamic and political concerns
should be taken into account in multilateral tariff negotiations if a fair and welfareimproving solution is aimed to be reached.
Next chapter will analyze the policy options of developing country governments
in dealing with the unfavorable policy options under the age of neoliberal globalization.
Our inquiry will focus on a comparative analysis of industrial and trade policies used in
Turkey and Malaysia. While the per-capita GDP in Turkey was twice as much as the one
in Malaysia in 1960, four decades later the development experience of Malaysia stands
out with a higher per capita income, a higher growth rate of income, a low unemployment
rates, and a presence in high-technology manufactured export markets. These divergent
paths of development call for further analysis.
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Figure 5.1 The Negotiation Sets
(b) The Johnson Case
(a) The Standard Case
South’s
Utility

South’s
Utility

B
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E
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D
D
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North’s
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0
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C
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Source: Riezman (1982).
Figure 5.2 Nash Cooperative Solution
(a) Free Trade Outcome

(b) Non-Free Trade Outcome

South’s
Utility
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Source: Riezman (1982).
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Table 5.1 Non-Cooperative Global Game
North

South

F

O

F

(b, b')

(a, d')

O

(d, a')

(c, c')

Source: Author’s formulation.
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Table 5.2 Average Tariff Rates on Manufactured Products for Selected Developed
Countries in Their Early Stages of Development
(weighted average; in percentages of value)1
18202

18752

1913

1925

1931

1950

R

15-20

18

16

24

18

Belgium

6-8

9-10

9

15

14

11

Denmark

25-35

15-20

14

10

n.a.

3

R

12-15

20

21

30

18

Germany5

8-12

4-6

13

20

21

26

Italy

n.a.

8-10

18

22

46

25

R

5

30

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

6-8

3-5

4

6

n.a.

11

Russia

R

15-20

84

R

R

R

Spain

R

15-20

41

41

63

n.a.

Sweden

R

3-5

20

16

21

9

Switzerland

8-12

4-6

9

14

19

n.a.

United Kingdom

45-55

0

0

5

n.a.

23

United States

35-45

40-50

44

37

48

14

Austria

3
4

France

6

Japan

Netherlands

4

Source: Chang (2002: 40) adopted from Bairoch (1993), Table 3.3.
Notes:
R= Numerous and important restrictions on manufactured imports existed and
therefore average tariff rates are not meaningful.
1. World Bank (1991, p. 97, Box table 5.2) provides a similar table, partly drawing on
Bairoch’s own studies that form the basis of the above table. However, the World
Bank figures, although in most cases very similar to Bairoch’s figures, are
unweighted averages, which are obviously less preferable to weighted average figures
that Bairoch provides.
2. These are very approximate rates, and give range of average rates, not extremes.
3. Austria-Hungary before 1925.
4. In 1820, Belgium was united with the Netherlands.
5. The 1820 figure is for Prussia only.
6. Before 1911, Japan was obliged to keep low tariff rates (up to 5%) through a series
of "unequal treaties" with the European countries and the USA. The World Bank
table cited in note 1 above gives Japan’s unweighted average tariff rate for all goods
(and not just manufactured goods) for the years 1925, 1930, 1950 as 13%, 19%, 4%.
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Table 5.3 Hypothetical Payoff Matrix (until 1950s)
North

South

F

O

F

(3, 3)

(-5, 5)

O

(5, 0)

(1, 1)

Source: Author’s formulation.
Table 5.4 Hypothetical Payoff Matrix after Northern Industrialization (1950-1980)
North

South

F

O

F

(3, 4)

(-5, 5)

O

(5, 2)

(1, 1)

Source: Author’s formulation.
Table 5.5 Hypothetical Payoff Matrix after Southern Industrialization (1980s-onwards)
North

South

F

O

F

(3, 4)

(-5, 5)

O

(5, -1)

(1, 1)

Source: Author’s formulation.
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CHAPTER 6
INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE AND THE ROLE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL
STATE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY AND MALAYSIA
6.1 Introduction

The significance of diversifying their export structures for middle-income
countries has grown with the widespread free trade agreements either under the new
WTO rules or through bilateral agreements. Among these countries, some have
succeeded to diversify their export base into more technology-intensive products but
many others have failed to do so. While Malaysia is closer to the successful end of this
spectrum, Turkey is considered less successful, although certainly not a complete failure.
Both countries are under pressure of rising competitiveness in their export markets. In
order to stay competitive in world markets, both countries need to upgrade their industrial
structures and invest in local content. While Malaysia has the advantage of having an
export-oriented MNC-led industry in high-technology manufactures, Turkish export
structure is relatively weaker and stagnant when it comes to increasing its technology
content. Its low-technology textile and manufacture industries, that have higher real wage
levels, face difficulties in competing with low-wage countries. In more sophisticated
parts of manufacturing, Turkish firms have difficulties in competing against hightechnology European firms.
This chapter compares and contrasts the role of the developmental state of past
and present industrial performance for Turkey and Malaysia. It takes a historical
perspective on comparing different phases of manufacturing experiences, and the role of
state policies in restructuring these experiences. One of the central questions that this
chapter aims to answer arises from Figure 6.1. Malaysia experienced a more or less stable
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trend in net barter terms of trade until the end of ISI period, which was followed by an
improvement with the beginning of liberalization. In contrast, Turkey experienced a
decline in its net barter terms of trade until trade liberalization and a slightly increasing
trend until 1994, and a further deterioration after the currency devaluation following the
financial crisis of 1994. More importantly, however, the purchasing power of exports
measured by income terms of trade increased dramatically in Malaysia, while it displayed
only a modest increase in the case of Turkey. The critical questions, therefore, are the
following: Why do we have these divergent paths in the terms of trade trends and how are
they associated to different development trajectories of Turkey and Malaysia?
This chapter addresses these questions by arguing that the rapid transformation of
Malaysian exports into manufactured goods with higher technological content is partly
responsible for the upward movement in relative export prices and for the massive
expansion in the volume of these high-tech exports. Likewise, specializing in low-tech
manufactured exports has resulted in deteriorating relative export prices and a much
lower rate of increase in the volume of Turkish exports. The existence of higher rates of
unemployment in Turkey is also partly responsible for keeping real wages lower, and
thus, resulting in lower prices of exported goods in case of Turkey. In contrast,
Malaysia’s lower rate of unemployment has led to higher rates of increase in real wages,
which was also reflected in rising terms of trade. Section 6.5.3.2 provides empirical
evidence in support of this view.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 provides the analytical
framework on (i) the role of technology in the distribution of Schumpeterian rents which
influence terms of trade trends, and (ii) the impact of technological structure of exports
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on export performance and economic growth. Section 3 presents an overview of stylized
facts about industrialization processes in Turkey and Malaysia. Section 4 analyzes in
great detail how differences in state policies (industrial and trade policies in particular)
generated different outcomes in industrialization, balance of payments problems, and
technological diversification of exports. Section 5 analyzes the evolution of technological
structure of manufactured exports, considers the prospects for Turkey and Malaysia to
sustain competitiveness in world markets, and provides empirical evidence on the
relationships between structural changes in manufacturing and export performance,
economic growth, and the terms of trade movements. Section 6 discusses the instruments
of technological upgrading by situating Turkey and Malaysia within the group of
exporters of manufactured goods. Section 7 evaluates empirically the relative impact of a
trade policy, namely trade liberalization, on the growth of their exports, imports, and the
resulting changes in their trade balance. Section 8 draws the conclusions.

6.2 Analytical Framework: Technology, Terms of Trade, and Export Structure

In his 1998 article, “Beyond Terms of Trade: Convergence/Divergence and
Creative/Uncreative Destruction,” Singer explained the implications of his proposed
extension of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis from different types of commodities to
different types of countries as follows:
The manufactures exported by developing countries tended to be technologically simpler
than the manufactures imported from developed countries – hence the extension of the
PST from commodities to countries also involved a shift from emphasis on
industrialization and diversification to an emphasis on building up technological capacity,
entrepreneurial skills, and of ‘human capital’ in general. Without such a technological
capacity, a shift into manufactures required foreign investment or aid (Singer 1998: 1415).
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The emphasis on building up technological capacity in the revisited PST, as a
driving force for growth and development, was greatly influenced by Schumpeter’s
conception of technical innovation. In this respect, PST can be considered as part of the
neo-Schumpeterian approaches to development. Singer interpreted Schumpeter’s concept
of creative destruction in the following sense: “The creation of new technologies
replacing primary commodities or economizing in their use or using them more
efficiently for the production of higher quality goods creates destruction for the producers
of primary commodities” (1998: 20). According to Singer, the innovation process begins
in the industrialized countries and in the industrial sectors with the creation of new
commodities, new methods of production, new forms of organization, and new trade
routes and markets, and new sources of supply while the destructive elements of this
process is felt in the primary producing countries and the primary producing sectors.
It must be clear, however, that the process of creative destruction is not limited to
the technological discrepancy between industrial and primary producing sectors or
countries. A more generalized interpretation needs to include the technological divisions
among the different forms of technological intensities of manufactured goods: hightechnology, medium-technology, low-technology, and resource-based manufactures.
While the high ends of the technical innovation generates rents (or super-profits in the
Marxian sense) for the entrepreneurs operating in high-technology industries, the
producers using standardized technologies receive no rents and often suffer from
excessively competitive markets.
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Schumpeter’s original conception of the process of creative destruction involves
innovations that cluster in time: a phase of revolution and later a phase of absorption of
the results of the revolution.
While these things are being initiated we have brisk expenditure and predominating
“prosperity” … and while [they] are being completed and their results pour forth we have
the elimination of antiquated elements of the industrial structure and predominating
“depression” (Schumpeter 1954: 68).

These innovative impulses that gather in time, generating long phases of
prosperity and depression, can also be seen as clustering in space (Arrighi, Silver, and
Brewer 2005: 26). In the quote above, one can replace “while” with “where” and “read it
as a description of a spatial polarization of zones of predominating ‘prosperity’ and zones
of predominating ‘depression’” (ibid: 26).
This kind of reading is indeed present in two prominent theories of economic
development inspired by Schumpeterian view of innovations: Akamatsu’s “flying geese”
model (1961) and Vernon’s “product-cycle” model. Both models picture the diffusion of
industrial innovations as a “spatially structured process” that originates in the more
developed countries and is gradually imitated by the less developed countries. The
innovation process tends to begin in developed countries because “high incomes create a
favorable environment for product innovations; high costs create a favorable environment
for innovations in techniques; and cheap and abundant credit creates a favorable
environment for financing these and all other kinds of innovations” (Arrighi et al. 2005:
27). The receipt of high rewards relative to effort in the form of rents further improves
the environment for innovations, creating “a self-reinforcing ‘virtuous cycle’ of high
incomes and innovations” (ibid: 27).
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Low-income countries tend to receive hardly any benefits of these innovations
taking place in high-income countries since they are no longer innovations once they
arrive to poor countries; instead, they are standardized technologies yielding average
rates of return due to intense competition. Moreover, the destructive aspects of major
innovations affect developing countries disproportionately because their low levels of
income and accumulated wealth leave their residents with a much lower capacity to
adjust socially and economically to the disruptive effects of innovations. Through the
asymmetric impacts on regions where innovations originate and regions where
innovations dissipate, the process of creative destruction reproduces uneven development
seen as a spatially structured process of divergence.
The effect of creative destruction process on terms of trade tends to favor the
“innovation-intensive” products especially thanks to the significant barriers for entry into
these product markets which allow the Schumpeterian rents to be appropriated by the
innovating group of entrepreneurs. This point is also made by Kaplinsky: “…the real
terms of trade will be not so much between commodities and manufactures, but between
innovation-intensive products (benefiting from Schumpeterian rents) and non-innovationintensive products” (2006: 992).
Since innovation-intensive products tend to be technology-intensive (products that
require the use of higher or more sophisticated technologies have a greater tendency to be
improved through new innovations), the export structures dominated by technologyintensive commodities have better growth prospects than others do. This can be further
explained by the interaction mechanisms emphasized by the North-South model (Botta
2009) introduced in chapter 4:
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(i)

Manufacturing activities that are subject to rapid product or process innovation

enjoy faster growth of demand compared to technologically stagnant activities. This
effect is illustrated by the positive (negative) impact of the technological content variable
( φ ) on the income elasticity of exports (imports). There is also considerable empirical
evidence that most of the dynamic products in world trade use complex and sophisticated
technologies (Ocampo, Rada and Taylor 2009: 72-73, Lall 1998).
(ii)

Technology-intensive manufacturing activities are less susceptible to entry by

rival producers compared to activities with low technological content, which require low
levels of scale, skill, and technology in general. Although a low-technology export
structure might be a good starting point for a labor-surplus economy, it cannot sustain
export growth over time unless it takes market shares from other exporters of low
technology manufactures. Under the slow growth of final goods markets, gaining market
shares is possible, but rather difficult. It requires substantial technical effort and
investments in skill formation, as well as R&D.
(iii)

Structural change involving higher shares of manufacturing activities in higher

ends of the technological spectrum allows higher rates of growth due to (a) spillover
effects from technology-intensive activities to other productive activities and to the
national system of technology; (b) ability to respond faster to changing competitive
conditions in global markets; and (c) the higher learning potential and greater opportunity
for application of science to technology. The coefficient for share of manufacturing GDP
(α) captures this positive effect on productivity and greater growth potential in our model.
(iv)

Adjusting to global market forces and specializing along static comparative

advantages impedes the process of industrialization in developing countries by confining
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them to their original productive pattern (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2006). The industrial
policies geared towards expanding key manufacturing sectors, with selective protective
measures and discretional incentives, can counteract negative impacts of market forces
and allow developing countries to specialize along dynamic comparative advantages.
This effect of industrial policies is captured by the policy variable ( σ ) in our model.
Very low values of this variable correspond to a ‘market-friendly’ institutional
environment, which avoids the adoption of infant-industry policies (Botta 2009: 64). The
effect of trade liberalization can also be interpreted from this perspective.
In light of these propositions, the rest of this chapter will focus on the following
questions. First, comparing the Malaysian economic performance with Turkey, which
economy portrays a more dynamic growth path coupled with a faster structural change in
its sectoral composition? Second, what is the role of industrial policy in creating the
differences in growth performance and structural change? Third, what are the trends in
terms of trade and what are the major factors generating these trends? Can they be partly
explained by the changes in technological-intensity of manufacturing activities
(benefiting from Schumpeterian rents)? Forth, how is the growth performance affected by
technological composition of manufactured exports? Fifth, what is the role of
technological efforts in attracting FDI, formation of skills, R&D expenditures on
promoting technology-intensive activities and economic growth? Sixth, how has the
liberalization of trade flows affected the relative growth of exports vis-à-vis imports and
the net effect on balance of payments?
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6.3 Late-Industrialization in Turkey and Malaysia: Some Stylized Facts

In 1968, Malaysia’s per capita income ($1,084 at 2000 prices) was only half of
Turkey’s per capita income ($2,038 at 2000 prices). Due to its rapid industrial
transformation, Malaysia caught up with Turkey in the late 1990s (Figure 6.2). In PPP
terms, its per capita income has exceeded Turkey over the past decade (see Table 6.1).
Malaysia’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.4 per cent during 1981-1997, led by
a manufacturing sector that expanded at 12.3 per cent (Lall 1995: 759). In contrast,
Turkey’s GDP, in contrast, grew on average at a rate of 5 percent during the same time
period, and the expansion of the manufacturing sector was also much slower. While the
Turkish and Malaysian economies have grown at similar rates since the 1998 Asian
Crisis, the rate of structural transformation has been much faster in the case of Malaysia,
whose share of manufacturing in GDP rose from 14 percent in 1971 to 30 percent in
1993, while shares of traditional sectors (mining and agriculture) declined from 43 to 24
percent. These figures stand out when compared to the case of Turkey, whose
manufacturing share increased from 16 percent in 1971 to 21 percent in 1993, and the
traditional sectors’ share fell from 37 to 17 percent (State Planning Organization, Turkey,
2010).
Massive structural transformation within the Malaysian economy is reflected in
rapid technological upgrading of its export composition. Figures 6.3a and 6.3b show the
technological composition of exports in Turkey and Malaysia respectively, over the
period of 1962 to 2006. The share of high-technology manufactures in Malaysian exports
has risen from almost nothing in 1962 to about 60 percent in 2006, and that of primary
commodities has declined from 75 percent to less than 10 percent. In comparison, the
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Turkish exports are dominated by a large share of low-technology exports (mainly
textiles and garments), and the share of manufactures with high technology content is less
than 10 percent. Section 5 will examine in greater detail the recent trends in the
technology intensities of exports.
When examining the macroeconomic performances of Turkey and Malaysia in a
comparative perspective, Table 6.1 shows that Malaysia has outperformed Turkey in a
number of indicators:
First, Malaysia has been much more successful in attracting foreign direct
investment (FDI), partly due to its earlier experience with British colonial capital exports
to its resource-based industries, namely rubber, tin and palm oil. The average share of
FDI in Malaysia’s GDP was 2.2 per cent during the 1960s, then increasing to 3.1 percent
in the 1970s and 4.6 percent until the East Asian currency crisis hit in 1998. Even after
the crisis, it has remained around 3.3 percent over the past decade. For the Turkish GDP,
on the other hand, the share of FDI has always been rather low—historically it has been
less than 1 per cent and only exceeded that mark during the last decade.
Second, the share of exports in GDP is much higher for Malaysia in all successive
periods due to its experience with export-oriented industrialization prior to their
independence in 1957. Over the past decade, Malaysia’s share of exports to its GDP has
grown remarkably, reaching 114 percent, while the same figure for Turkey was only 23
percent. The average annual percentage growth of exports has also been higher for
Malaysia than for Turkey.
Third, while the value of imports, as a percent of GDP, has been much higher in
Malaysia, the imports grew at a faster rate in Turkey. The rapid growth of imported
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commodities often caused current account deficits, especially during the late 1970s as the
workers’ remittances deteriorated. According to recent IMF Economic Outlook reports,
Turkey has one of the highest shares of current account deficit relative to its GDP. This is
a major concern for maintaining economic stability since these deficits are financed by
short-term capital inflows that are very volatile and that tend to fly out as the fragilities
increase, for example, during the financial crisis of 1994. In contrast, Malaysia has run a
current account surplus at an average rate of 12.4 percent to its GDP, and it also instituted
capital controls during the financial crisis of 1998 to maintain stability of its financial
sector. This contrasts with the experiences of other Asian countries such as Korea and
Thailand, which practiced IMF-led austerity programs to recover from the crisis.
Fourth, another concern for the Turkish macroeconomic performance is the rising
total debt service ratio. As a share of exports of goods, services, and income, this ratio
has reached an average of 36 percent over the past decade, whereas it is only 6 percent in
the case of Malaysia. As a share of the Turkish GNI, the total debt service rose from an
average of 6 percent over 1981-97 to 8.7 percent since the year 1998. Malaysia has
reduced this ratio from 9.7 percent to 7.3 percent over the same time periods.
Fifth, Turkey has faced a relatively much higher rate of inflation since the 1970s
compared to Malaysia, which had inherited a low-inflation and fairly stable
macroeconomic dynamics from their previous British colonial period. Turkey’s
fluctuations in relative prices, due to high inflation, have been one of the reasons for the
reluctance of the manufacturing sector to invest in long-term projects (Rodrik and
Aricanli 1990). With single-digit inflation on average, Malaysia has been more successful
in sustaining price-stability.
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6.4 Industrial Policy in Turkey and Malaysia

Late industrialization in case of Turkey and Malaysia has unfolded through
successive phases of industrial policies having common characteristics but yet being very
distinct in their capacity to achieve competitiveness in world markets. Although both
countries began industrializing earlier than the 1960s, we will focus on the period
beginning with 1960s due to the difficulties with data availability for the previous
periods. One can trace four phases of industrial development considering the historical
experiences of Turkey and Malaysia:
(i)

Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI): 1957-1970 in Malaysia, 1954-1976 in

Turkey
(ii)

ISI Second Round and Exhaustion: 1971-1985 in Malaysia, 1977-1980 in Turkey

(iii)

Liberalization and Export-Oriented Industrialization: 1986-1997 in Malaysia,

1981-2000 in Turkey
(iv)

Crisis Management: 1998-2008 in Malaysia, 2001-2008 in Turkey

6.4.1 Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI)

The first phase for Malaysia begins with gaining independence in 1957 and ends
with a drastic shift in industrial policies in 1970. This period involves a moderate degree
of protection for import-substituting activities and measures to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI) into export activities. In case of Turkey, a similar period of importsubstituting industrialization (ISI) has taken place over the period 1954-1976.40 In both
countries, the state played an active role in promoting infrastructural development and

40

Note, however, that the first industrialization efforts in Turkey took place during 1930-39. We
shall come back to this point in Section 6.4.1.3.
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nurturing the import-competing industries with protective trade policies and tax
incentives. The main difference between the two countries’ experiences over this period
was that the Malaysian industrial policies were focused on export promotion in resourcebased manufactured goods while Turkish industrial policies were predominantly targeting
domestic market until the 1980s. The Malaysian Industrial Development Authority
(MIDA), which was set up in the late 1960s to enhance export growth, became a major
actor in encouraging electronics multinational corporations (MNCs) in the USA to shift
their production units to Malaysia. This was happening during the semiconductor
assembly boom in the developing countries and Singapore—Malaysia’s greatest role
model—was reaching out to the MNCs to upgrade its labor-intensive assembly to more
complex activities. Having the same motivation, MIDA’s efforts to attract electronics
MNCs became eventually successful partly due to generous fiscal incentives (due to the
rich tax base from resource-based sectors) and a favorable investment climate, as well as
an English speaking labor force that was well-trained and disciplined. It was thanks to the
combination of these factors that Malaysia could launch on its high-technology export
growth path (Lall 1995, Jomo 2008).

6.4.1.1 Path Dependence: Colonial and Semi-Colonial Experiences

In contrast to the Malaysian development, Turkey has neither set up an institution
to attract foreign investment nor promoted export activities to a degree that Malaysia has
done. One of the significant factors that induced these different trajectories has been the
path-dependence. When Malaysia became independent in 1957, it had already a
developed resource-based sector in exporting processed tin, rubber, and food, and this
sector was previously developed by the British to satisfy its industrial raw material needs.
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This provided Malaysia with a strong taxable base for raising government revenues to be
directed into other sectors. The Malaysian government preserved the tradition of exportorientation and welcoming attitude to foreign investors, but only strived to upgrade it
from low-skill, resource-based activities to more sophisticated lines of production.
Turkish industrial efforts were also partially path-dependent to follow previous
historical achievements. Despite being never officially colonized, when Turkey was
founded in 1923 (after a brutal independence war against European powers after the
World War I), it inherited a semi-colonial economic structure from the defeated Ottoman
Empire: First, small industrial producers were driven out by European competitors during
the course of the 19th century. Almost all of industrial goods were imported and the only
export commodities consisted of raw materials. Although Ottoman Empire was selfsufficient in textile products at the beginning of the 19th century, a century later 80 to 90
% of its domestic consumption was obtained from imported garments and textile
products. Secondly, and more importantly as an indicator of semi-colonial status,
Ottoman Empire had accumulated a large amount of external debt that it had increasing
difficulties to service. The lender countries from Europe, as a result, had begun to dictate
terms not only in economic decisions, but also in political and military realms with
growing sanctions for the Ottoman Empire. In short, the newly-established Turkish state
took over an economically backward and dependent productive sector coupled with a
weak financial structure and a huge debt stock that it had to pay over a short period of
time (Boratav 1988).
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6.4.1.2 Differences in Manufacturing Experiences before WWII

Amsden classifies prewar manufacturing experience into three categories: premodern, émigré, and colonial. Since it is based on small-scale artisan handicrafts, the
Ottoman Empire’s experience falls into the first category. Pre-modern manufacturing was
also seen in China, India, and Mexico, and was of longest standing among all. Malaysia’s
experience, in contrast, arose from the know-how transferred by permanent or quasipermanent emigrants from China and India, and thus falls into the émigré type of prewar
manufacturing together with Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand. Manufacturing industries
in Turkey and Latin America received also emigrants from North Atlantic countries, but
this type of émigré experience differed from Malaysia’s and others’ experience since the
influence of foreign individuals was felt before the arrival of foreign firms (Amsden
2001: 15). In case of Turkey, these individuals were mostly wealthy merchants who were
sometimes engaged in money-lending, but they were hardly any entrepreneurs engaged in
industrial production. By contrast, in Malaysia, Chinese emigrants played an important
role in earlier forms of industrial organizations in export and import processing.
Amsden’s third category, colonial prewar manufacturing experience, represents the
know-how emerging from formal colonial organizations established by the North Atlantic
countries (as in India) or by Japan (as in Korea, Taiwan).
The distinction between émigré and colonial experience allows Amsden to
differentiate the long-run technology strategies among late-comers—whether to “make”
or to “buy”. Those that invested heavily in national firms and national skills—China,
India, Korea, and Taiwan—all had colonial manufacturing experience, whereas those that
had attracted foreign direct investment and were slow to invest in advanced skills—
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Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Turkey—all had North Atlantic émigré experience.
The reason behind this differentiation lies in the transition to national-state formation.
While the previously-colonized countries could in the postwar period nationalize,
expropriate, and acquire foreign-owned business enterprises and seize “first-mover”
advantage in expanding industries with large economies of scale, the countries with
North Atlantic émigré experience had no comparable discontinuity and the nascent
national enterprises were often crowded out by multinational firms (Amsden 2001: 16).
Note, however, that the Turkish case differed from the Latin American experience
since there was some discontinuity with the end of the Independence War and the
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. What differentiates the North Atlantic
émigré experience from the colonial one, in our opinion, is not that the existence of
foreign direct investment per se, but rather the nature of that foreign direct investment.
Malaysia had also attracted large sums of FDI under Chinese émigré experience, and did
not carry-out a whole-scale nationalization of the existing foreign enterprises. Yet, the
impact was mostly positive, especially in terms of upgrading from resource-based
manufacturing to more complex activities such as electronics in the later periods. For
countries with North Atlantic émigré experience, the problem was not simply the
existence of “a large stock of foreign direct investment” and the crowding-out problem,
but rather the fact that the existing foreign capital was employed either as merchant
capital, that is, for buying cheap and selling dear without engaging in production, or as
interest-bearing capital, that is, to lend money for earning interest on it. Thus, the
problem was the almost complete non-existence of factory-scale manufacturing activity
(see Boratav 1988 for the Turkish case). Amsden tends to underplay this factor (the
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absence of productive capital), focusing more on the differences between national and
foreign capital.

6.4.1.3 First Industrial Interventions in Turkey

The first industrial move of the Turkish state took place during the Great
Depression, when the imports of industrial commodities from developed countries came
to a halt. Under a significant degree of protection and etatist policies, state economic
enterprises (SEEs) began to emerge as the main industrial enterprises. The major
industrial activities consisted of the production of consumer goods such as flour, sugar,
and garments, and industrial raw materials such as iron and other metals. State took also
an active role in maritime transportation, municipal services, and the energy sector.
In 1934, the First Five-Year Industrial Plan was designed to guide public
investments in strategic sectors. While some of the investment projects were completed
by 1938, others were interrupted by the Second World War.41 After the war, for the first
time in the history of the Turkish Republic a multi-party system was set up. The new
ruling party, the Democrat Party, implemented drastic changes in economic policies
including a new external-orientation, the reduction of protective measures for the
domestic industry, and prioritizing investments in agriculture, mining, and infrastructure.
As a result, imports grew by more than a 100% while exports remained stagnant in
1947—which resulted in a large trade deficit for the first time since the foundation of the
Turkish Republic. The trade deficits took a chronic form after 1947 as the share of the

41

Turkey did not participate in this war. However, it has seen the negative impacts of the war
through the significant reduction in export earnings and the postponement of the industrial
planning activities until the end of the war due to the rising share of military expenditure in total
income.
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industry shrank from 15.2% to 13.4% from 1946 to 1952, which made it increasingly
dependent on imported inputs. This situation continued until the limits of external
borrowing were reached and the consumer demand stagnated in 1954. Under these
pressures, the Democrat Party shifted back to a more protective set of policies42 and direct
public investments in SEEs, encouraging import-substitution. However, ISI did not take
the form of a stable industrial plan until the 1960s.
Beginning in 1963, Turkey instituted three five-year industrial plans with a focus
on promoting the production of chemicals, commercial fertilizers, iron, steel and
metallurgy, paper, petroleum, cement, and vehicle tires. While the first of these plans
prioritized state initiatives and enterprises in taking the lead, the second and third
industrial plans gave the priority to private capital accumulation supported by subsidies
and incentives, limiting the role of the state to merely support private enterprises. Over
the period 1962-1976, the SEEs became more active in intermediate goods sector while
the private enterprises took the lead in producing consumer goods. Machinery production
was largely undertaken by SEEs, but it was not sufficient by any means, which led to
significant spending on imported machinery. Although final goods industries’ share in
GDP rose over this ISI period, the dependence on imported inputs and investment goods
was not reduced—which tended to keep trade deficits significantly high as a share of
GDP. These deficits were financed either by external borrowing or workers’ remittances
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The import-controlling programs were established in 1958 and they placed importable goods in
one of the three lists: the Liberalized List 1 (LL1), the Liberalized List 2 (LL2), and the Quota
List (QL). Unless a good was included in one these lists, it was prohibited to be imported. Tariff
rates tended to be the lowest for raw materials and intermediate goods that were not domestically
produced, and highest for final goods that were domestically produced (Katircioglu et al 1995:
34). These restrictions remained intact until the trade liberalization of 1980 and the new Import
Program of 1983.
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(which increased over time and became the main source that balanced the current
account).

6.4.1.4 Early Attempts of Performance Requirements

Despite the targets in industrial plans for a large increase in exports and the
promotion of textile industry, there was only limited achievement. One of the attempts of
the Turkish government in the 1960s was to promote exports by making them a condition
for capacity expansion by foreign firms. A German multinational, Mannesmann, formed
a joint venture with a Turkish development bank, Sumerbank, to produce steel pipes.
Both the Turkish and German managers recognized that the Turkish government was
constantly willing to assist the joint venture in its operations. However, foreign investors
were worried about the condition that each capital increase could only take place with the
consent of the Turkish government. It became a government policy to allow for a capital
increase by forcing companies to take on export commitments. Moreover, the
government placed the condition that any profit transfers had to be covered by export
earnings. However, the steel pipes produced by the joint venture could not yet compete at
world market prices and the export sales led to losses (Friedman and Beguin 1971: 20910). Hence, although the promotion standards set by the Turkish government resembled
significantly to the treatment of the Korean government in terms of its monitoring and
disciplining big capital, the Turkish case was of little success—perhaps because it was
not maintained long enough to bear its fruits as it takes significant periods of time to
complete ‘technology transfer’; or because the government failed to subsidize the losses
from export sales.
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In the Malaysian case, in addition to the activities of MIDA to attract eletrononics
MNCs from USA in the late 1960s, “the 1958 Pioneer Industries Ordinance (PIO)
provided incentives and tariff protection for the development of import substituting
manufacturing. Firms enjoyed tariff protection and tax relief depending on the level of
investment” (Li and Imm 2008: 83). However, the implementation of performance
requirements and guided promotion of exports had not started until the small domestic
market began to show signs of saturation and the rate of employment creation proved to
be insufficient. Furthermore, the linkages between the export sector and domestic importcompeting sectors were very few and weakly-developed, and only a few of these
domestic enterprises had the capacity to upgrade themselves to internationally
competitive levels (Lall 1995: 764).

6.4.2 ISI Second Round and Exhaustion

The second phase, 1971-85 for Malaysia and 1977-80 for Turkey, represent a
second-round of ISI for Malaysia, and an exhaustion of ISI for Turkey. It is possible to
say that Malaysia had a longer period of import-substitution, especially with the
government’s effort to build heavy industry in the 1980s. By the time Turkey reached
1980s, it had pretty much exhausted its potential for pursuing import-substitution under a
highly-protected domestic market and the export promotion strategies had not been
effective as in the case of Malaysia.
The second-round of ISI in Malaysia began by the launch of the New Economic
Policy (NEP) in 1971 as a response to the ethnic disturbances in 1969. The NEP sought
to improve the living standards of bumiputeras (indigenous Malays) by increasing their
employment in the domestic industries as workers as well as owners of capital. The
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government’s most significant intervention in this period was to take over domestic
shares of foreign-owned plantations and import-competing enterprises, and to establish
state enterprises, which were later transferred to Malay capitalists. The number of SEEs
increased substantially as these nationalizations gained speed. Malay-owned enterprises,
whether big or small in scale, were strongly preferred in government financing and
support. Moreover, employment and education quotas were used as policy tools to
improve the labor participation rate of the Malay population.

6.4.2.1 Heavy Industrialization in Malaysia and Turkey

Aside from the inter-ethnic redistribution taking place during this period, there
were also significant industrial interventions to improve the linkages between the MNCled export sector and the Malay enterprises that were expanding under generous
government finance. The central initiative involved in these interventions was the
establishment of the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) in 1980. The
Malaysian government was imitating for the most part the Korean drive for the Heavy
and Chemical Industry in the 1970s. Its primary focus was the expansion of
manufacturing activities outside of the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and the improvement of
inter-industry linkages. Nevertheless, HICOM faced large losses since the mid-1980s and
several other state enterprises also displayed a poor performance.
These weak performances are regarded by the proponents of neoliberal policies as
a costly failure and the modification of the governments’ policies after 1985 are seen as a
refutation of Malaysian industrial policy at large (see World Bank 1993). Lall and others
have argued that this view is largely “unwarranted” because “the design of the
interventions in Malaysia was not ideal, and so does not constitute a proper test for the
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effectiveness of industrial policy; and the period over which effectiveness should be
assessed may need to be longer when complex learning processes are involved” (Lall
1995). The design of these policies was not ideal because “the NEP was addressed
primarily to redressing social imbalances and not to gaining world market
competitiveness in a new set of industrial activities. HICOM and other state industrial
enterprises were set up to serve domestic markets and establish local linkages, and there
was no systematic attempt to guide or monitor their technological development process…
[unlike Korea]” (Lall 1995: 765). This point also applies to the comparison between
Turkey and Malaysia because the design of interventions was also not ideal in Turkey,
and therefore, does not represent an appropriate test for the effectiveness of industrial
policy in Turkey. Similar to Malaysia, the great majority of state enterprises in Turkey
targeted the domestic market and their technological development process was not guided
or monitored as in the case of Korea.
In Turkey, the same period of 1971-85 witnessed the Third Five-Year Industrial
Plan (1972-76), the exhaustion of inward-oriented, protective, import-substituting
manufacturing (1977-79), and the launch of the first economic liberalization program in
1980. The difference of the 70s import substitution from the earlier periods was the
efforts of the government to create import-competing industries that produced investment
goods and intermediate inputs. While the main instrument was the foreign trade regime,
the investments in “heavy industry” were mostly achieved through direct state
involvement in production. An additional incentive for increasing investment began in
1968 with the issuance of “certificates of encouragement” to private enterprises by the
State Planning Organization. The investment projects eligible for these certificates
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enjoyed subsidized credits, tax breaks, and were partially exempt from customs duties.
However, the realization rates of these projects were rather low, and there was no process
of guiding or monitoring after the certificates were issued. Furthermore, the government
provided substantial export subsidies to exporting firms since the early 1960s in order to
compensate for the overvalued exchange rate. Yet, these subsidies were also not effective
in many cases to upgrade domestic industries to internationally competitive levels (Erzan
1995).

6.4.2.2 Turkish Debt Crisis, 1977-79

During the last few years of 1970s, the recessionary pressures in the worldeconomy were severely felt in Turkey. As exports fell by $ 200 million from 1976 to
1977, imports still continued to rise by $ 660 million and export/import ratio declined to
30 %. Consequently, trade deficit was over $ 4 billion. The workers’ remittances, which
were financing a large part of this deficit in early 1970s, were adversely affected by the
overvaluation of the currency and the austerity programs that were implemented in
Europe after the first oil shock. To finance the increasing current account deficits, the
Turkish government came up with a plan to provide exchange-rate guarantee to the
Turkish firms accumulating short-term debts from European banks. This form of
subsidized foreign financing became increasingly costly as the currency became
progressively overvalued. By mid-1977, foreign banks refused to lend any further, which
created a severe liquidity crises in Turkey (Rodrik and Aricanli 1990: 1344). This period
also corresponds to escalating civil unrest and political tensions in the parliament. It came
to an end by a military coup in September 12th, 1980 and the military government
implemented a far-reaching stabilization program under the guidance of the IMF.
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6.4.2.3 Comparison of ISI Experiences

Before getting into the details of this program, it will be useful to compare the
Malaysian ISI experience with the Turkish one.
First, Malaysia did not encounter the balance of payments problem to the degree
that it was faced in Turkey, for two reasons: (i) Malaysia had relatively strong market
positions in tin, rubber, and palm oil, and promoted its export-oriented industries
effectively so that its export growth never lagged too much behind its import growth; and
(ii) the import-competing industries were more successful in building backward linkages
and deepening ISI into the second-round of intermediate and investment goods sectors.
The second reason is at least as important as the first one because the protected infant
industries in final goods sector can become mature only in the presence of local suppliers
of the inputs required. In case of Turkey, although state enterprises were actively engaged
in intermediate goods production, they have often made losses due to inadequate knowhow and imperfections in knowledge transfers. But, perhaps more importantly, they were
not given enough time to absorb complex organizational and production technologies. By
contrast, Malaysia had an additional five years of ISI (1980-85), substantially investing in
its heavy industry drive through state-owned enterprises. Turkey could not afford waiting
longer due to its rising trade deficit that was becoming increasingly unsustainable.
Second, as a more general point, the divergence in growth paths is to a great
extent influenced by the comparative strength of the Malaysian trade and fiscal positions,
both of which reflect structural differences in international specialization patterns and
their impact on tax base as compared to Turkish. This is an exogenous difference that is
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path-dependent and structural and thus, cannot be reduced to relative effectiveness or
strength of economic policies implemented.
Third, both the Turkish and Malaysian interventions were carried out by public
sector enterprises with ‘soft budgets’, lacking an initial learning basis for effectively
using new production technologies. This aspect contrasts significantly with other Asian
latecomers such as Korea, whose drive for machinery and chemical industries were
undertaken by giant private conglomerates (the chaebol) with an already strong and
diverse production base and an already internationally competitive export performance.43
Nonetheless, while the Malaysian enterprises were successfully restructured and gained
such capabilities through being subject to performance requirements in the late-1980s, the
Turkish counterparts have only been privatized and financially encouraged through
subsidies, tax incentives, etc.—but they were hardly monitored for their performance,
which has not improved to desired levels. Thus, as I will explain in the next section in
detail, the Turkish manufacturing experience differed considerably from successful East
Asian latecomers in one respect: Turkish state failed to develop institutions that could
provide guidance and monitoring to the manufacturing enterprises for enabling them to
compete at world market prices.
Fourth, neither the Turkish nor the Malaysian industrial policies were supported
by supply-side measures to ensure sufficient development of skills or technology support.
Despite having good basic educational institutions, both countries had a relatively small
share of technical education provided at the level of university or vocational institutions.
This was certainly a large constraint to industrial upgrading as the high-level technical
43

Note that Taiwanese industrialization was driven largely by small-scale firms. Thus, the large
scale enterprises were not uniformly true for all East Asian latecomers.
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and engineering skills were not well-developed at all. Yet, both countries have placed
significant measures to improve skill development—but Malaysia has been more
successful in creating a large pool of well-trained technicians and engineers compared to
Turkey. Moreover, during import-substitution phase, both countries were short of an
effective system for the development of industrial technology. Without such a system, it
was rather difficult to establish linkages required to perform better. This factor also
differs significantly from first-tier NICs such as Korea, where its industrial deepening
was backed up by supply-side measures and this has accompanied interventions in
industrial development.
Fifth, neither the Turkish nor the Malaysian governments had a clear-cut,
selection strategy for identifying and rigorously supporting key industrial sectors during
the import-substituting industrialization process. The Turkish interventions especially
suffered from lacking a coherent strategy as all sectors—the agriculture, the importcompeting sector, the export-oriented sector, the service sector—were tried to be
supported all at once. Rodrik argues that the governments had indeed “good intentions”,
yet a policy supporting agriculture often hurt the industry, or policies supporting importcompeting sectors were detrimental to the performance of exporting enterprises. Thus, to
target all sectors at the same time amounts to targeting none of them (Rodrik 1995).
Malaysian ISI experience was similar to the Turkish case in this sense since selective
industrial strategies began to be implemented only after 1985.

6.4.3 Liberalization and Export-Oriented Industrialization

The third phase, 1985-1997 for Malaysia and 1980-2001 for Turkey, follows the
recessions of the previous period and represents a radical turn towards opening up to the
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world markets and promoting export-orientation at an increasing scale. The Malaysian
government instituted measures to privatize and restructure state enterprises and started
to implement a new set of incentives to attract MNCs. With the Investments Act of 1986,
the requirements for local share-holdings of the NEP were relaxed and more generous
investment incentives for the manufacturing sector were offered. Moreover, the value of
the Malaysian ringgit declined (by 7% against the US dollar and by 20% against SDRs)
and this nominal devaluation was reflected by a real effective exchange rate decline of
about 20% in 1986. In the meantime, most of the East Asian currencies’ value rose
relative to the US dollar, raising comparative production costs. As a result of these
developments, Malaysia began to receive an increased inflow of FDI with rising
importance from the East Asian countries including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Japan. The
growth of FDI flows in this period is also attributed to the lower real wage costs (due to
high unemployment rates over the mid-1980s) and the new labor laws that weakened
workers’ bargaining position and increased labor flexibility (Jomo 2008: 15).
Although similar downward trends in real wages and exchange rates are also
observed in Turkey (due to massive nominal devaluation and anti-labor laws passed after
the 1980’s stabilization program), the response of FDI flows has been quite stagnant.
There has been an increase in the number of investors from 100 in 1980 to 610 in 1986.
However, FDI has predominantly been concentrated in foreign trade financing and
investment banking—areas where foreign investors had a clear advantage over domestic
ones. The banking sector was receiving 4% of foreign investment in 1979, but this figure
rose to 20% in 1986 (Rodrik and Aricanli 1990: 1348). The contribution of FDI flows to
manufacturing activity has been very disappointing, especially considering the
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liberalization efforts (simplification of the approval process, reductions in bureaucratic
impediments, etc.) that took place. It has been often argued that foreign investors doubt
the long-term existence of reforms and the stability of the financial system. Overall
macroeconomic instability appears to be an important concern given the high rates of
inflation, interest, and exchange rate depreciation. Political instability, of course, is
another factor that keeps FDI in real sectors relatively low.
Apart from the differences in the flows of foreign investment, the Turkish case
differs from the Malaysian industrialization in this period by the absence of a more
selective strategy in its industrial policy design. In 1985, the Malaysian government
replaced the NEP with the New Development Policy (NDP), which was much more
similar to the industrial policies adopted by other East Asian NICs. The capabilities and
requirements of the manufacturing activities were systematically analyzed, which formed
the basis of the Industrial Master Plan (IMP) from 1986 to 1995. The emphasis of this
plan was to develop a more selective strategy targeting automated manufacturing,
microelectronics, advanced materials, biotechnology, and information technology (Lall
1995: 767). These targeted sectors were promoted by investments in education, training,
technical support, finance, and quality improvement.

6.4.3.1 Selective Import Protection and the ‘Flying Geese’ effect in Malaysia

Import protection in Malaysia became more selective. While tariff protection was
reduced to an average of 20 percent, infant industry protection was preserved, for
example, in case of light aircraft production in the public sector. It is important to stress
this point because it constitutes a major difference compared to the more comprehensive
elimination of import protection in Turkey. Moreover, a technology plan formed the core
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of IMP, improving the infrastructure of science and technology institutions and inducing
R&D expenditures in private enterprises. The re-organized public enterprises kept their
significant role in industries requiring large investments that have long gestation periods,
such as automotive, petrochemical, iron and steel, and cement. Selective strategies
showed themselves also in the regulation of export-oriented MNCs. MIDA provided
incentives to direct FDI into higher-value added activities and higher-technology
processes, replicating the experience of Singapore. However, unlike Singapore, Malaysia
began to use incentives for increasing local content. Foreign suppliers in FTZs were
denied their full privileges and started to be treated as local firms. Malaysian government
also attempted to direct the investments into labor-intensive activities from Penang into
Johor, by building a ‘growth triangle’ with Singapore and Indonesia (Lall 1995: 767).
These changes in Malaysian industrial policy were accompanied by high growth
rates in exports and national income. However, much of this strong performance is
attributed to the attraction of the MNCs to the new incentive structure and the rising costs
of production in the other East Asian countries (Jomo 2008: 16). Thus, being part of the
“East Asian” area constitutes another structural factor favoring Malaysia. These regional
dynamics reflect the ‘flying geese’ effect: as production costs rise over time in mature
developing countries, companies migrate to lower-cost producers in search for higher
profit rates for the same working capital. Migration of Korean and Taiwanese firms to
Malaysia is a case in point for the flying geese effect. In the meantime, Malaysia
succeeded in ‘maturing’ some of its import-substituting industries as these firms
developed technological and managerial capabilities over time and began to compete in
external markets.
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6.4.3.2 Non-selective Export Promotion in Turkey

In comparison, the reform package in Turkey was mainly designed to put the
economy on an outward-oriented course and promote export industries as the main
engine of growth. This promotion strategy, however, did not take a selective character as
in the Malaysian case. Its basic instruments consisted of a large nominal devaluation (that
led to a sizable real depreciation of 50% from 1979 to 1987) and a generous program of
export subsidies composed of tax rebates, export credits, and foreign currency retention.
While currency depreciation made exporting firms more competitive, the export subsidies
were dispersed across the sectors without much targeting based on the dynamic
comparative advantages. There was only one clearly promoted sector, textiles and
clothing, which has received an increasing number of investment incentives over this
period (Erzan 1995: 94). Thus, while the impact of the export incentives on the apparent
export boom of the early 1980s is obvious, their net contribution to capacity building has
been disappointing. After capital account liberalization in 1989, there were massive
capital inflows in 1989 and 1990 and the Turkish lira appreciated substantially. This
appreciation led to a fall in profit margins of export-oriented firms. Although export
volume did not decline, its high levels are attributed to the export subsidies received. In
other words, without export subsidies in place, it would be very difficult for these firms
to compete at world market prices. What is more disappointing, however, is the fact that
private investment in tradables has been stagnant. Exporting firms relied for the most part
on existing capacity (Rodrik and Aricanli 1990: 1347).
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6.4.3.3 Non-selective Import Protection in Turkey

The Turkish strategy in trade liberalization has also not been selective in its
targeting. The main policy tool in controlling foreign trade—quantitative restrictions (or
non-tariff barriers (NTBs))—was abolished with the new Import Program in 1984. This
program specified which commodities could not be imported, and which commodities
were subject to license. Under the previous system, all commodities that were not listed
in the ‘liberalized lists’ were prohibited. The new Import Program, therefore, constitutes
a shift from the ‘positive list’ to the ‘negative list’ and reduces the role of non-tariff
barriers significantly. However, this amounted to an overall reduction of NTBs without
reserving some degree of protection for the existing infant industries. There was some
adjustment of import tariffs upwards and some special import levies were imposed to
finance extra-budgetary funds. In 1985-6, the highest tariff rates were on capital goods
(20.8%), relatively lower rates were on non-durable consumer goods (8.2%), and the
lowest rates on intermediate goods (7.0%) (Katircioglu 1995: 35). These measures,
however, were far from replacing the protective role of the quantitative restrictions and
the competition in domestic markets became much more intense. Moreover, starting in
1988, these tariff rates declined across all commodity groups as part of Turkey’s tariff
harmonization efforts with the European Union.

6.4.3.4 Capital Account Liberalization in Turkey

Turkey liberalized its capital account in 1989. This became a policy maneuver
paving the way for liquidity injection into the domestic economy in the form of shortterm foreign capital, i.e. flows of “hot money”. These capital inflows served a doublepurpose: to finance the growing public sector expenditures and to cheapen the cost of
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imports by providing cheaper short-term credit. This policy was thus an attempt to offset
the twin structural weaknesses, of trade and fiscal deficits. As a result, the lower cost of
imported intermediates provided another stimulus for growth over the period 1990-1994
(Yeldan 2006: 1999).
Despite the advantages of lower costs, however, private investment in
manufacturing—domestic and foreign—has on the whole been stagnant after the 1980s.
By increasing the instability of the financial sector and raising the interest rates on credit
beyond reasonable levels, capital account liberalization has been partly responsible for
this stagnancy.44 High inflation rates also contributed to dampen investment levels by
creating uncertainty due to the fluctuations in relative price levels. The high rate of real
depreciation coupled with high relative tariffs has increased the cost of capital goods.
Although overall investment incentives increased substantially, the share of
manufacturing sector has declined (from 75% to 6% from 1980 to 1988) at the expense of
the service sector45 (Senses and Taymaz 2003: 4). All these factors induced by the policy
reforms after the 1980s generated major weaknesses in the Turkish manufacturing sector
in terms of a low saving and investment rate, increased short-sightedness, and unable to
stimulate the future growth of the economy. Analysts agree that the success of the export
sector in expanding exports in the early 1980s also owes significantly to the
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The idea behind capital account liberalization was the opposite: to lower the cost of credit by
having access to cheap sources of foreign borrowing. However, the cost of borrowing increased
tremendously with the rise of interest rates due mostly to increased speculative activity related to
arbitrage earnings that attracted inflows of short-term capital.
45

Housing and tourism were the two highly-promoted service sectors experiencing a remarkable
private investment activity.
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“accumulation of industrial capacity in the earlier period” (Rodrik and Aricanli 1990,
Boratav 1988, Senses and Taymaz 2003).

6.4.4 Crisis Management

The fourth phase, 1998-onwards for Malaysia and 2001-onwards for Turkey,
begins with the spread of the East Asian currency crises to Malaysia and with a few years
delay to Turkey. Its distinct characteristic has been the abandonment of the
industrialization strategy due to the exigencies of crisis management. The crisis has been
managed through the implementation of capital controls in Malaysia, while Turkey
resorted to another IMF-led stabilization plan. Despite differences in the forms of crisis
management, both countries seem to prioritize the management of the financial system at
the expense of the manufacturing sector (Jomo 2001, Senses and Taymaz 2003).
Management of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 differed significantly among
the worst affected economies in the region. While Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia
responded by calling in the IMF and embarking on IMF-designed programs to secure
emergency credit flows from the IMF, Malaysia was never in serious need of IMF credit
facilities due to its lower levels of foreign debt and stricter central bank prudential
regulation. Unlike Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia—which committed to float their
exchange rates, raise interest rates, constrain fiscal spending, liberalize their financial
markets opening to foreigners, close troubled banks, and implement other conditions to
secure financial assistance from the IMF, Malaysia took a very different path. The
Malaysian authorities decided to impose comprehensive controls on capital-account
transactions, fix the exchange rate at RM3.80 per US$ (a 10 per cent appreciation),
reduce interest rates, and follow a policy of reflation. These policy changes were
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undertaken during the summer of 1998 as the financial crisis was deepening in Malaysia
compared to other affected countries.
There is some controversy on whether the implementation of capital controls
produced a faster recovery from the economic crisis and a better economic performance
than would have been possible in its absence. Some have shown using econometrics that
the capital controls have “produced faster recovery, smaller declines in employment and
real wages, and more rapid turnaround in the stock market” (Rodrik and Kaplan 2001).
Opponents of capital controls disputed these claims (Dornbush 2000), arguing that South
Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia had positive growth rates beginning in the first quarter of
1999, whereas the Malaysian recovery took off later in the second quarter. There is also
an argument in between these two poles, which suggests that “the nature of the
experiences do not allow strong analytical or policy conclusions to be drawn” (Jomo
2001: 13)—due to strong differences in the pre-crisis regulation schemes and exposure to
foreign borrowing. Malaysia could preserve a strong prudential regulation that was
designed as a response to its late 1980s-crisis, while other countries deregulated their
financial systems much more. This was important for Malaysia’s successful
implementation of transparent capital controls, which would have been harder to
undertake in more financially-liberalized economies of South Korea, Thailand, and
Indonesia. Moreover, the recovery in Malaysia was also accompanied by Keynesian
reflationary efforts and favorable external conditions, most notably the electronics boom.
Hence, it is unreasonable to attribute the successful elements of crisis management
merely to the imposition of capital controls.
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Compared to Malaysia, Turkey’s crisis management resembles to the experiences
of more financially-liberalized economies of South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Turkey was forced to call in the IMF and undertake IMF-designed programs to cope with
its financial crisis in 2000-2001. Unlike Malaysia, its banking regulation system was very
weak and the indebtedness to foreign banks was rather high—which made the
implementation of such capital controls rather difficult, even though several critics have
argued that capital controls are necessary for the management of Turkish financial system
(Akyuz and Boratav 2003)
A greater concern in the long-term is the change in the nature of bank loan
portfolios. The Malaysian banks increased their lending for residential property loans and
raised their limits in purchases of shares. These developments took place at the expense
of loans for productive purposes, especially in manufacturing, but agriculture and mining
as well. Given the declining trend in FDI inflows since 1996, the redirection of bank
loans away from productive sectors would restrain investments in the real sector
substantially (Jomo 2001). Moreover, the emphasis on the official development policy on
attracting high value-added investments and moving up the technological ladder is
suspended after the crisis. Economic policy became all about managing the crisis and
stabilizing the economy, and much less about strategic and long-sighted industrial
policies. Human resource development, in particular, continued to lag behind first-tier
NICs after the Asian financial crisis.
The post-crisis developments in Turkey resembled those in Malaysia with its
neglect of long-term priorities in high productivity, high technology investments.
Monetary policy was tightened and the IMF-designed inflation-targeting programs were
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implemented. While inflation rate was kept at lower figures, the contractionary effects of
tight monetary policy were reflected in very high rates of unemployment, economic
expansion did not create new jobs, and the bargaining power of workers deteriorated
further resulting in declining real wages (Yeldan 2006, Senses and Taymaz 2003). These
trends and their relationship to terms of trade movements will be analyzed in the next
section.

6.5 Export Performance: Turkey, Malaysia, and other NIEs
6.5.1 Growth of Manufactured Exports

This section will consider Turkey’s export performance and structures in
comparison to Malaysia and other newly industrializing economies (NIEs). Table 6.2
indicates the values and growth rates of manufactured exports for 13 leading developing
countries. The largest exporter is China, with 2,140 billion of manufactured exports in
2008, followed by Korea and Mexico with about 330 billion and 208 billion respectively.
The smallest ones are Argentina and Indonesia; Turkey is next with 101 billion. The
fastest growing exporters over the 1980-2008 period are China, Thailand, Mexico each
with over 14 percent annual growth, followed by Turkey and Indonesia (see Table 6.3).
The slowest growing are Hong Kong, Brazil and Argentina. It is important to notice that
the 13 countries listed in Table 6.2 account for nearly 80% of the developing countries’
total manufactured exports in 2005. The analysis of export patterns from developing
countries thus eventually amounts to explaining what drives exports from these few
NIEs.
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The growth rates of Turkey’s manufactured exports were particularly high in the
early 1980s, but they slowed down after mid-1980s. In 1997-98, when world trade
growth fell dramatically as a result of economic crises in NIEs and in Russian Federation,
Turkey’s export performance suffered significantly, its growth declining from 10.5% in
1990-95 to 6.8% in 1995-2000. On the other hand, since the year 2000, Turkey’s
manufactured exports have been accelerating at an annual rate of more than 21 per cent
(Table 6.3). In contrast, Malaysia’s manufactured exports seem to have slowed down
especially in the last few years.

6.5.2 Technological Composition of Manufactured Exports

Table 6.4 shows the technological structure of exports. Turkey has the weakest
structure of the group—having only 3.8 per cent of its manufactured exports in hightechnology products. 45 per cent of Turkey’s manufactured exports are accounted for by
low-technology (LT) products and 3.2 per cent by resource-based (RB) products. The
sum of medium technology (MT) and high-technology (HT) products contribute 51.4%
of its exports. This is a very low figure compared to Malaysia, whose 74 per cent of
exports consist of MT and HT products. Even China, despite its specialization in laborintensive LT exports, has been shifting to produce a much higher share of medium- and
high-technology products, and its proportion of HT products has slightly outweighed that
of LT share in 2008.
The export structure of Turkey is not only technologically weak, but also
relatively stagnant. Over the period 1985-2008, the total share of HT and MT products
has risen by 26.9 percentage points, a tiny rise in the share of HT largely complemented
by the rise in that of MT products (Table 6.4). Although the rise in the share of MT
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products in Turkey has been remarkable since 1995, it pales in comparison to the extent
and speed of structural change in Malaysia and other NIEs. Given the rapid
transformations in the structure of world trade and rising importance of products with
higher technology content, Turkey’s structural stagnation is a major problem that needs
to be addressed. Table 6.5 provides the values and growth rates of each category of
exports for these countries.
Considering the whole period from 1985 to 2008, Table 6.5 shows that Turkey
has its highest growth rates in exports of HT products. However, this high rate is only an
indicator of its small beginning level. In absolute terms, its high-tech exports in 2008 are
a small proportion (3-4%) of those from Singapore, Hong Kong, and Korea, and only
about 1% of China’s. Apart from that, the highest overall growth comes from MT
products, whose growth rate began to exceed LT products especially since the late-1990s.
This provides evidence for a significant structural change towards products with higher
technological content—from LT towards MT products. However, the tiny share of HT
products in total exports and the slowdown in their growth rates since 1995 continues to
pose significant challenges for the dynamic transformation of Turkey’s export structure.
In short, the figures in Table 6.5 suggest a recurring structural problem in Turkey’s
exports, with a dominance of LT and MT products and small evidence of an ability to
shift to more dynamic HT products.
One of the problems with having a high share of low-technology products in
Turkish exports is that most of these products are textiles and garments—whose
international markets are becoming increasingly competitive due to East Asian newcomers. Turkey is considerably a high-wage country compared to countries such as
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China, India, Indonesia, and Philippines. Given this cost-disadvantage, the Turkish textile
industry has been investing in equipment, quality improvements, and design capabilities.
However, Asian textile firms have also upgraded their productive capacity and invested
in such capabilities. It remains to be seen if the Turkish exporters will be able to establish
a reputation of quality and retain their market shares, especially in Europe.
Malaysian HT exports tended to grow at a slower rate during the late 1990s and
early 2000s, particularly due to the Asian currency crisis in 1998. However, despite being
lower compared to the previous period, the growth rate of HT products’ exports was
higher than goods with lower technological content over the period 1995-2008. These
exports also form the major stimulating force in the Malaysian economy that relies
significantly on the performance of export-oriented MNCs. These companies began to
invest in local content, which involves large sunk costs and makes it harder for the
productive activities of MNCs to be “footloose”. To put another way, the local content
investment ties the export-oriented MNCs to the hosting country and encourages them to
upgrade their exports to remain competitive in world markets.
If Turkey desires to mobilize itself to compete in advanced export activities in the
Malaysian fashion, it has to upgrade its domestic activities in more sophisticated
technologies to global levels of efficiency. Such an upgrading requires a significant
degree of technological learning. Although the previous instruments of industrial policy
to promote such learning are no longer applicable under the new global agreements, there
are yet other tools of policy that could be carefully designed to encourage and stimulate
the process of technological learning to compete at world market prices. The next section
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examines these instruments and their relative effectiveness focusing on Turkey and
Malaysia.

6.5.3 Structural Change in Manufacturing Sector, Export Performance, and the
Terms of Trade
6.5.3.1 Impact of the Share of High-Technology Exports on Export Performance
and Economic Growth

The brief theoretical review in Section 6.2 provided us with three testable
propositions: (i) Manufacturing activities with rapid product or process innovation enjoy
faster growth of demand compared to technologically stagnant activities; (ii) Technologyintensive manufacturing activities are less susceptible to entry by rival producers
compared to activities with low technological content; (iii) Structural change involving
higher shares of high-technology manufacturing production allows higher rates of
growth. In order to asses whether the empirical evidence gives support to these
propositions, we use indicators of technological intensity of export structures and plot
them against indicators of international competitiveness and export dynamism. This
provides suggestive evidence in favor of these relationships.
The share of high-technology exports in total exports (Xtechi/Xi) is an indicator
of technological intensity of the specialization pattern. In Figure 6.4 this indicator is
plotted against a measure of international competitiveness—the country’s share in total
world exports—for Turkey and Malaysia between 1962 and 2008. The dark line
represents the path followed by Malaysia and the light one represents that of Turkey. We
expect that a country can capture a larger share of world markets if it increases its
specialization in high-technology manufactures whose markets pose higher barriers to
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entry and grow at a faster rate (the first two propositions). Figure 6.4 shows that there is a
strong positive association between the technological intensity of the export structure and
international competitiveness measured by market shares. The Pearson correlation
coefficient between the two indicators is 0.91 for the two countries, which is highly
significant. It also illustrates that Turkey remained in the lower corner of the technology
intensity-market share space, exhibiting a small share of high-technology exports coupled
with a small rate of participation in world markets. In contrast, while Malaysia started
from a similar position to Turkey in the early 1960s, the technological upgrading of her
export structure allowed her to reach the upper corner of the technology intensity-market
share space in the first decade of twenty-first century.
Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 plot the growth rate of the share of high-technology
exports in total exports against the growth rates of manufactured exports and of export
share in world markets for the leading exporters of manufactured goods (Hong Kong,
Singapore, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Turkey,
and Malaysia) over the period 1962-2008.
Two results emerge from Figure 6.5. First, countries that had higher rates of
technological upgrading experienced higher rates of growth in their total manufactured
exports. The correlation coefficient between high-technology share exports and the value
total manufactured exports is 0.30, and the correlation coefficient between the former and
the log of the latter is 0.60 (Table 6.6). Second, while Turkey has experienced a relatively
high rate of export growth along with a relatively lower rate of technological upgrading,
the opposite is true for Malaysia. Given that higher rates of technological efforts at any
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point in time yield higher rates of expansion in more dynamic sectors, the prospects for
future growth of manufactured exports is brighter for Malaysia compared to Turkey.46
Figure 6.6 shows that countries that raised their high-technology export shares in
1962-2008 also tended to capture a larger share of world export markets than the average
in the same period. Korea, China, Malaysia, and Thailand cover the upper corner with
successful structural transformation and export performance, while Turkey, India, and
Latin American countries occupy the lower corner of Figure 6.6.
Furthermore, it is seen from Figure 6.7 that the countries that remained
competitive in world markets over the period 1962-2008 were also the ones that attained
higher rates of income growth in per capita terms. Turkey performed only slightly better
than Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in terms of increasing the average income level of its
citizens. All Asian countries achieved to raise their average income levels at a faster rate
due to rapid transformation in their export structure towards manufactured commodities
with greater technological content. Malaysia could have performed even better than it did
given the high rate of growth in its high-technology share of manufactured exports.

6.5.3.2 Structural Changes in Manufacturing and the Terms of Trade Trends

Let us now consider how the patterns of structural change in productive sectors
influence the trends in terms of trade for Malaysia and Turkey. As we have mentioned in
the beginning, we expect that the rapid transformation of Malaysian exports into
manufactured goods with higher technological content has generated an upward
movement in relative export prices and a massive expansion in the volume of these high46

The relatively high rate of growth of manufactured exports in Turkey is attributable to the
growth of its low- and middle-technology industries, which have so far been the driving export
sectors.
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tech exports. Figure 6.8 displays the evolution of net barter terms of trade vis-à-vis the
rise in share of high-tech exports in total exports for Malaysia from 1962 to 2007. It is
possible to see a parallel upward movement towards the end of ISI period and the
beginnings of the export-led growth in late 1970s and early 1980s.
The parallel movement is even more apparent in the trends of income terms of
trade and the share of high-tech exports seen from Figure 6.9. This means that rising
relative prices of Malaysian exports accompanied rising volume of exports that resulted
in a steep rise in her income terms of trade, at least in part because of rising shares of
high-technology manufactured goods in its total exports. The Pearson correlation
coefficients for terms of trade indices and high-technology export shares are 0.79 for net
barter and 0.91 for income terms of trade, which are highly significant.
As we described in great detail in the previous sections, Malaysia has been very
successful in attracting multinational corporations in electronics manufacturing from the
US and mature Asian economies during the boom in electronics demand worldwide.
This has played a very significant role in its technological upgrading and future prospects
of economic growth. It has also benefited from the regional structural factors as we
explained under the “flying geese” effect in the previous section. Thus, it was a
combination of internal factors such as a guided technological effort to attract FDI in
high-technology sectors along with favorable external factors such as a good trade and
fiscal position initially and following movement of other Asian firms into Malaysia that
provided a positive cumulative causation mechanism between industrialization and
economic growth.
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Turkey, on the other hand, experienced a downward trend in its net barter terms of
trade for most of the period over 1962-2007 and the share of its high-technology
manufactured exports was significantly low throughout this period (see Figure 6.10). We
expect the specialization in low technology-intensive manufactures to generate a
tendency for the relative export prices to deteriorate over time and a much lower rate of
growth in the volume of exports (that is, a modest rise in income terms of trade). The
very low levels of high-tech export share indicate that the overwhelming majority of
Turkish manufactured exports are low or medium technology-intensive (also shown from
Table 6.4). Due to high levels of competition in these types of manufactures, the relative
prices tend to deteriorate over time (UNCTAD 2005). Since 1994 Customs Union with
European Union, the net barter terms of trade declined 14 percent over 1994-2007. The
collapse in Turkey’s net barter terms of trade in 1970s is primarily due to the rising prices
of oil—which is a net import commodity for Turkey—during the oil price shocks of 1973
and 1979.
Figure 6.11 provides evidence for a positive relationship between Turkey’s
income terms of trade and high-technology export share. However, most of the gains in
export volume since 1980s has been a product of the expansion in low-technology and
(later) middle-technology exports. The relatively low shares of high-technology exports
account for the much lower rate of growth in income terms of trade in Turkey in
comparison to the massive expansion in Malaysian income terms of trade. Table 6.8
displays the Pearson correlation coefficients for NBTT, ITT, and HST for Turkey. While
ITT is strongly positively correlated to HTS, NBTT is negatively correlated to HTS.
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We also expect that higher rates of unemployment in Turkey to create a tendency
for keeping real wages lower, and thus, resulting in lower relative prices of exports of
Turkey. Inversely, we expect that the lower rates of unemployment in Malaysia will tend
to push real wages upwards, which would be reflected in rising net barter terms of trade
for Malaysia. In order to asses whether empirical evidence supports this view, we provide
the evolution of real wages in manufacturing sector, the rate of unemployment, and the
net barter terms of trade for Turkey and Malaysia in Figures 6.12 and 6.13, respectively.
Figure 6.12 shows that the rise in the rate of unemployment47 after 1996
significantly lowered the collective bargaining power of workers and lowered real wages,
which was also reflected in an overall decline in terms of trade since the late-1990s.
Table 6.9 provides the correlation coefficients for these variables. Net barter terms of
trade for Turkey is positively correlated with real wages (0.51) and negatively correlated
with the unemployment rate (-0.40), as we had previously expected.
Figure 6.13 illustrates the trends in manufacturing real wages, unemployment
rates, and the net barter terms of trade (NBTT) for Malaysia. It is seen that during the
steep rise in NBTT in mid-1980s unemployment rate was rapidly declining and real
wages were soaring. Table 6.10 shows that the correlation coefficient of NBTT with
unemployment rate was significantly negative (-0.96) and with real wages significantly
positive (0.72), supporting our observation from Figure 6.13. These correlations are
stronger in case of Malaysia compared to Turkey.

47

The highest rise in unemployment rate took place during the 2001 Currency Crisis and
unemployment rate remained high since the crisis.
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6.6 Instruments of Export Upgrading and Competitiveness

Theorists of technological learning and capabilities have emphasized three sets of
factors that might enhance or undermine the pace of learning in a late-industrializing
country: the incentive framework, the factor markets, and institutions (see, for example,
Lall 1992). Considering the first one, one can argue that Turkey has developed economic
incentives conducive to raising overall productivity. Fostering the manufacturing industry
under a regime of import-substitution relying on state protection, ownership, and
interventions, Turkey has implemented a liberal policy regime since the 1980s. This has
mainly been accomplished through lowering trade barriers, abolishing all NTBs,
systematizing and reducing tariff rates, and entering a free trade agreement with the
European Union since 1994. The Turkish government also restructured its tax incentives
and preferential credit system, reformed the SEEs, and liberalized the FDI regime.
Accompanying these developments was a shift in state investments from sectors of
potential competition with private sectors into complementary sectors of infrastructure
provisions such as transportation and communications (Lall, 2000). Similar changes have
also taken place in the case of Malaysia, but as we have emphasized, in a more carefullyplanned, and strategically-selective fashion.
The liberalization of Turkish policy regime has significantly restrained the
capacity of the developmental state to use industrial policy in support of new activities.
Under the WTO rules and as part of its free trade agreement with the EU, the traditional
instruments of industrial policy—infant industry protection, the use of subsidies to
promote local productive enterprises, local content regulations, and selective acceptance
of FDI—are no longer permitted. Before liberalization, Turkey could implement some of
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these policy tools, but as we have seen, with limited success, partly due to insufficient
degree of selective targeting to encourage domestic enterprises for entering sectors with
complex technologies. Given the new rules of international agreements, however, Turkey
can still make use of other instruments of competitiveness that are commonly applied by
industrial countries and NIEs: upgrading of skills, planning to promote science and
technology, technology support for private enterprises, R&D incentives, and attracting
FDI. This still consists of a large pool of instruments that middle-income countries such
as Turkey and Malaysia can successfully implement.
Let us now consider some of the indicators of the effectiveness of these
instruments as far as they were used in Turkey and Malaysia, and compare their
performance with other NIEs and some industrialized countries. We will follow two sets
of indicators: (i) skill upgrading and R&D expenditures, and (ii) the attraction of FDI
inflows into productive sectors.

6.6.1 Skill Upgrading and R&D Expenditures

The nature of technological change in the twenty-first century brings greater
demands for skills and the skill formation needs to be flexible enough to be responsive to
emerging industrial requirements. To move from one pattern of competitiveness, thus,
requires transforming the formation of new skills and the interaction of this skillgeneration process with the productive system as it uses and contributes to skill
upgrading. In short, to enhance competitiveness in manufacturing sector, skill upgrading
should be continually taking place and encouraged by the governments’ supportive
policies towards education and R&D expenditures.
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Table 6.11 shows the share of the labor force having tertiary education and the
school enrollment percentages on the one hand, and R&D expenditures as a percentage of
GDP, researchers and technicians in R&D per million people on the other. This is the
data for 2007 or most recent year available for the NIEs and some earlier industrializers.
Malaysia’s share of tertiary educated labor force in its total labor force is 20 per cent,
which is about 50 percent larger than Turkey’s share, 13 per cent. These figures are way
below compared to industrialized countries such as Japan and UK, but they are also much
lower than most of the NIEs, such as Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Turkey and
Malaysia’s percentage of tertiary educated labor force is only higher than some of the
Latin American countries, including Brazil and Mexico.
In school enrollment ratios, Turkey has a higher percentage of tertiary enrollments
than Malaysia, but notice that the Malaysian figure is a year older. In gross secondary
enrollment rate, Turkey has also a higher share compared to Malaysia. However, in net
terms, they are equal as seen from the fourth column in Table 6.11. These figures lag
behind Korea, Thailand and Argentina, but better or on a par with Hong Kong, Indonesia,
India, China, Brazil and Mexico. However, they lag much behind all of the selected
industrialized countries. Note here that Korea has the highest tertiary enrollment rate, 95
percent, much above the industrialized world. These enrollment rates in formal education
are a major indicator of skill generation, but they are certainly not the only one. In
particular, they exclude other forms of training, such as within-firm training. The
comparisons of enrollments also neglect the differences in quality and completion rates
between countries. In Turkey, for example, a student appears as enrolled to the secondary
school even when he/she discontinues school after one or two years. The rate of
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completion, therefore, is much lower than the rate of enrollment. The percentage of the
labor force with tertiary education is a better indicator of human capital formation since it
does not suffer from such overestimation problems. Despite its exclusion of other forms
of training, it captures a critical process in skill formation, and it is the only data available
comparable across countries.
Compared to export structures across countries, Turkey appears to have a skill
base that is further advanced relative to the technological complexity of its manufactured
exports. With a lower or equal level skill endowment, countries in Southeast Asia, in
particular Malaysia and Thailand, have been able to develop export bases with higher
technological content by specializing in simple assembly electronics led by MNCs. Seen
from this perspective, Turkey has excess skills for the assembly part of high-tech
manufactures. On the other hand, if Turkey aims to develop capabilities embedded in
domestic enterprises such as Korea and Taiwan, its skill base needs much improvement.
This is also the case in comparison to European countries such as France and Germany,
which have much stronger skill endowments than Turkey. For meaningful integration
with the EU in terms of using its advanced technologies as a full member and not merely
as a supplier of cheap labor, Turkey needs to face the deficiencies in its skill base and
implement carefully-designed measures to overcome them.
The R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP are about 1 per cent in Turkey
and Malaysia, as well as other NIEs, with the exception of Singapore and Korea: the
ratios of R&D spending in GDP for these two countries are at the same levels as the
previously industrialized countries. In the number of researchers in R&D expenditures,
Turkey has a slightly greater figure than Malaysia, but the latter’s figure are two years
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older. Thus, it might be the case that in two years time, Malaysia could have improved in
this indicator. In comparison of the number of technicians in R&D expenditures, the
figures are for the same year of 2004 and Malaysia appears to have a greater number than
Turkey. However, these numbers still lag much behind most of the NIEs, especially
Singapore, Korea, and Hong Kong. Needless to say, they are also much smaller than the
number of researchers and technicians in the industrialized world. Singapore and Korea
appear to be two outstanding countries closest to the performance of the industrialized
countries, followed by Hong Kong. Malaysia and Turkey follow them from a ten-fold
distance.
One of the reasons behind the poor performance in R&D efforts in Turkey is the
absence of a tradition for conducting R&D due to a high reliance on imported
technologies and new products. This passive reliance is reflected in low levels of R&D
spending by the private sector (Boratav 2009). The majority of R&D is financed by the
government and takes place in public universities and institutes. This R&D activity has
little linkages to the industrial sector as there has been very little collaboration between
the private industry and public universities. This is partly due to a mismatch between the
technical needs to the industry and the research conducted at the universities. The
infrastructure for technological activities is unable to satisfy industrial needs, especially
in competitive export sectors. There are a large number of Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs) that comprise the bulk of Turkish industry, but these have few sources of
financing their technological investments and thus tend to lag in technology. In face of
these deficiencies, the Turkish government has been implementing improvements in tax
incentives for industrial R&D, direct procurements to stimulate technological effort, and
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more importantly, to improve linkages between industry and science community. On a
more personal note, during my last visit to Turkey in December 2009, one of my friends
who is a research assistant at mechanical engineering in the Middle East Technical
University shared his experience with an industrial research project conducted for the
private sector. One of the automobile assemblers needed a mechanism to keep the hood
of the car open as they were painting it. My friend was quite surprised that all those
engineers employed by the firm were incapable of designing such a simple mechanism.
All they do, he said, is to talk on the phone and make business arrangements, rather than
solving technical problems. In short, the linkages between the scientists and private
industry are crucial in advancing technological learning and building industrial
capabilities.

6.6.2 FDI Inflows into Fixed Capital Formation

Unlike Malaysia and other Southeastern late-comers, Turkey has not been able to
attract very large FDI inflows in relation to gross domestic fixed capital formation—this
is despite the fact that it has liberalized its FDI regime and provided incentives to
international investors.
During the last few years there has been a rise in FDI inflows as a share of
domestic fixed capital formation. It has reached two-digit levels in 2005 and 2006, 13.8
per cent and 25.3 per cent respectively. However, these inflows have been primarily
through acquisitions in financial services, particularly the domination of foreign investors
in the banking sector. This contrasts starkly with the Malaysian experience where most of
the FDI was invested into export-oriented manufacturing activities. Such inflows of FDI
have not generally materialized in the Turkish manufacturing industry. In order to attract
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export-oriented FDI, especially in high-tech manufactures, a developing country needs to
offer a disciplined, trained, and self-monitoring labor force specialized in modern
technical skills. This should be accompanied by a well-maintained infrastructure,
standardized procedures, reduced business costs, provision of intermediates at world
market prices, priority treatment for MNCs and a stable macroeconomic environment. An
effective FDI promotion strategy is further required to target high-technology investors
and meet their needs. Although Turkey has some of these aspects, it lacks in others. For
instance, uncertainties in its macroeconomic dynamics might hinder MNCs to commit
themselves to outsourcing components from Turkey. Its industrial infrastructure may not
be able to compete with Eastern European countries. Furthermore, the promotion and
targeting of FDI may not suffice to change previous perceptions that Turkey is hostile to
foreign investors, and these perceptions can act as a disincentive to prospective investors.
In short, Turkey could take some lessons in MNC-targeting from Malaysia, whose FDI as
a percentage of its capital formation has been significantly high and its promotion of the
electric MNCs from USA to outsource their assembly activities has succeeded to bear
fruit.

6.7 The Effect of Trade Liberalization on Exports, Imports, and Balance of
Payments

Trade liberalization is often implemented with the purpose of stimulating
economic growth through a more efficient allocation of resources under a more
competitive market system, a growing flow of knowledge and investment across borders,
and eventually a rising rate of capital accumulation and technical improvement. This
traditional view of trade liberalization has several times been refuted by a growing body
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of literature by Chang, Amsden, and others. However, the point is that even under this
supply side view, while the trade liberalization affects exports and imports positively by
increasing their growth, the effect on trade balance and balance of payments remains
uncertain. The latter depends on the relative impact of liberalization on export and import
growth, and on the changes in relative prices of traded goods. If the balance of payments
worsens in the post-liberalization period due to a larger increase in import growth relative
to export growth, economic growth might be constrained from the demand-side. This is
particularly the case when payments deficits are not sustainable by increasing amounts of
capital flows or are not eliminated by changes in relative prices.
Turkey and Malaysia exemplify two countries that have undergone excessive
trade liberalization in 1984 and 1988 respectively. To assess the relative impact of these
liberalizations on export and import growth, we specify standard equations for export
growth and import growth and add to the normal determinants of trade performance (e.g.
domestic income, foreign income, and price competitiveness) a measure of trade
liberalization that interacts with income and price variables.48 We test for the effect and
significance of liberalization using different estimation techniques including OLS with
Newey-West standard errors that are heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation corrected
(HAC), and cointegration techniques of dynamic OLS (DOLS) and fully-modified OLS
(FMOLS) (after testing for unit roots and cointegration). The results from the
cointegration techniques should be treated with caution due to the limited degrees of
freedom.
The export performance of a country depends primarily on competitiveness
(measured as the price of a country’s exports relative to the foreign price of related goods
48

The methodology used in this section follows Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004).
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expressed in a common currency) and the level of world demand (measured by the world
GDP minus the GDP of the own country). This yields the following export function:
ln X t = β 0 + β1 ln Wt + β 2 ln PX t + ut

(6.1)

where lnPX is the logarithm of relative prices; lnW is the logarithm of world income; and
u is a stochastic error term.
The export equation can be modified by introducing the measure of trade
liberalization: a dummy variable (lib) for the year of significant trade liberalization. This
provides an augmented equation of the form:
ln X t = β 0 + β1 ln Wt + β 2 ln PX t + β 3libt + vt

(6.2)

The second modification allows us to see the impact of trade liberalization on the
price and income elasticities of demand for exports, and involves including the
interaction dummies liblnW and liblnPX. These slope dummies capture the joint effects
of the elimination of trade barriers on income and price elasticities respectively:
ln X t = β 0 + β1 ln Wt + β 2 ln PX t + β 3libt + β 4 lib ln W + β 5lib ln PX + vt

(6.3)

Following the same methodology, the import equation can be specified as a
function of domestic income and relative prices:
ln M t = α 0 + α1 ln Yt + α 2 ln PM t + et

(6.4)

where lnPM is the logarithm of relative prices; lnY is the logarithm of world income; and
e is a stochastic error term.
Including the shift dummy for taking account of the trade liberalization, we can
rewrite (6.4):
ln M t = α 0 + α1 ln Yt + α 2 ln PM t + α 3libt + ε t
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(6.5)

Another version of equation (6.5) can be obtained by adding the interaction
dummies:
ln M t = α 0 + α1 ln Yt + α 2 ln PM t + α 3libt + α 4 lib ln Y + α 5lib ln PM + ε t

(6.6)

Let us now consider the regression results for export equations in (6.2) and (6.3),
and for import equations in (6.5) and (6.6). First, we see that the income elasticity for
exports is estimated to be lower than that for imports in case Turkey (Tables 6.13 and
6.14). Pre-liberalization income elasticity for exports is 0.82 with OLS estimates, or 0.80
with fully-modified OLS. Trade liberalization had a significant positive impact on export
growth, increasing exports by 0.82 per cent for one per cent increase in foreign income in
the post-liberalization period.
The cointegration results also show similar increases, with 1.79 per cent using
FMOLS estimates. However, the impact of liberalization on import elasticities was much
more pronounced. The income elasticity of imports rose from 1.04 over 1971-1983 to
2.46 over 1984-2006, with a 1.42 per cent additional increase after the trade restrictions
were liberalized. Cointegration results are also broadly similar; however, the preliberalization income elasticities are insignificant with dynamic OLS estimation. It would
be more valid to draw results from the fully-modified OLS estimates, whose elasticity
estimates are significant for both income variables and their interaction dummy variables.
Second, for the Turkish case, we find that the shift dummies showing the impact
of liberalization on real export/import performance were found to be significant and
negative. This implies that removing trade restrictions had an overall negative impact on
both exports and imports. However, the negative impact was greater for exports relative
to imports in real terms.
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Third, the first and second points together imply that the impact of trade
liberalization was negative on the trade deficit and thus on balance of payments,
exacerbating the effect of the relatively larger import income elasticity in the preliberalization period.49 If the worsening in trade balance is not sustainable through capital
inflows, downward income adjustment is necessary to keep the balance of payments at a
sustainable level. What is worse, the economy becomes dependent on foreign capital
inflows that very highly volatile. Their attraction depends on keeping interest rates high.
However, such high rates of interest lower the return on productive capital and reduced
productive investments. This is exactly what has been taking place in the Turkish
economy since the implementation of the new Import Program in 1984.
Fourth, in case of Malaysia, we see that the export income-elasticity was already
higher than the import one in the pre-1988 period. With the remarkable reductions in
trade barriers in 1988, there was an increase in income elasticities of export and import
demands. Note, however, that the increase in export income-elasticities was significantly
larger than that in import income-elasticities (Tables 6.15 and 6.16). While the increase in
import elasticity ranged from 0.59 to 0.66 per cent, the rise in export elasticity ranged
between 0.94 and 1.19, depending on which estimation technique is used. In short, the
relative impact of trade liberalization on income-elasticity of exports was greater than
that of imports, relaxing the balance-of-payments constraint even further in case of
Malaysia.

49

The negative impact on the trade balance could at least be partially explained by
financial/capital account liberalization, leading to higher interest rates and exchange rate
appreciation, and thus current account deficits.
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In conclusion, the impact of trade liberalization might vary across countries with
different manufacturing experiences. Countries having a more carefully planned and
strategic manufacturing experience, such as Malaysia, might benefit from liberalization
that is conducted in a timely-fashion—allowing infant industries to reach some maturity.
By contrast, countries failing to use strategic industrial policy in a selective manner to
nurture targeted manufacturing sectors, such as Turkey, is likely to be constrained by
balance of payments restraints and high interest rates detrimental to the growth of new
industrial activities.

6.8 Conclusion

Flows of international trade influence the patterns of growth divergence among
countries through differences in the types of goods and services countries produce and in
the potential for export growth in international markets for these goods and services.
Those specializing in innovation-intensive commodities with higher technological
content tend to experience dynamic gains from trade—benefiting from Schumpeterian
rents retained in a rising trend of terms of trade as well as higher rates of growth in their
export volumes and per capita income levels. The East Asian countries that have
achieved to sustain this high-road to industrialization have adopted strategic industrial
policies to develop their infant industries and make them competitive at world market
prices. In other words, diversification into technology-intensive sectors has never been an
automatic outcome of integration into the world economy and specialization along static
comparative advantages. Quite the opposite, all successful latecomers including the
today’s developed countries such as the United States and Germany have made extensive
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use of interventionist policies to counter the adverse effects while taking advantage of the
positive effects of external economic relations.
The historical comparison of manufacturing experiences of Malaysia and Turkey
provides further evidence in support of the careful design and strategic use of industrial
policies. Some of the critical points can be summarized as follows:
(i)

The export-led growth strategy of Malaysia involved a preceding import-

substitution phase along with an active export diversification strategy. Malaysia used a
series of interventions including infant industry protection (even after lowering average
rate of tariffs substantially), export subsidies and targets, performance requirements,
allocation of credit, local content rules, investment in human capital, skill-formation, and
local R&D capabilities, as well as loose protection of intellectual property rights to allow
for reserve engineering. Turkey made use of some of these interventions as well;
however, it eliminated a great part of its protective measures much faster and did not
subject the promoted firms to performance criteria once they received the export
subsidies. Thus, the measures of neither the import protection nor export promotion were
temporary and conditional to the achievement of precise performance criteria in Turkey
to the extent that it was in Malaysia.
(ii)

Previous experiences of developing countries in manufacturing create important

cumulative effects of path-dependency. British colonial experience provided Malaysia
with well-established manufacturing sectors in resource-based exports such as tin, rubber,
and palm oil, and thus a strong tax base for raising government revenues. The semicolonial Ottoman experience, in contrast, resulted in a very weak manufacturing base
with a poor trade performance and a fragile basis for fiscal purposes (not to forget the
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massive debt payments made to the European countries that won the First World War). In
sum, although Turkey was never formally colonized, it inherited a semi-colonial
economy with a “twin weakness” in trade and fiscal conditions much worse than the
colonial Malaysia.
(iii)

Location of Malaysia in the rapidly-growing East Asian region also provided

another exogenous effect that benefited from external economies of the “flying geese”
pattern. These benefits were not available to Turkey which, to a great extent, remained as
a peripheral economy to the central economies of Europe. It never attracted exportoriented FDI from Europe to the extent that Malaysia did from the rest of Asia, although
it benefited from preferential access to the European market for the growth of its textile
industry.
(iv)

The terms of trade dynamics, especially the trends in income terms of trade,

suggest a strong positive correlation between the share of technology-intensive
manufactured exports and the income terms of trade for both Turkey and Malaysia.
However, the rise in income terms of trade has been much more pronounced in case of
Malaysia due to its ability to diversify into high-technology manufactures with growing
global demand. Moreover, the changes in real wages and unemployment rates play an
additional role in determining the net barter terms of trade movements. Significant rises
in real wage indices (or falls in rates of unemployment) tend to create higher export
prices, which lead to rises in net barter terms of trade, ceteris paribus.
(v)

Trade liberalization in Turkey increased the income-elasticity ratio by creating a

stronger positive impact on income elasticity of demand for imports. In contrast,
Malaysian trade liberalization reduced the income-elasticity ratio with a relatively larger
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positive impact on export income-elasticity. The differences in the outcomes of trade
liberalization may be attributed to the timing of the liberalization (earlier in Turkey), the
way of liberalization (more gradual and selective in Malaysia), and the other
complementary policy changes such as the methods of export promotion (conditional to
export performance in Malaysia).
Additional points could be drawn, but these points outline the arguments of
critical importance in making a case for the use of industrial policies to overcome the
balance of payments constrained growth mechanisms and take advantage of upcoming
opportunities for realizing dynamic gains from international trade.
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Figure 6.1 Malaysia-Turkey, Terms of Trade Trends, 1960 2007.
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Source: World Bank WDI 2009 online database, IFS Supplement of Trade Statistics, Author’s
calculations.
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Figure 6.2 Turkey-Malaysia, GDP per capita, 1960-2008, in constant 2000 US$.
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Figure 6.3 Composition of Exports in Turkey and Malaysia, 1962-2006

Figure 6.3a. Composition of Exports in Turkey
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Figure 6.3b. Composition of Exports in Malaysia
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Source: Feenstra et al (2005) and author’s calculations from COMTRADE database.
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Figure 6.4 Structural Change and Export Share Patterns: Malaysia, Turkey (1962-2008)
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Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics provides data for export shares of individual
countries in world trade. Specialization index is calculated from the technological composition
of exports provided by Feenstra et al (2005) and author’s extensions based on COMTRADE
database.
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Manufactured export value, growth rate (1962-2008)

Figure 6.5 Structural change in the manufacturing sector and its growth performance
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Feenstra et al. (2005) and COMTRADE data. The
growth rates are annual growth rates in percent.
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Export share in world markets, growth rate (1962-2008)

Figure 6.6 Structural change in the manufacturing sector and its competitiveness

10

8

Kor

Y=0.46+0.44*X
R2=0.31

6

4

Chi

Hong
Sing

Mex

Thai

Tur
Mal

2

Indo

Bra

0

India

Arg

-2
-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

High-tech export share, growth rate (1962-2008)

Source: Author’s calculations based on Feenstra et al. (2005) and COMTRADE data, and
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics for export shares in world markets.
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Figure 6.7 Structural change in manufacturing and per capita income growth

GDP per capita growth rate (1970-2004)
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Feenstra et al. (2005) and COMTRADE data, and
World Development Indicators for GDP per capita growth rate (annual percent growth rate
averaged over time).
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Figure 6.8 Net Barter Terms of Trade and High-Technology Export Share in Malaysia
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Source: World Bank WDI 2009, IFS Supplement of Trade Statistics, COMTRADE.
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Figure 6.9 Income Terms of Trade and High-Technology Export Share in Malaysia
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Source: World Bank WDI 2009, IFS Supplement of Trade Statistics, COMTRADE.
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Figure 6.10 Net Barter Terms of Trade and High-Technology Export Share in Turkey
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Source: World Bank WDI 2009, IFS Supplement of Trade Statistics, COMTRADE.
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Figure 6.11 Income Terms of Trade and High-Technology Export Share in Turkey
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Source: World Bank WDI 2009, IFS Supplement of Trade Statistics, COMTRADE.
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Figure 6.12 Real Wages, Unemployment, and Terms of Trade in Turkey
280

12

240

11

200

10

160

9

120

8

80

7

40

6

0
1960

5
1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Real Wages in Manufacturing, Turkey (left scale)
Net Barter Terms of Trade, Turkey (left scale)
Unemployment Rate in Turkey (right scale)

Source: Real wage index is calculated from Boratav (1988), Yeldan (2006) and State Planning
Organization online database. Unemployment rate is provided from IFS. NBTT is calculated
from IFS Supplement on Trade Statistics and WDI.

222

Figure 6.13 Real Wages, Unemployment, and Terms of Trade in Malaysia
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Table 6.1 Macroeconomic performances of Turkey and Malaysia in comparative perspective
1960-1970

1971-1980

1981-1997

1998-2008
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Turkey

Malaysia

Turkey

Malaysia

Turkey

Malaysia

Turkey

Malaysia

1. Income Growth and Per Capita Income
GDP Growth (%)
Real GDP per capita (US$)
Real GDP per capita (PPP constant 2005 international $)

3.6a
2063
n.a.

6.5
977
n.a.

4.1
2424
n.a.

7.9
2276
n.a.

5.0
3165
7407

7.4
2711
6908

4.0
4359
10202

4.4
4345
11075

2. FDI, Export Growth, Composition of Exports
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)

0.3b
3.9c
n.a.

2.2b
42.5
5.9

0.1
5.0
n.a.

3.1
45.7
8.1

0.3
15.9
10.7d

4.6
70.1
11.9

1.4
22.7
6.6

3.3
114.2
6.9

3. Import Growth, Composition of Imports
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)
Imports of goods and services (annual % growth)
Manufactures imports (% of merchandise imports)

5.4
n.a.
75.9

37.9
4.2
52.3

9.5
n.a.
66.6

41.7
11.2
63.7

19.2
12.8d
61.0

69.0
12.1
77.9

24.4
8.7
68.1

93.6
6.1
81.0

n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.

-3.3
22.4

0.3
7.8

-1.1
30.6

-4.2
13.4

-2.7
35.8

12.4
5.9

1.0b

2.0b

1.3

3.4

6.0

9.7

8.7

7.3

4. Current Account, Total Debt Service
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and
income)
Total debt service (% of GNI)

5. Real Wages Growth Rate
Private manufacturing
5.6
2.3
3.3
1.6
Public manufacturing
5.9
3.6
5.4
6.9
6.0
6. Unemployment Rate
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
7.6
4.7
8.9
3.4
7. Inflation Rate, Terms of Trade
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)
4.0
0.9
33.6
6.0
60.3
3.4
34.5
2.7
Net barter terms of trade (2000 = 100)
71.4f
107.9
93.0
99.3
101.3
n.a.
n.a.
109.1f
Source: World Development Indicators 2009 online database. Notes: Figures are simple averages over the periods. a 1960-68 data missing; b 1970’s
figure; c 1960-1967 data missing; d Pre-1987 data missing; e Pre-1989 data missing; f 1980’s figure.

Table 6.2 Values of Manufactured Exports by Leading Developing Countries (mil. US$)
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1970
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
Country
1962
Turkey
46
104
987
4,340
10,044
17,455
24,644
Malaysia
312
760
7,593
9,531
24,632
73,150
104,223
Hong
632
2,109
14,744
17,493
44,154
49,542
54,732
Kong
Singapore
152
304
7,113
10,622
32,714
75,153
87,506
Korea
20
646
15,193
24,713
59,825
112,821
165,485
Taiwan
n.a.
n.a.
18,214
28,295
62,211
103,987
115,896
Indonesia
137
361
3,858
3,069
11,725
31,519
47,650
Thailand
127
146
2,563
3,649
17,249
45,380
63,788
China
272
878
8,920
25,844
73,722
213,684
379,672
India
822
1,450
4,842
6,601
16,653
27,270
33,854
Argentina
215
533
2,996
2,985
6,175
10,919
11,131
Brazil
362
1,084
13,271
17,321
25,758
36,578
44,382
Mexico
226
712
5,021
9,848
25,920
62,101
135,565
Total
3,323
9,087
105,315
164,311
410,782
859,559
1,152,632
All LDCs
9,022
22,190
156,788
206,593
470,546
988,546
1,514,270
Total %
36.8%
41.0%
67.2%
79.5%
87.3%
87.0%
76.1%
LDCs
Source: Feenstra and others (2005)
Notes: a Calculated from UN Comtrade data and adjusted to Feenstra and others (2005)
b
2007 and 2008 data for India includes Sikkim whereas the rest of the years excludes this region.

2005
65,970
136,566
80,275

2007a
86,003
160,639
89,183

2008a
101,812
134,294
93,267

131,385
274,739
133,075
55,018
101,144
983,318
70,319
15,791
87, 692
164,301
2,407,490
3,081,775
78.1%

155,697
329,650
140,013
64,605
121,253
1,834,942
92,134b
22,677
105,945
200,405
3,056,729
n.a.
n.a.

164,358
n.a.
140,393
72,147
131,313
2,140,775
113,589b
27,679
111,343
208,818
2,608,422
n.a
n.a.

Table 6.3 Growth Rates of Manufactured Exports by Leading Developing Countries
(Percent per annum)
Country

196270

197080

198085

198590

199095

19952000

20002005

20052008

196280

19802008

Turkey
8.6
21.8 23.2 18.0 10.5
6.8
21.3 25.7 20.4
13.9
Malaysia
10.7 24.0
6.0
20.7 21.6
5.5
7.1
-0.9
18.0
12.6
Hong
14.7 19.5
3.9
19.7
0.2
1.4
8.6
4.7
17.5
6.2
Kong
Singapore 10.0 29.7 10.0 24.2 16.7
1.3
10.2
6.8
24.2
11.6
Korea
40.8 32.6
9.1
18.8 11.9
6.7
12.3
9.1
36.4
11.4
Indonesia 11.5 22.7 -0.2
29.1 19.6
7.3
3.2
8.9
20.9
13.5
Thailand
0.7
28.1
6.9
31.8 18.7
5.6
10.5
8.1
18.4
15.1
China
13.4 20.5 17.0 21.5 20.8 10.6 20.9 16.8 16.8
18.8
India
6.0
14.0
7.4
20.7 10.5
4.1
15.8 15.5 10.9
11.2
Argentina 9.4
18.4 -2.4
17.0 10.9
0.7
5.9
18.6 15.8
8.4
Brazil
12.9 23.7
5.2
10.5
7.3
3.1
14.4
8.0
21.0
7.2
Mexico
13.2 19.7 14.4 20.1 17.2 14.9
3.7
7.6
18.2
14.4
Total
11.8 22.6
8.6
20.1 15.0
7.5
16.0 11.9 18.8
13.5
All LDCs 10.4 19.6
5.7
17.6 14.6
7.6
15.5 15.6 15.8
12.5
Source: Author’s calculations based on Feenstra and others (2005)
Notes: Data for 2007 and 2008 are calculated from UN Comtrade data. 2007 and 2008
data for India includes Sikkim whereas the rest of the years exclude this region.

Table 6.4 Structure of Manufactured Exports by Leading Developing Countries (%)

RB

1985
LT MT HT

RB

1995
LT MT HT

Turkey
18.4 57.1 23.0 1.5 16.9 58.1 21.5 3.5
Malaysia
52.5 8.4 11.7 27.4 18.4 11.9 21.1 48.6
Hong Kong 4.1 62.3 19.1 14.5 5.8 44.6 19.4 30.2
Singapore
14.7 13.3 31.1 40.9 7.7 7.0 21.1 64.2
Korea
6.8 49.0 30.0 14.3 6.7 22.0 36.0 35.2
Indonesia
68.9 18.1 7.7 5.2 38.6 37.3 16.4 7.7
Thailand
37.8 36.3 13.2 12.6 17.2 28.1 17.7 37.0
China
14.3 44.3 33.0 8.5 7.6 57.1 19.7 15.7
India
33.7 50.0 11.8 4.5 31.8 49.2 14.1 4.9
Argentina
56.9 18.6 18.6 5.9 46.0 22.0 28.3 3.7
Brazil
43.6 21.2 30.4 4.8 43.6 18.2 33.9 4.3
Mexico
14.2 14.2 46.8 24.8 7.9 17.4 50.7 24.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on Feenstra and others (2005)
Notes: Korea’s export structure for 2008 is based on 2007 figures.

RB

2008
LT MT HT

3.2
9.8
0.4
2.5
1.1
31.7
5.7
0.6
35.8
35.2
32.4
0.6

45.4
16.1
28.0
6.6
11.4
28.2
19.7
37.0
31.4
11.4
12.7
18.1

47.6
23.0
17.5
26.6
45.8
28.3
39.1
25.2
23.4
48.3
44.1
48.8

3.8
51.1
54.1
64.3
41.7
11.8
35.5
37.2
9.4
5.1
10.8
32.5

Table 6.5 Exports of Leading Developing Countries by Technological Categories
Values
($ million)
1985
1995
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Growth Rates
Values
Growth Rates
(% p.a.)
($ million)
(% p.a.)
2008
1985199519851985
1995
2008
19851995- 19851995
2008
2008
1995
2008 2008
Resource Based
Medium Technology
Turkey
797
2,955
3,237
12.7
4.3
8.7
1,000
3,747
48,426
12.0
20.7
16.3
Malaysia
5,005
13,443
13,152
10.0
1.1
3.4
1,113
15,440
30,880
28.0
6.4
12.9
Hong Kong
723
2,888
372
13.8
-8.4
1.6
3,339
9,597
16,329
9.1
5.0
3.3
Singapore
1,560
5,757
4,095
12.8
-0.3
5.3
3,302
15,873
43,741
15.9
8.6
9.2
Korea
1,672
7,532
3,642
12.8
3.1
8.5
7,410
40,669
151,106
15.1
10.9
12.1
Indonesia
2,115
12,164
22,887
16.7
4.2
8.4
236
5,185
20,424
32.2
9.6
17.1
Thailand
1,381
7,811
7,429
16.0
2.2
7.9
483
8,024
51,359
28.7
14.6
18.4
China
3,685
16,196
13,458
13.8
5.3
10.6
8,520
42,100
539,267
18.5
20.7
18.8
India
2,224
8,675
40,705
12.3
16.7
12.7
777
3,840
26,607
16.7
15.8
14.4
Argentina
1,699
5,026
9,736
10.5
3.8
6.6
555
3,085
13,359
16.2
8.3
12.0
Brazil
7,550
15,932
36,072
7.1
8.1
7.2
5,270
12,392
49,113
8.1
10.9
7.9
Mexico
1,403
4,878
1,243
9.7
-0.9
6.1
4,606
31,476
101,955
18.0
8.4
13.1
Low Technology
High Technology
Turkey
2,478
10,149
46,235
13.0
11.5
11.2
66
603
3,913
22.9
14.3
17.3
Malaysia
801
8,736
21,623
24.0
6.6
11.9
2,612
35,530
68,639
26.6
6.8
16.0
Hong Kong
10,893
22,099
26,113
6.0
1.4
1.9
2,538
14,959
50,454
16.1
10.4
10.8
Singapore
1,415
5,282
10,767
12.7
5.8
6.3
4,345
48,240
105,755
23.0
6.4
12.4
Korea
12,104
24,869
37,452
5.3
3.1
2.7
3,527
39,751
137,450
20.5
11.5
15.3
Indonesia
556
11,758
20,312
32.0
3.1
12.8
161
2,413
8,524
33.3
7.8
22.3
Thailand
1,323
12,748
25,911
21.7
6.0
9.7
461
16,797
46,614
34.7
7.7
17.9
China
11,449
121,931
791,269
23.6
14.8
16.1
2,190
33,457
796,781
30.9
26.2
27.8
India
3,302
13,417
35,625
13.6
8.1
9.3
297
1,338
10,653
11.5
15.1
14.0
Argentina
554
2,403
3,162
10.8
2.3
5.8
177
405
1,421
9.7
6.0
7.8
Brazil
3,675
6,672
14,098
7.0
6.9
4.9
826
1,581
12,060
5.0
14.4
12.0
Mexico
1,396
10,819
37,799
18.0
8.3
14.9
2443
14,929
67,819
17.0
10.1
14.9
Source: Author’s calculations based on Feenstra and others (2005). Notes: Korea’s export structure for 2008 is based on 2007 figures.

Table 6.6 Correlations between high-tech export share (HTS), manufactured exports
(MX), log of manufactured exports (LMX) and export share in world trade (WT)
(based on panel data for leading exporters of manufactures from 1962 to 2008)

HTS
MX
LMX
WT

HTS
1.00
0.30
0.60
0.52

MX

LMX

WT

1.00
0.45
0.81

1.00
0.65

1.00

Source: Author’s calculations based on Feenstra et al. (2005) and
COMTRADE data, and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics for WT.

Table 6.7 Correlations between net barter terms of trade (NBTT), income terms of
trade (ITT), and shares of high-technology exports (HTS) in Malaysia

HTS
ITT
NBTT

HTS
1.00
0.91
0.79

ITT
0.91
1.00
0.72

NBTT
0.79
0.72
1.00

Source: World Bank WDI 2009, IFS Supplement of Trade Statistics,
COMTRADE.

Table 6.8 Correlations between net barter terms of trade (NBTT), income terms of
trade (ITT), and shares of high-technology exports (HTS) in Turkey

HTS
ITT
NBTT

HTS
1.00
0.80
-0.53

ITT
0.80
1.00
-0.58

NBTT
-0.53
-0.58
1.00

Source: World Bank WDI 2009, IFS Supplement of Trade Statistics,
COMTRADE.

Table 6.9 Correlations between real wages in manufacturing (RW), net barter terms of
trade (NBTT), and unemployment rate (UN) in Turkey

RW
NBTT
UN

RW
1.00
0.51
-0.40

NBTT
0.51
1.00
-0.60

UN
-0.40
-0.60
1.00

Source: Real wage index is calculated from Boratav (1985), Yeldan
(2006) and State Planning Organization online database. Unemployment
rate is provided from IFS. NBTT is calculated from IFS Supplement on
Trade Statistics and WDI.
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Table 6.10 Correlations between real wages in manufacturing (RW), net barter terms
of trade (NBTT), and unemployment rate (UN) in Turkey

RW
NBTT
UN

RW
1.00
0.72
-0.85

NBTT
0.72
1.00
-0.96

UN
-0.85
-0.96
1.00

Source: Real wage index is taken from ILO labor statistics database and
adjusted to fit the left scale. Unemployment rate is provided from IFS.
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Table 6.11 Tertiary- Secondary Education, R&D Expenditure (2007 or most recent year)
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Tertiary
School
School
School
R&D
Educated
Enrollment,
Enrollment,
Enrollment,
Expenditure
(% of Labor
Tertiary
Secondary
Secondary
(% of GDP)
Country
Force)
(% gross)
(% gross)
(% net)
Turkey
13
36
80
69
1a
a
b
b
Malaysia
20
30
69
69
1c
Hong Kong
26
34
86
79
1c
Singapore
24
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2a
Korea
35
95
98
97
3a
Thailand
n.a.
50
83
76
0d
Indonesia
6
17
73
68
n.a.
India
n.a.
12a
55a
n.a.
1c
China
n.a.
23
77
n.a.
1a
a
a
a
a
Argentina
30
67
84
78
0a
a
Brazil
9
30
100
77
1b
Mexico
17
27
89
72
1b
Selected Industrialized Countries
Japan
40
58
101
98
3a
France
29
56
113
98
2a
Germany
24
n.a.
100
n.a.
3a
UK
32
59
97
91
2a
USA
61
82
94
88
3a
Source: World Bank WDI 2009. Figures refer to the year 2007 unless otherwise is indicated.
Notes: a 2006’s figures, b 2005’s figures, c 2004’s figures, d 2003’s figures, e 2001’s figures

Researchers in
R&D
(per million
people)
577a
503c
2090c
5713a
4162a
116e
n.a.
n.a.
926a
895
46c
432c

Technicians in
R&D
(per million
people)
46c
63c
416c
476c
583a
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
..
366a
394c
219c

5546a
3300c
3386a
3033a
4770c

572c
1739c
1063c
n.a.
n.a.

Table 6.12 Inward FDI as Percentage of Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation
2003

2004

2005

2006

4.7
10.8
40.6

5.4
19.1
95.0

13.8
15.2
90.4

25.3
20.1
103.9

15.8
26.2
28.9
59.7
52.2
3.0
0.8
1.8
3.2
2.4
10.7
1.6
3.9
-0.1
-1.3
2.3
3.3
7.5
15.2
15.2
n.a.
1.6
11.1
8.6
8.3
n.a.
0.2
1.6
4.1
3.0
1.3
3.4
14.4
13.8
8.4
4.3
3.1
7.8
16.7
11.3
2.9
6.8
11.9
15.2
12.7
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics online database.

77.5
4.5
3.4
14.0
7.7
3.2
15.6
15.3
16.7

57.6
3.1
13.5
17.5
7.7
2.9
12.7
9.5
13.3

79.5
1.9
6.4
16.5
6.1
6.3
13.6
10.5
11.7

Turkey
Malaysia
Hong
Kong
Singapore
Korea
Indonesia
Thailand
China
India
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico

197079
0.9
13.9
9.6

198089
0.9
10.3
18.7

199099
1.9
18.5
21.9

200006
9.7
14.1
78.7
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Table 6.13 Export Growth in Turkey, 1971-2006

OLS with HAC s.e.
Eq. (6.3)
Eq. (6.2)

Dependent variable: log of real exports (lnX) in Turkey
DOLS (-1, 1)
FMOLS
Eq. (6.3)
Eq. (6.2)
Eq. (6.3)
Eq. (6.2)
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Explanatory Variables:
Log of world income (lnW)
0.82**
1.62**
0.48
1.63**
0.80**
1.59**
Log of relative prices (lnPX)
-1.84**
-0.06
-2.39**
-0.12
-1.92**
0.17
Shift dummy (lib)
-59.25**
0.33
-82.23**
0.31
-69.21**
0.37§
Interaction dummy (liblnW)
0.82**
1.15**
0.99**
Interaction dummy (liblnPX)
1.97**
2.58**
1.79**
Constant
-23.93*
-81.50**
-0.66
-81.41**
-22.78
-80.71**
Diagnostic statistics
R2
0.99
0.98
0.99
0.98
0.98
0.97
Omit liblnY liblnPM
11.07
Serial Correlation
36
36
33
33
35
35
Number of obs.
-4.23*
-3.45
-4.23*
-3.45
Engle-Granger tau-stat
-23.84*
-23.28*
-23.84*
-23.28*
Engle-Granger z-stat.
-4.23*
-2.90
-4.23*
-2.90
Phillips-Quliaris tau
-23.74*
-13.61
-23.74*
-13.61
Notes:
** indicates significance at the 1% level; * significance at 5% level, and § at the 10% level.
In DOLS estimations, lib, liblnW, and liblnPX are estimated as deterministic regressors
Unit root tests failed to reject the presence of a unit root for explanatory variables.
Data sources are the same as in Appendix B, except for the relative price variables which are obtained from real exchange rates
reported by Bahmani-Oskooee and Mirzai (2000).

Table 6.14 Import Growth in Turkey, 1971-2006

OLS with HAC s.e.
Eq. (6.6)
Eq. 6.6)’
Eq. (6.5)

Dependent variable: log of real imports in Turkey
DOLS (-1, 1)
FMOLS
Eq. (6.6)
Eq. (6.5)
Eq. (6.6)
Eq. (6.5)
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Explanatory Variables:
Log of domestic income
1.04**
0.37
2.24**
0.51
2.09**
1.12**
1.93**
(lnY)
Log of relative prices
-0.70
-0.30
-0.37*
-0.31
-0.65
-0.61*
-0.80*
(lnPM)
Shift dummy (lib)
-33.39**
-51.83**
0.06*
-53.57**
0.09
-36.48**
0.25
Interaction dummy (liblnY)
1.42**
2.02**
2.02**
1.34**
Interaction dummy
-0.59
0.69
8.80
10.90
(liblnPM)
AR(1)
0.51**
0.82
Constant
-11.91
7.19
-40.79**
3.43
-38.41**
-13.46
-34.98**
Diagnostic statistics:
R2
0.99
0.99
0.97
0.99
0.98
0.98
0.97
Omit liblnY liblnPM
15.10**
3.32*
Serial Correlation
[0.004]
[0.16]
[0.73]
Number of obs.
36
36
36
33
33
35
35
Engle-Granger tau-stat
-3.92§
-2.18
-3.92*
-2.18
Engle-Granger z-stat.
-35.06**
-8.68
-35.06**
-8.68
Phillips-Quliaris tau
-3.55
-2.32
-3.55
-2.32
Phillips-Quliaris z
-19.43§
-9.95
-19.43§
-9.95
Notes:
** indicates significance at the 1% level; * significance at 5% level, and § at the 10% level.
In DOLS estimations, lib, liblnW, and liblnPX are estimated as deterministic regressors
Unit root tests failed to reject the presence of a unit root for explanatory variables.
Data sources are the same as in Appendix B, except for the relative price variables which are obtained from real exchange rates
reported by Bahmani-Oskooee and Mirzai (2000).

Table 6.15 Export Growth in Malaysia, 1971-2006

OLS with HAC s.e.
Eq. (6.3)
Eq.(6.3)’
Eq. (6.2)

Dependent variable: log of real exports in Malaysia
DOLS (-1, 1)
FMOLS
Eq. (6.3)
Eq. (2)
Eq. (6.3)
Eq. (6.2)
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Explanatory Variables:
Log of world income (lnW)
1.13**
1.56**
1.89**
1.18**
1.46**
1.12**
1.41**
Log of relative prices (lnPX) -0.02
0.03
0.09
0.26
-1.14§
0.04
-0.74§
Shift dummy (lib)
-67.71**
-26.33
-0.02
-77.46**
0.002
-60.80**
0.19
Interaction dummy (liblnW) 1.04**
0.42
1.19**
0.94**
Interaction dummy (liblnPX) 0.84
0.13
0.97
0.62
AR(1)
0.70**
0.78**
Constant
-50.35**
-76.78**
-97.33**
-54.79**
-65.00**
-50.31**
-63.94**
Diagnostic statistics
R2
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.99
0.98
Omit liblnY liblnPM
18.71**
0.23
Serial Correlation
[0.05]
[0.62]
[0.66]
Number of obs.
36
36
36
33
33
35
35
Engle-Granger tau-stat
-3.40
-2.64
-3.40
-2.64
Engle-Granger z-stat.
-19.26§
-10.46
-19.26§
-10.46
Phillips-Quliaris tau
-3.36
-2.69
-3.36
-2.69
Phillips-Quliaris z
-18.70§
-11.05
-18.70§
-11.05
Notes:
** indicates significance at the 1% level; * significance at 5% level, and § at the 10% level.
In DOLS estimations, lib, liblnW, and liblnPX are estimated as deterministic regressors
Unit root tests failed to reject the presence of a unit root for explanatory variables.
Data sources are the same as in Appendix B, except for the relative price variables which are obtained from real exchange rates
reported by Bahmani-Oskooee and Mirzai (2000).

Table 6.16 Import Growth in Malaysia, 1971-2006

OLS with HAC s.e
Eq. (6.6)
Eq. (6.5)

Dependent variable: log of real imports in Malaysia
DOLS (-1, 1)
FMOLS
Eq. (6.6)
Eq. (6.5)
Eq. (6.6)
Eq. (6.5)
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Explanatory Variables:
Log of domestic income (lnY)
1.10**
1.60**
1.13**
1.40**
1.11**
1.36**
Log of relative prices (lnPM)
-1.00**
-0.41§
-1.17**
-0.06
-1.02**
-0.15
Shift dummy (lib)
-12.77**
0.09
-15.04**
0.16
-12.33**
0.25**
Interaction dummy (liblnY)
0.59**
0.66**
0.58**
Interaction dummy (liblnPM)
0.28
0.13
0.31
AR(1)
0.72**
Constant
-12.81**
-21.85**
-14.45**
-15.30**
-13.17**
-14.92**
Diagnostic statistics
R2
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.97
Omit liblnY liblnPM
26.04**
Serial Correlation
[0.20]
[0.73]
Number of obs.
36
36
33
33
35
35
Engle-Granger tau-stat
-5.61**
-2.88
-5.61**
-2.88
Engle-Granger z-stat.
-33.98**
-12.48
-33.98**
-12.48
Phillips-Quliaris tau
-5.65**
-2.87
-5.65**
-2.87
Phillips-Quliaris z
-28.81**
-12.32
-28.81**
-12.32
Notes:
** indicates significance at the 1% level; * significance at 5% level, and § at the 10% level.
In DOLS estimations, lib, liblnW, and liblnPX are estimated as deterministic regressors
Unit root tests failed to reject the presence of a unit root for explanatory variables.
Data sources are the same as in Appendix B, except for the relative price variables which are obtained from real exchange rates
reported by Bahmani-Oskooee and Mirzai (2000).

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION AND WIDENING NORTHSOUTH AND INTRA-SOUTH GROWTH DIVERGENCE
7.1 Eradication of Pro-industrialization Measures?

Several points deserve attention about the industrial policy structures in this
globalized era. First, it is often overlooked that the implementation of industrial policies
has been highly asymmetric between the developed and developing worlds. On the one
hand in the developed world, governments have sought to protect their infant industries
through high levels of tariffs and production related subsidies until the present.50 On the
other hand the Bretton Woods organizations (the IMF, World Bank, and WTO) have
been extremely strict in making third world governments abandon their tariffs and export
subsidies that distort relative prices for protecting domestic industrial producers. This
unfair competition that the third world manufacturers have to now face with the mature
first world manufacturers and multinationals has led to depressed returns both because of
the deterioration in terms of trade (due to the “export desperation”, slowdown in Northern
growth, and income-elasticity differentials) and only a modest increase in the volume of
output sold in international markets (due to low price elasticity of demand) as I have
shown in the case of the majority of developing countries which are still primary
exporters. On top of this, the massive reduction in import tariffs along with the reduction
in subsidies for industrial production by the Southern governments has led to widespread
“deindustrialization”—a reversal of the previous gains from earlier industrialization
efforts.

50

Even England, the greatest champion of free-trade policies, has taken advantage of protective
measures to nurture its cotton industry (Chang 2008).
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Second, the elimination of trade taxes which comprise a large portion of fiscal
revenues for many developing countries (especially the relatively poor ones) has led to a
shrinking tax base and weakening fiscal balance (Rao 1998b). Thus, instead of curtailing
unproductive rent-seeking behavior51, eliminating tariffs curtailed the fiscal capabilities
of third world governments and made them less effective in designing and implementing
industrial policies.
Third, the initial structural differences and path-dependency matter for subsequent
success in the process of industrialization as I showed in the case study of Turkey and
Malaysia. The latter benefited, to a large extent, not only from a stronger fiscal and trade
structure initially, but also from the geographical proximity and presence of transport and
communications infrastructure among producers in the East Asian regional cluster. In the
absence of these advantageous factors, many developing countries—including Turkey—
face significant challenges in diversifying into technology-intensive manufactured
exports. If the elasticity differentials are reduced through continuous technological
upgrading and productive diversification as empirical evidence for leading exporters of
manufactures suggests, then the difficulties associated with technological diversification
reproduce North-South and intra-South growth divergence, often coupled with adverse
terms of trade movements.
Fourth, the outward-orientation of successful East Asian economies including
Malaysia does not constitute a liberal trade regime simply because they have practiced
well-targeted trade and sectoral policies that consistently promoted the creation of
technological capabilities in these countries. As I have discussed in detail, when Malaysia
gradually lowered its tariffs in late 1980s, it still retained import protection for its infant
51

See Onis (1991) for the emergence of rent-seeking under liberalized trade regime of Turkey.
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industries which were largely subsidized by the state. These pro-industrialization
measures subject to performance criteria were largely responsible for the sustained export
performance following liberalization and its positive impact on income-elasticity for
exports relative to imports, as I have shown in the case of Malaysia.
Fifth, the conventional wisdom in the writings of the advocates of neoliberal
globalization is that developing countries that remain isolated from global market
integration will suffer the consequences because as national economies become more
densely interconnected through trade and investment flows, their growth rates tend to
converge. Greater integration requires specialization along comparative advantages and
abandoning distortions in relative prices; in short, following signals of the global market.
According to the neoliberal paradigm, therefore, any market-distorting policy pursued by
the state should be condemned as creating rent-seeking behavior with no positive
contribution in the productive sphere. Moreover, the multilateral trading regime should
favor regulations under aimed at harmonizing tariffs across countries and reducing tariff
dispersion across products for “leveling the playing field.” The inference that follows
from this logic is that the state should refrain from pursuing production sector policies
and its active role in development policy ought to be eradicated.

7.2 A Case for Production Sector Policies

A case for production sector policies can be made on several grounds, some of
which are listed below. First, despite the intense debate among economists on the
rationale and effectiveness of government intervention in the production sector, it is
acknowledged that all the success cases in the developed and developing world relied on
some sort of production sector strategy to support industrialization and structural
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transformation of their economies. These strategies included a complex set of unorthodox
policies combining infant industry protection, licensing with special economic zones,
subsidies for export-oriented investments, and other subsidized means of credit allocation
to priority sectors—all of which required a strong political will to develop and catch-up
with more advanced countries. Even in a more liberalized economic environment, the
recent success cases in East and Southeast Asia, including China, Korea, and Malaysia,
have continued to use production sector strategies to promote the emergence of new
sectors and methods of production (see chapter 6, Wade 2005).
Second, a case can be made for production sector policies on the grounds of
dynamic gains from trade (Ocampo 2005). According to this view, reliance on global
market forces and static comparative advantages might yield efficiency gains in the shortrun by allocating resources more efficiently. It fails, however, to shift resources from less
to more dynamic sectors whose markets have a greater potential to expand and which are
more innovation-intensive; and thus promote long-run dynamic gains from trade. These
dynamic gains are enhanced through the emergence of linkages among firms and sectors
and the diffusion of innovations throughout the economy. Without production sector
strategies, the economy remains locked in methods of production that use less advanced
technology and cannot diversify into more dynamic activities with increasing returns.
Third, a case can be made for production sector policies on the grounds of taking
advantage of windfall gains from improvements in the terms of trade. From a
development perspective, the use of additional income resulting from improvements in
terms of trade is of crucial importance. For example, if the terms-of-trade gains from
higher export prices accrue in the form of higher profits in the export-oriented sector, and
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if these are reinvested for enhancing productive capabilities, the impact on growth would
be much greater than in a situation where the gains accrue to foreign actors controlling
the export-oriented sector, which are used for profit repatriation. The latter has taken
place several times in history, and the most recent examples include two exporters of
mining products, Chile and Zambia. Since their export activities were controlled by
transnational corporations (TNCs), the gains from rising terms of trade during 2003-2008
were captured by TNCs and led to an increase in factor payments abroad (UNCTAD
2005: 104). Effectively designed and implemented production sector strategies could
ensure the re-investment of the windfall gains from terms of trade changes into more
dynamic sectors. In Malaysia, for instance, multinational corporations (MNCs) were
required to invest in local content for continuing their operations in this country (Lall
1995). An argument to dismantle the production sector policies in the developing world is
therefore to be faulted not only on historical and dynamic advantage grounds but also on
economic sovereignty grounds.

7.3 An Alternative to Neoliberal Policies?

A different set of policies can be advocated as alternatives to the present set of
neoliberal globalization policies based on the analysis of the widening global divergence
and the comparative analysis of two latecomers, Turkey and Malaysia.
i) Improve Multilateral Trading Regime: The new set of regulations in the WTO
agreements does not allow previously-used tools of development policy such as local
content and trade-balancing requirements. They have also increased the costs of
technology transfer due to intellectual property rights protection. I argued above that
these the implementation of these WTO agreements have effectively reduced the policy
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space available to developing countries, and restricted the scope for production sector
strategies. Although there are still more indirect ways of pursuing production sector
strategies (involving public investments in skill formation, R&D expenditures, etc.), the
international policy environment can be reformed to be more conducive in terms of
facilitating dynamic structural changes in developing countries. In particular, infant
industry protection provisions should be changed to eliminate compensation to injured
parties. The latter has been an effective disincentive for developing countries not to
invoke and make use of infant industry provisions (Ocampo and Vos 2008). Thus, if they
were not required to compensate for the injured parties, they could use infant industry
policies more often than they have done so far. In addition, intellectual property rights
regulations should be changed to allow for reverse-engineering and compulsory licensing
in case of developing countries that are engaged in technology transfer. Shifting epicenter
of the global economy towards China52 might be a means of empowerment of the South
through G-20 and other initiatives relative to the North—and might change the ways in
which global lending institutions function.
ii) Diversifying Export Structure: Diversifying into manufactured exports could
potentially lead to higher productivity apart from being a long-term solution to problems
of growth divergence and terms of trade deterioration. Note, however, that the relative
export prices of major exporters of manufactures were also subject to significant
deterioration over the past few decades. Yet this tendency resulted from commodity-like
characteristics of manufactures with low technology content (Kaplinsky 2006). For
example, while China’s terms of trade deteriorated rather sharply, Korea’s and
Malaysia’s terms of trade showed an improvement in the last two decades (UNCTAD
52

See Arrighi (2007) for an account of this shift.
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2005). Moreover, the export volumes of manufacture exporters expanded rapidly,
compensating for the losses from terms of trade deterioration for the group as a whole. As
I have shown in Chapter 4, countries specialized in manufactures also experienced much
higher rates of growth compared to those specialized in primary products. Due to greater
potential for eliminating growth divergence and benefiting from rising dynamic gains
from trade, it is of developing countries’ best interest to use diversify their productive
structures. In the transition period, revenues from primary exports can be used as a
platform from which to move to the production of natural-resource based and lowtechnology manufactured exports.
iii) Selective Targeting in Industrial Policy: Developing countries should not only pursue
to diversify their productive structures towards technology-intensive manufactures, but
this diversification should involve a selection of key industrial sectors with high priority.
This might depend on demand conditions in international goods markets, for example, the
electronics boom in the case of Malaysia. Moreover, the provision of protective measures
and subsidies should be temporary and conditional to the achievement of precise
performance criteria, as it has been the case for Malaysia after 1985. The disappointing
results of industrial policies in Turkey have been related to these factors: non-selective
application of industrial promotion incentives and the absence of monitoring and
disciplining the promoted firms and joint-ventures (see chapter 5).
iv) Implement Land Reform: The “miracle” of East Asian industrialization could not have
happened without the foundation of land reforms that played an effective role in
redistributing land more equitably and eliminating politically-powerful landlords and rich
farmers (as in the example of South Korea, Taiwan, and China). The now-industrialized
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countries also went through a significant transformation of their agrarian structures along
with their industrial transformation. This policy prescription would increase agricultural
productivity that would not only lower food prices but also improve the nutrition of the
population and boost the demand for manufactured goods, contributing to the
development of non-agricultural sectors. It also curtails the political power of landlords,
and thus opens the way for economic policies geared towards promoting industrial
sectors.
v) Promote Regional Integration: One of the central pillars of Prebisch’s thought was the
promotion of regional integration by means of regional trade agreements encouraging
South-South trade and regional financial cooperation encouraging South-South financial
flows (Ocampo 2001). Regional integration in South-South trade provides a source of
trade flows with greater content of technology than those in North-South flows because
the Southern manufactured goods that are not competitive in Northern markets can be
competitive in other Southern markets. Indeed, Turkey experienced this discrepancy in
late 1970s and early 1980s when its exports to Middle Eastern countries were much more
technology-intensive than its exports to the European markets (Senses 1990). This has
also been observed for Latin American countries under MERCOSUR as in 1991
manufactures comprised 81 per cent of intra-regional trade, and 65 per cent of total
external trade (Ocampo 2001: 34). Complementary to the promotion of regional trading
networks, similar attention should be given to the development of regional and
subregional financial institutions. These might take the form of multilateral development
banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank and Caribbean Development Bank,
or multilateral lending institutions such as the Latin American Reserve Bank, the Bank of
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the South, and the Chiang Mai Initiative that make use of accumulated foreign exchange
reserves and swaps between Central Banks to provide immediate emergency lending for
troubled developing countries.53

53

The latter lending institutions were founded based on the principle of mutual support in cases
of financial emergencies that might trigger crises. Chiang Mai Initiative, for example, evolved as
a response to the functioning of the IMF during the Asian financial crisis. See Erten and Rosero
(2010) for a review of the evolution of these alternative institutions of regional financial
integration.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF PREBISCH-SINGER HYPOTHESIS UNDER UNBALANCED
TRADE
TB = E (Y N ; 1 p ) − pM (Y S ; p )

Differentiating with respect to time, we obtain the following identity:
∂ TB
∂E ∂YN
∂E
(− 1 p ) ∂ p − ∂ p M − p ∂ M ∂ Y S − p ∂ M ∂ p
=
+
∂YN ∂t
∂YS ∂t
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∂t
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Dividing by E results in:
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Multiplying (*) by E TB to obtain TˆB :
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E
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pM
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= pˆ
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− 1) + η S

= pˆ

APPENDIX B
DATA DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

•

Log of imports in real terms54 (m):

The logarithm of total value of imports deflated by the index of unit value of imports
(both measured in U.S. dollars). Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics for import
values, and International Financial Statistics (IFS), UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics,
IFS Supplement on Trade Statistics (1988) for import unit values.
•

Log of real domestic income (y):

The logarithm of GDP constant in 2000 US$. Source: World Bank, World
Development Indicators (WDI), 2009.
•

Log of import prices relative to domestic substitutes (pm):

Relative price of imports is measured by the ratio of the unit value of imports divided
by the GDP deflator and adjusted by the exchange rate. Source: International Financial
Statistics (IFS), UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, IFS Supplement on Trade Statistics
(1988) for import unit values, International Financial Statistics (IFS) for GDP deflator
and exchange rates.
•

Log of imports in real terms (x):

The logarithm of total value of exports deflated by the index of unit value of exports
(both measured in U.S. dollars). Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics for export
values, and International Financial Statistics (IFS), UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics,
IFS Supplement on Trade Statistics (1988) for export unit values.

54

The specification in log-log form follows Wu (2005).
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•

Log of real foreign income (z):

The logarithm of world55 GDP constant in 2000 US$. Source: World Bank, World
Development Indicators (WDI), 2009.
•

Log of relative export prices (px):

Relative price of exports is measured by the ratio of the unit value of exports of each
country to the unit value of world’s exports. Source: International Financial Statistics
(IFS), UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, IFS Supplement on Trade Statistics (1988) for
export unit values, International Financial Statistics (IFS) for the unit value of world’s
exports.
Appendix Tables:
Table B.1 Pedroni Cointegration Test for Import Equation: 1960-2006
Common AR coefs.
(within-dimension)
Panel v-Statistic
Panel rho-Statistic
Panel PP-Statistic
Panel ADF-Statistic
Individual AR coefs.
(between-dimension)
Group rho-Statistic
Group PP-Statistic
Group ADF-Statistic

Statistic

Prob.

2.83
-2.85
-3.82
-1.93
Statistic

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
Prob.

-1.47
-5.79
-1.36

0.07
0.00
0.09

Weighted
Statistic
1.90
-3.89
-4.93
-3.27

Prob.
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00

Table B.2 Individual Unit Root Tests for the Variables in Import Equation

Null: Unit root (assumes
common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
Null: Unit root (assumes
individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-st

log(m)
Statistic Prob.**

log(y)
Statistic Prob.**

log(pm)
Statistic Prob.**

1.67

0.95

-6.25

0.00

-6.50

0

6.09

1.00

3.19

1.00

-5.92

0

55

World GDP is used as a proxy for the world GDP minus GDP of the individual developing
country (Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall 2004, Cimoli et al. 2010).
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ADF - Fisher Chi-square
PP - Fisher Chi-square

50.80
46.50

1.00
1.00

95.30
102.28

0.67
0.47

389.12
217.37

0
0

Table B.3 Pedroni Cointegration Test for Export Equation: 1960-2006
Common AR coefs.
(within-dimension)
Panel v-Statistic
Panel rho-Statistic
Panel PP-Statistic
Panel ADF-Statistic
Individual AR coefs.
(between-dimension)
Group rho-Statistic
Group PP-Statistic
Group ADF-Statistic

Statistic

Prob.

1.57
-1.90
-3.23
-3.11
Statistic

0.06
0.03
0.00
0.00
Prob.

0.41
-1.42
-1.33

0.66
0.08
0.09

Weighted
Statistic
1.09
-1.23
-2.49
-2.46

Prob.
0.14
0.11
0.01
0.01

Table B.4 Individual Unit Root Tests for the Variables in Export Equation

Null: Unit root (assumes
common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*

log(rx)
Statistic Prob.
**
1.33
0.91

log(f)
Statistic
Prob.
**
-27.50
0.00

log(rpx)
Statistic
Prob.
**
0.57
0.72

Null: Unit root (assumes
individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-st
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
PP - Fisher Chi-square

6.95
68.19
91.07

-14.86
410.92
893.88

-0.62
123.52
110.69

1.00
1.00
0.77

249

0.00
0.00
0.00

0.27
0.07
0.26

APPENDIX C
ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table C.1 Estimation Results for the Remaining Countries
Yearly moving
average estimation
MA (3)

Dependent
variable

gS

p̂
MA (4)

gS

p̂
MA (5)

gS

p̂

Constant
2.69
(6.38)
0.70
(0.93)
2.30
(6.79)
1.36
(2.38)
2.25
(7.09)
1.63
(3.04)

gN

Adjusted
R2
0.11

τ

0.27
(2.55)
-0.03
(-0.17)
0.36
(4.15)
-0.23
(-1.71)
0.38
(4.65)
-0.28
(-2.20)

8.00
(0.99)

0.75

0.03
0.33

5.12
(0.65)

0.38

-0.02
0.28

6.73
(0.85)

es/en

0.78

0.07

Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. Remaining countries include all non-major exporters of
oil and manufactures goods, that is to say, primarily exporters of primary commodities, classified in
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. The data for terms of trade series and trade balance comes from
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, and the data for growth rates (constant 2000 US$) comes from
WDI 2009. τ represents the change in the trade balance divided by export volume.

Table C.2 Estimation Results for the Major Exporters of Manufactures
Yearly moving
average estimation
MA (3)

Dependent
variable

gS

p̂
MA (4)

gS

p̂
MA (5)

gS

p̂

Constant
4.55
(9.83)
2.98
(3.90)
4.06
(11.19)
3.398
(5.43)
3.91
(11.06)
3.68
(6.02)

gN
.393
(3.44)
-.473
(-2.49)
.532
(5.76)
-.62
(-3.77)
0.57
(6.32)
-0.68
(-4.18)

Adjusted
R2
0.20

τ

10.1
(1.13)

1.74

0.30
0.49

-3.38
(-0.35)

1.12

0.13
0.49

2.48
(0.26)

es/en

1.74

0.30

Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The data sample includes all countries classified as major
exporters of manufactures in UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. The data for terms of trade series
and trade balance comes from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, and the data for growth rates
(constant 2000 US$) comes from WDI 2009. τ represents the change in the trade balance divided by
export volume.
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Table C.3 Estimation Results for Major Exporters of Oil
Yearly moving
average estimation
MA (3)

Dependent
variable

gS

p̂
MA (4)

gS

p̂
MA (5)

gS

p̂

Constant
-0.34
(-0.26)
-6.5
(-2.16)
-2.01
(-1.69)
-6.28
(-2.25)
-2.01
(-1.69)
-6.28
(-2.25)

gN
1.60
(4.92)
2.4
(3.11)
2.06
(6.82)
2.50
(3.32)
2.06
(6.82)
2.50
(3.32)

Adjusted
R2
0.35

τ

-103.46
(-6.88)

1.26

0.53
0.53

-123.95
(-6.95)

1.47

0.52
0.53

-123.95
(-6.95)

es/en

1.06

0.53

Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. The data sample includes all countries classified as major
exporters of petroleum in UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. The data for terms of trade series and
trade balance comes from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, and the data for growth rates (constant
2000 US$) comes from WDI 2009. τ represents the change in the trade balance divided by export
volume.
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